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“I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they 
will not be judged by the colour of their skin but by the content of their character.”  
Martin Luther King, Jr., August 28, 1963 
Since I was a child, my parents instilled in me the idea that no one deserves to 
be poor, and that the opportunities are what makes the difference and that I 
should be very grateful for the situation I was born in. Now, many years later, I 
still have my parents advising from a distance and always reminding me that I 
must be grateful for the life I live and the opportunities that others have probably 
deserved more than me.
Apart from my parents, there is another person who marked me deeply when
I was 13 and began to be aware of the world around me. This friend I speak of is 
called Germán, who was at the time a boy of my age whose family was poor and 
ill-constituted. He passed by my house 2 or 3 times a week to beg, was always 
poorly dressed and wore broken shoes. My family, and in particular my mother, 
taught me to treat Germán with respect and even affection. Amongst other injus-
tices, he had to leave school because he needed to go to work to help his 
younger sisters, who just like him suffered from their condition.
One day, I was in the centre of my city and I suddenly felt unwell; I wanted 
to go home soon but did not have the money to take a taxi. At that very moment, 
Germán showed up with his broken shoes as usual and seeing my situation of-
fered me his help. He gave me the equivalent of about $20 to go home by taxi 
and told me not to worry about it. I promised to return the money the next time 
we met.
Even to this day, the actions of Germán bewilder me, and I am still unable to 
understand how someone with all the shortcomings that he has had throughout 
his life is able to help others with such generosity. Unfortunately, Germán was 
born to a poor family and never managed to finish his studies. He has sadly 
spent some time in prison, and as a result of this he now has difficulty finding 
adequate employment. These circumstances mean that Germán will live in pov-
erty and vulnerability in the same way his children are likely to follow. It's a 
great shame that people, as a result of the misfortune of being born under certain 
conditions are convicted in advance despite how good they may be intrinsically.
The lack of opportunities excludes people, breeds violence and insecurity, 
weakens cultural development and causes unhappiness. Enough evidence al-
ready exists to not see that the fight against inequality as antagonistic to eco-
nomic growth. A developed economy is necessarily a just economy and offers 
equal opportunities. The pursuit of economic and social development should 
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thus be based on the basis of equality of opportunity, a truly democratic and rep-
resentative political system. These ideas stem from my life experience of know-
ing and living in countries where equity is understood as necessary and desir-
able. It also stems from having grown in an unequal country and highly tolerant 
of abuse showing a huge tolerance to the misfortune of people like Germán. 
Strangely, and unintending, my work focuses around the concept that a poor dis-
tribution of opportunities has a negative impact on development. It is thus very 
gratifying to see that the conclusions drawn from my life experience have finally 
found support in the findings of my doctoral dissertation.
During all this time spent writing my dissertation, I often felt that I could not 
progress and felt I was failing. In those moments, I thought many times of Ger-
mán and my parent’s efforts to educate me and support my decision to come to 
Germany. Living in the beautiful city of Goettingen, flooded by young people of 
all nationalities is the perfect climate to develop ideas and learn about life. This 
city, which has hosted more than forty Nobel Prizes, has been the perfect place 
to write my dissertation and this would not have been possible had it not been 
for the support of many people I want to thank.
First I want to thank my parents Marcos Villalobos and Vicky Barría for the 
years of effort and support, my niece Camila Ignacia Villalobos Cisterna (a 
source of inspiration), my brothers Marcos and Rodrigo. Also to all those who, 
like Germán, had a word of encouragement when I felt alone or overwhelmed; 
to my friends of all nationalities; to those with whom I would talk about saving 
the planet. I would like to give my most sincere thanks to Leontina Steflic and
Tessa Träger for their company, friendship and having always been there to help 
and listen.
I would also like to thank all those who are part of the Chair in Development 
Economics and Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research. In particular, I 
want to thank the director of both institutions who was also my professor, guide 
and mentor all this time, Prof. Dr. Stephan Klasen; thank you very much for 
having believed and trusted in me, and for giving me the opportunity to develop 
myself in a career I enjoy more and more. For giving me the freedom to develop 
my research and always being willing to listen and help me in everything I need. 
Thanks also for having facilitated my participation in more than fifteen interna-
tional conferences that have shown me much of the world. Thanks professor, 
without you this would not have been possible.
I also thank the institutions that took care of me during long stays, such as 
the DIW-Berlin and UNU-WIDER in Helsinki. Thanks to all with whom I inter-
acted in these institutions. Thank you for your hospitality and for giving me the 
opportunity to improve my skills as a researcher. I also thank Dr. Thomas Otter,
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for having invited me to collaborate with his research and for giving me friend-
ship and advice.
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Thank you very much for joining me in my quest, for showing me that happi-
ness is not in material things but in cultivating a life in love, friendship and un-
derstanding. I want to thank my mother for instilling in me a love for my 
neighbour and my father for being the man that I aspire to be like.
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In many parts of the world, this century has brought about the most varied forms 
of expressions of discontent; all of which convey a desire for greater degrees of 
social justice, inclusion and equal opportunities. It seems, however, that all these 
ideas are not being properly represented within political systems. It is worth 
mentioning that these demonstrations are taking place in different countries with 
very different characteristics; from the U.S. to the Arab countries and from 
Spain to Chile. However, all these have something in common and that is the 
vision of a just and inclusive society based on the principle of equal opportuni-
ties under democracy. Few protesters claim today what Harry Frankfurt once 
called an “economic egalitarism”.1
As for overcoming poverty, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) re-
flect efforts to institutionalize the fight against poverty in eight goals, 18 targets 
and 48 technical indicators to measure progress towards its achievement. The 
MDGs recognize poverty as a multidimensional condition and whose implica-
tion is that the well-being should not be reduced to a problem of a lack of 
money, its measurement needing to be supplemented by direct indicators, such 
as for example status and access to health and education. Cornia et al. (2008) 
argues that the inclusion of nonmonetary indications amongst the MDGs reveals 
that such indicators measure structural dimensions of the human well-being. In 
spite of many countries having reduced their poverty levels over the past dec-
ades, people also demand greater levels of equity. Regarding the relevance of 
inequality, Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) studied the 23 richest countries in the 
world with populations greater than three million providing adequate data for 
comparison. They conclude that economic inequality is the main determinant of 
all social problems such as reduced life expectancy, mental illness, child mortal-
ity, violence and educational failure amongst other problems. Wider income 
gaps are harmful to the wellbeing of almost everyone in the society, not only the 
Citizens of developed countries demand "fair 
play", where the losses as well as the gains in welfare are distributed in a consis-
tent manner. Meanwhile, citizens of developing countries claim for "an evening 
out" process by which the benefits of economic progress will serve to improve 
the welfare of everyone and thus progress will be achieved towards overcoming 
poverty and inequality.
                                                          
1 Harry Frankfurt (1987) defines economic egalitarianism as “the doctrine that there 
should be no inequalities in the distribution of money”. 
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18 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
poor. The main implication of this is that solving these problems depends on the 
ability to reduce economic inequality.2
In general, it may be argued that the largest portion of those manifesting 
demanding equal opportunity would tolerate inequality as long as opportunity is 
widely available. However, how to achieve equal opportunities is a complex 
matter. Bell (1973) argues that equal opportunities require the elimination of 
birth, nepotism, patronage or any other criterion different than the “fair” compe-
tition open equally to talent and ambition to allocate the position that an individ-
ual holds in the educational system and in the labour market. Under a simplified 
framework, I believe that equal opportunities mean to be properly prepared for a 
social and productive life, having equal opportunities to access good-quality 
jobs and compensations regardless of birth, race, gender, or other characteristics 
that might be considered arbitrary or beyond an individual’s control. In simple 
words, it means to provide a levelled playing field. In each of the essays, the 
problem of inequality is addressed from a different angle; however, the overall 
conclusion of this thesis, which focuses on studying the labour market in coun-
tries such as Paraguay, Honduras and Chile, shows that although certain indi-
viduals have adverse family backgrounds, this has permanent effects on their job 
performance. Adverse family backgrounds are associated with fewer employ-
ment opportunities, precarious employment or underemployment, the inability to 
migrate in search of better job opportunities and greater degrees of vulnerability 
when there are structural economic changes. Unfortunately, poor job perform-
ance of relatively large portions of the population results in low levels of in-
come, poverty and vulnerability that are passed on to the next generation.
Essay 1 analyzes the dynamics of the income inequality change in the highly 
dualistic economy of Honduras between 1991 and 2007. This study was part of 
the UNU-WIDER project ‘The New Policy Model, Inequality and Poverty in 
Latin America: Evidence from the Last Decade and Prospects for the Future’
and it is the base of our contributing chapter to the textbook edited by Prof. An-
drea Cornia "Falling Inequality in Latin America. Policy Changes and Lessons", 
published by the Oxford University Press.
Honduras stands out in Latin America as one of the few examples where 
inequality has not declined in the early 2000s, as in most other Latin American 
countries. Honduras has thus been an outlier where the peak in inequality oc-
curred much later and the decline thereafter is also much more tentative. The 
macro and micro causes of this exceptionalism are the main topic of this paper.
                                                          
2 Sen (1997) points out the importance in going from income inequality to economic ine-
quality which is a much broader concept.
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Honduras is a small open economy relying heavily on a narrow range of ex-
ports, mainly bananas and coffee, making it highly vulnerable to shifts in com-
modity prices and natural disasters. Hurricane Mitch largely wiped out the ba-
nana production in 1998 and 1999, from which Honduras recovered slowly 
thereafter. Additionally, the Honduran economy was damaged by falling coffee 
prices until about 2002 and benefited by rising prices for both commodities 
thereafter. However, investments in U.S. factories operated in Honduras under 
preferential tariff programs and non-traditional export sectors are slowly diversi-
fying the production of the Honduran economy. Honduras is the fastest growing 
remittance destination in the region with inflows representing over a quarter of 
the GDP, equivalent to nearly three-quarters of all exports.
The country began to liberalize its international trade in 1990. As a result, 
total imports increased enormously. At the same time, the growth of Honduran 
exports lagged well behind the surge in imports. After the 1994 crisis, where the 
exchange rate was drastically depreciated, GDP growth resumed and the country 
witnessed improved public finances, a reduction of inflation and an increase of 
international reserves. Nevertheless, the trade imbalance continued to grow, real 
interest rates increased until 2002, and the real exchange rate continued to ap-
preciate steadily until the same year. The appreciation of the real exchange rate 
seems to be linked to significant capital inflows received after Hurricane Mitch 
and donor transfers for reconstruction, and more recently by increased remit-
tances, aid and debt relief.
But what are the channels of this disequalization of the income distribution? 
In order to answer this question, Essay 1, based on a methodology proposed by 
Barros et al. (2006), identifies and quantifies these inequality changes due to 
change in demographics, labour markets, remittances (international), govern-
ment transfers (social policies) and other non-labour income (principally capital 
incomes and domestic private transfers). It relies on series of counterfactual 
simulations. 
During the nineties, while in urban areas, the slight equalization of the 
household per-capita income distribution is driven by changes in non-labour in-
come per adult, in rural areas, the story seems to be pretty much the same as 
what we observe at the country level, where the distribution of monthly earnings
is the main disequalizing factor. Between 1999 and 2005, labour earnings are by 
far the more important inequality driver. Additionally, we find a limited impact 
of non-labour income on inequality changes. This impact is broken down into 
remittances, on the one hand, and other non-labour income on the other. At a 
country level and in rural areas, the impact is almost nonexistent, while in urban 
areas, the impact is slightly disequalizing. Finally, the period between 2005 and 
2007 is characterized by a strong equalization in the household per-capita in-
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come distribution with a decrease of 5.2 Gini points at the country level, and of 
7.3 and 3.2 Gini points in rural and urban areas, respectively. It is worth noting 
that changes in labour and non-labour income are responsible, almost in equal 
proportions, for the equalization pattern observed at the country level during this 
period. However, labour incomes appear to be more relevant in rural areas than 
in urban areas as a driver for reducing inequality. On the other hand, non-labour 
income are extraordinarily equalizing in all areas explaining about 43% of the 
equalization in rural areas and about 80% in urban areas. 
Summarizing, changes in the distribution of labour incomes are by far the 
greatest contributor to the disequalization of the household per-capita income 
distribution between 1991 and 2005, particularly at the country level and in rural 
areas where most of the inequality change took place. In order to assess the rele-
vance of the various factors on income inequality changes, handling whole dis-
tributions instead with averages, a micro-econometric decomposition methodol-
ogy first proposed by Bourguignon et al. (1998) was tailored and applied to the 
Honduran case. Changes in unobservables (prices and endowments) and in the 
structure of education, together with a pronounced occupational sorting associ-
ated with an increasing productivity gap between the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors, represent the main drivers of the disequalization between 1991 and 
2005. Regarding unobservable factors, it is plausible that the relative expansion 
of the non-agricultural sector during the 1990s, which demands a wider set of 
skills, is behind the extraordinary contribution of the unobservable to the in-
crease in labour income inequality. Contrary to this, during the 2000s, the equal-
izing contribution of changes in the structure of formal education, together with 
a recovery of the tradable sector - driven by favourable external conditions and 
improved export revenues - promote equality by increasing labour earnings in 
the tradable sector, expressed as a reduction in the price to occupations (occupa-
tional sorting), and an equalizing impact of changes in unobservable factors on 
inequality.
Finally, Essay 1 presents an application of a methodology decomposition of 
a distributional change proposed by the author in Essay 2. Between 1991 and 
1999, results show that the exogenous macroeconomic shift between the trad-
able and non-tradable sectors (occupation) explains a minimum of 8% of the 
observed disequalization at the country level. The contribution tends to be 
higher in the later periods contributing up to 40% of the disequalization between 
1999 and 2005. After 2005, the commodity boom seems to have reversed the 
tradable-non-tradable shift, but whether it is able to overcome the other struc-
tural causes of rising inequality, is hard to predict at present. The presented 
methodology in Essay 2 aims to link findings from the micro-econometric de-
composition by Bourguignon et al. (1998) with the macroeconomic story. The 
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mentioned methodology assumes workers’ heterogeneity (allowing correlation 
between mobility costs and skills) causing an insufficient mobility of workers 
between tradable and non-tradable sectors (inducing a positive sloped non-
tradable labour supply) and skill capital complementarity. Therefore, different 
equilibrium labour earnings across sectors determine the observed wage gap be-
tween sectors. This formulation is compatible with the model by Devillanova et 
al. (2010) which also relies on the complementarity between the two types of 
labour. The prediction of this formulation is that an economy suffering a sectoral 
shift against the backward sector will increase the inequality between and within 
sectors.
We argue that the underlying determinant of the disequalization is the rela-
tively low mobility between sectors and occupations of less-skilled workers, 
where typically a poor agricultural worker is unable to abandon his sector and 
change to other sectors or occupations. As shown Essay 2, improvements in 
productivity tend to cancel the wage-gap between the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors and also ensure higher labour income levels, while improvements in mo-
bility between sectors lead to an accelerated decrease in this gap. We argue that 
the rising international competitiveness through policies promoting the produc-
tivity of the tradable sectors, at the expense of other sectors, increases the stan-
dard of living in the country, when compared with treating the other sectors 
equally.
Turning to Chile, although the dynamic growth experienced during the past 
two decades, there is a consensus that the improvement of the standards of living 
has not been equally distributed across regions or communes. In a context where
it is expected that internal migration may work as a mechanism to equalize rela-
tive resource scarcities over regions, Soto and Torche (2004) show evidence that 
migration has become increasingly less important as an equalizing mechanism 
for regional disparities. Based on this evidence, Essay 3 focuses on the determi-
nants of inter-communal movements of workers aiming to understand how the 
selection process of the migrant population is. It considers observed and unob-
served characteristics, productivity differentials and initial conditions allowing 
to asses which factors are currently discouraging migration and thus hampering 
the equalization of living standards. The empirical approach of this paper con-
sists of a switching regression model presented by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) 
with endogenous switching (Maddala, 1983) which can be properly used as a 
counterpart from an extended Roy model in the migration context. The used 
methodology contributes through the provision of a structural form for internal 
migration, which is derived from a powerful theoretical framework. 
Evidence has been found that the potential wage differential strongly deter-
mines the probability to move, but only when the differential reaches some de-
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termined threshold for individuals with mean characteristics (about 0.5 and 0.3 
log-points for workers originating from rural and urban communes respectively). 
This evidence supports the idea that migration can be seen as an investment de-
cision. However, the potential wage differential for most individuals is relatively 
small compared to the migration costs. This explains why migration is a rare 
phenomena being unable to reduce regional disparities. Moreover, migration not 
only depends on individual characteristics, but strongly relies on the household 
education. Unfortunately, this evidence indicates that it is highly possible that 
the one who is migrating is not necessarily the one who may benefit from higher 
labour incomes at the destination (observing high potential wage differentials 
and therefore, contributing to equalize outputs across regions), but the one who 
is not being constrained by its household. Contrary to this, the one who may 
probably take advantage from labour market differentials, but belongs to a 
household with low levels of education, will probably be forced to stay. Thus, 
household-level migration costs are a source of inefficiency when labour mar-
kets allocate workers between rural and urban communes. Finally, this study 
suggests that supporting the supply side in the rural economy is not the only way 
to achieve convergence across the territory. Subsidies aimed to reduce migration 
costs can also be considered under a framework oriented towards encouraging 
functional migration flows. Thus, this paper supports the main idea of the New 
Economics of Labour Migration Theory, considering migration as a household 
decision (Stark and Bloom, 1985 and Stark 1993).
Turning to education, the idea that schooling scores depend on a combina-
tion of family background characteristics, ability and school-institutional related 
variables is well-accepted. Regarding the issue of intergenerational transmission 
of inequality in the educational system, the degree to which a better institutional 
performance of the school service can compensate problems originated in the 
family background is crucial. In the case of Paraguay, despite the significant 
progress achieved in recent years regarding access to education and school per-
manence, the country still faces great challenges. These include the problems of 
internal efficiency, quality in learning and equity. Essay 4 merges three different 
data sets and uses the mathematics and communication scores in its pure form 
(non-logarithmic) as dependent variables. In general, the way our model is 
specified, it can be understood as a reduced form specification where the coeffi-
cients change in their scope according to the specification of the education pro-
duction function.
By providing integral health solutions, minimizing under-nutrition and pro-
viding good conditions in the classroom, training teachers (according to their 
gaps) can impact positively on low and mean learning outcomes, thus contribut-
ing to an improved educational quality and breaking cycles of intergenerational 
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transmission of inequality. Moreover, the equality approach should focus on try-
ing to improve the worst scores and our results show that this can be reached at a 
significant level closing teacher training gaps, improving classroom conditions 
and improving health and nutrition. To ask education policies to focus their ef-
forts regarding inequality-reducing measures on lower income quintiles should 
not be that difficult, given that an important part of students from higher income 
quantiles are enrolled in private education. Unfortunately, any action taken by 
public policies to reduce inequality will have, in the short run, a limited impact 
regarding its possibility to reduce the intergenerational transmission of (welfare) 
inequality, since family background is a much stronger force in determining the 
persistence of high inequality levels.
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Essay 1 - The dynamics of inequality change in a 
highly dualistic economy: Honduras, 1991-2007i  
Abstract
We examine the drivers of inequality change in Honduras between 1991 and
2007, trying to understand why inequality increased in Honduras until 2005, 
while it was falling in most other Latin American countries. Using annual 
household surveys, we document first rising inequality between 1991and 2005, 
which is followed by falling inequality thereafter. Using an inequality decompo-
sition technique, we show that the rising inequality between 1991 and 2005 was, 
for the most part, driven by the dispersion of labour incomes in rural areas. We 
also show that the extraordinary labour earnings disequalization is mainly the 
result of a widening wage gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors and 
occupations, combined with highly segmented labour markets and poor overall 
educational progress. The underlying determinants of the divergence between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors were highly overvalued currencies and poor 
commodity process for Honduras' agricultural exports. Between 2005 and 2007, 
however, the inequality reduction was a result of equalizing trends in labour and 
non-labour income. The commodity boom promoting the tradable sector and 
remittances (in this order) played a significant role here, with government trans-
fers playing a small supporting role. Since the decline in inequality is largely 
driven by international factors, we cannot be sure whether the decline in ine-
quality will continue.
                                                          
i Based on a joint work with Stephan Klasen and Thomas Otter. This study is the base of 
our chapter contributing to the textbook edited by Prof. Andrea Cornia "Falling Inequal-
ity in Latin America. Policy Changes and Lessons", published by Oxford University 
Press.
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1.1 Introduction
Honduras stands out in Latin America as one of the few examples where ine-
quality has not declined in the early 2000s, as in most other Latin American 
countries. As we show below, inequality has been rising, more or less continu-
ously between 1991 and 2005. After 2005, inequality has started to fall, appar-
ently extending beyond the last data point in our analysis, 2007.3
Despite considerable economic growth before the global economic down-
turn started in 2008, the World Bank (2006a) portrays Honduras as one of the 
poorest countries in Latin America with more than 50% of its population below 
the poverty line. Moreover, the country has one of the highest rates of inequality 
in Latin America. Poverty and inequality, in particular, have been aggravated by 
natural disasters (such as Hurricane Mitch in 1998)
Honduras has 
thus been an outlier where the peak in inequality occurred much later and the 
decline thereafter is also much more tentative. The macro and micro causes of 
this exceptionalism are the main topic of this paper.
4 since the poor commonly 
live off small-scale agriculture in rural areas.5
Honduras is a small open economy relying heavily on a narrow range of ex-
ports, mainly bananas and coffee, making it highly vulnerable to natural disas-
ters and shifts in commodity prices. In particular, Hurricane Mitch largely wiped 
out the banana production in 1998 and 1999, from which Honduras recovered 
very slowly thereafter, and was greatly affected by falling coffee prices until 
about 2002 and rising prices for both commodities thereafter (see Figure A.1 in 
After the disaster of Hurricane 
Mitch, Honduras designed a Poverty Reduction Strategy, seeking to reduce ex-
treme poverty by half by 2015 (World Bank, 2006b), and its implementation 
since 2006 has been supported by debt relief from donors through the HIPC Ini-
tiative. These actions, together with external market conditions, have allowed 
Honduras to experience a positive economic growth during the last 15 years, 
averaging 3% annually.
                                                          
3 2007 is the most recent year for which reliable household survey data are available 
(Encuesta Permanente de Hogares: EPHPM I from 1991-99 and II from 2001-07.) We 
always use the October wave of the survey. Since 2008, only the May wave has been 
available. These show that the decline in inequality has apparently continued beyond 
2007 (EPHPM 2008, 2009 and 2010).
4 ECLAC (1999) states “Hurricane Mitch is the most serious hydro-meteorological disas-
ter to have struck Central America in many years. Its force upon reaching the coasts of 
the region was exceptional, as were its diameter, the amount of moisture and rain it car-
ried and the erratic path it followed for several days”. Moreover, Mitch caused around 
14,000 direct deaths and an estimated material loss of around US$3.8 billion.
5 EPHPM 2007 shows that 85% and 64% of individuals of the first and second quintiles, 
respectively, are living in rural areas.
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the Appendix). However, investments in the “maquila” (U.S. factories operated 
in Honduras under preferential tariff programs) and non-traditional export sec-
tors are slowly diversifying the production of the Honduran economy. These 
attempts at diversification are supported by signing and ratifying the U.S.-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Honduras is also notable for 
its very high population growth rate of more than 2 % yearly throughout the pe-
riod under examination. With such a rapidly growing labour force, it also ex-
ports its labour and is in fact the fastest growing remittance destination in the 
region with inflows representing over a quarter of the GDP, equivalent to nearly 
three-quarters of all exports. Consequently, external conditions, trade and cur-
rency policy will have an important impact on growth, poverty, and inequality.
Honduras has recurrently faced serious economic crisis; in 1994, 1998/9 and 
then again in 2009. These crises were often disequalizing, because of the lack of 
available proper safety nets for poor and vulnerable population groups (Lustig, 
1995). Despite improvements in tax collections and other macro-economic poli-
cies, the country continues to struggle with fiscal deficits.6 Since 2005, as a re-
sult of the combined effects of public policies (targeted social transfers),7 im-
proved economic growth closely linked to increasing commodity prices and the 
fact that significant additional resources have gone directly to households 
through remittances,8
The political system in Honduras of the past 30 years has been characterized 
by the Liberal Party (social liberal political party) and the National Party (cen-
tre-right conservative political party) taking turns in government. As a result, 
there is not much variation in the kinds of policies implemented. Tax revenues 
have been growing continuously since 1994, beginning with Carlos Reina's gov-
ernment. The same occurs with the public social expenditure. It may be argued, 
that liberal governments have been slightly more willing to increasing debt-
based social expenditure, while governments led by the National Party have 
been more conservative in this policy aspect. Regarding labour market policies, 
even when there are some labour regulations protecting workers, these regula-
tions are quite flexible and have been systematically ignored by the government 
and by companies. As a result, there is much evidence on job insecurity, which 
remains almost unchanged. The last liberal government of Zelaya (since 2006) 
took a more populist turn, expanding social programmes and minimum wages, 
there has been a reduction in extreme poverty.
                                                          
6 See Cardemil et al. (2000).
7 US$ 71.5 million accumulated between 2005 and 2007 according to the Honduran Sec-
retary of Finance.
8 In 2008, remittances reached US$ 2.8 billion corresponding to 18% of GDP (Central 
Bank of Honduras, 2010).
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and was subsequently ousted in 2009 by the military. After renewed presidential 
elections Lobo from the National Party was installed in 2010.
1.1.1 Macroeconomic environment, liberalization and 
trade imbalance
Honduras began to liberalize its international trade in 1990.9 As a result, total 
imports increased enormously; almost 12% per annum during 1990-1995, and 
afterwards even faster. At the same time, the growth of Honduran exports lagged 
well behind the surge in imports (see Figure 1.1). After the 1994 crisis where the 
exchange rate was drastically depreciated, GDP growth resumed and the country 
witnessed improved public finances, a reduction of inflation and an increase of 
international reserves (see Table 1.1).10 Nevertheless, the trade imbalance con-
tinued to grow, real interest rates increased until 2002, and the real exchange 
rate continued to appreciate steadily until the same year (see Table A.4 in the 
Appendix).11
The Honduran growth has been accompanied by low investment rates induc-
ing a weak modernization in the productive sectors. These conditions did not 
facilitate an improved productivity. According to Lugones et al. (2007), the an-
nualized change rate of the total factor productivity was -1.24 per cent between 
1991 and 2003.
The appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER) seems to be 
linked to significant capital inflows received after Hurricane Mitch and donor 
transfers for reconstruction, and more recently by increased remittances, aid and 
debt relief. Paz Cafferata (2003) argues that this happened despite sterilization 
policies of the Central Bank which proved to be insufficient.
12 Figure 1.1 shows how GDP growth is closely correlated with 
the expansion in the total amount of working hours during the 1990s.13
                                                          
9 Through the Macroeconomic Policy Reform Law in March 1990.
In con-
trast, the 2000s are characterized by higher rates of gross fixed capital formation 
and declining real interest rates (starting in 2002) and a divergence between the 
rates of expansion of labour and real GDP.
10 Total GDP grew at an annual average rate of 4.5% between 1994 and 1997, after which 
this trend was interrupted by Hurricane Mitch. International reserves increased from 
US$205 million to US$1,248 million. The fiscal deficit, excluding international trans-
fers, dropped almost five percentage points from 8% to 3% of the GDP during the peri-
od between 1994 and 2000.
11 See also Paz Cafferata (2003).
12 Total factor productivity is commonly understood, though not without controversy, as a 
proxy of technological change.
13 This employment index equals the unity in 2005 and represents 102.3 million working 
hours per week.
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Table 1.1: Relevant macroeconomic indicators for selected periods (averages)
Indicator 1991-99 1999-2005 2005-07
Remittances/GDP* (since 2000) n/a 10.8 20.1
Exports of goods and services/GDP* 40.6 52.9 56.1
Imports of goods and services/GDP* 47.7 67.8 78.6
Banana price index (until 2009) 86.4 123.2 196.4
Coffee price index (until 2009) 112.2 90.3 154.7
Current account balance/GDP* -6.5 -5.6 -5.3
Average in	
 18.9 10.7 6.4
Maximal in	
 28.8 30.8 7.2
Real exchange rate (2000=100) 121.8 99.8 99.0
Real interest rate 19.36 9.26 7.10
Overall balance central government/GDP* -3.2 -3.48 -2.13
Debt/GDP* 120.8 69.1 32.6
Tax revenues/GDP* 13.2 14.1 15.4
Public social spending/GDP* 5.92 8.92 9.90
Public social security spending/GDP* 0.28 0.22 0.36
Note: * percentages.
Source: Based on WDI, Secretaría Ejecutiva Consejo Monetario Centroamericano, Central Bank of Honduras 
(2010), ECLAC (1999).
This divergence may be the consequence of productivity improvements.14
As in many developing countries (and in contrast to the richer middle-
income economies of Latin America), the agricultural sector employs more peo-
ple than any other sector. Although other sectors have been gaining importance, 
the agricultural sector still provides over one-third of jobs overall and over 55% 
in rural areas. Improvements in the agrarian production have not translated into 
higher labour incomes, presumably because of stagnant productivity given the 
low competitiveness of this sector, partly a consequence of the appreciated RER, 
insufficient capital investment, and the effects of the Hurricane Mitch on infra-
structure and soil productivity.
However, these averages do not let us see just how unequal the improvement 
(deterioration) of the labour productivity has been across the working population 
which we discuss below.
15
                                                          
14 It is possible to observe in Figure 1.1 that the slope of the employment expansion is not 
decreasing over time.
After 2005, the commodity price booms in cof-
15 For instance, between 1991 and 1999, the number of tractors per 100 km2 increased by 
about 13%, while the number of workers in the agricultural sector rose by 19% during 
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fee and bananas significantly improved the situation in the agricultural tradable
sector, a development that has continued to this day.16
Figure 1.1: Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1990-2008 
Contrary to this, and consistent with the appreciation of the RER since the 
early 1990s, the non-tradable sector appears to gain momentum. During the last 
two decades, a shift in the productive path, value generation and labour earnings
can be observed. Household surveys show that earnings in agriculture, as a share 
of total earnings, declined from 28% in 1991 to 20% in 1999 and to 17% in 
2007, while the share of labour incomes in non-tradable sectors such as com-
merce, transport, construction and basic services grew from 29% in 1991 to 39% 
in 2007. Other tradable sectors such as the manufacturing sector (maquiladoras) 
maintain a constant employment share.17
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the same period. From 1991 to 2007, both figures have grown by about 40%, also driv-
en by rapid population growth. These facts may support the idea that the productivity of 
labour, at least within agricultural activities, has been decreasing during the 1990s in 
part because of a reduction of units of capital per worker. 
16 See Figure A.1 in the Appendix for a development of coffee and banana prices. 
17 Figures obtained based on EPHPM I and II. 
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1.1.2 Sector-related changes in earnings: tradables 
versus non-tradables
An overvaluation of the RER will induce a loss of relative competitiveness of 
the tradable sector while favouring the non-tradable sector. The tradable sector 
consists of formal and informal employment of agriculture and livestock activi-
ties, mining and manufacture. The non-tradable sector consists of formal and 
informal employment in basic services (electricity, water, and gas), construction, 
commerce, transport, financing and other services. This hypothesis is supported 
in Figure 1.2, which shows that in both rural and urban areas, there is a rising 
gap between labour earnings in the non-tradable and the tradable sectors. Re-
markably, this is true even if considering the fact that a considerable share of 
non-tradable employment are informal sector activities with low earnings. In 
fact, it turns out that in the early 1990s, earnings at the low end of the earnings 
distribution of the non-tradable sector were below those at the low end in the 
tradable sector. By 2005, the earnings in the non-tradable sector were considera-
bly above those in the tradable sector. Consequently, the tradable sector has rela-
tively declined over the last two decades.18
How would the expansion of the non-tradable sector affect inequality? The 
answer depends on the initial levels of inequality within and between the two 
sectors, and on how efficient labour markets are in reallocating workers from the 
tradable to the non-tradable sector. If workers can be reallocated easily, we 
would not expect large effects as workers move across sectors with little loss of 
earnings. Figure 1.3 shows evidence of this issue in rural areas. While low-
earners in the tradable sector (top panels) suffered steep real earnings declines 
between 1991 and 2005, low-earners in the non-tradable sector seem to have 
kept their labour income stable between 1991 and 1999, and even improved 
their performance between 1999 and 2005. Why were low earners in the trad-
able sector not able to move to the non-tradable sector and profit from growing 
labour incomes?
                                                          
18 According to household surveys, the share of wages in the tradable sector in rural areas 
declined from 67% of total wages in 1991 to 56% in 2007 (and from 25% and 22% of 
wages in urban areas).
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Figure 1.2: Earnings and employment: tradable and non-tradable sectors, 1991-2007
Figure 1.3: Growth incidence curves: monthly earnings in the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors in rural areas, 1991-2007
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The hypothesis here is that, in an economy where mobility cost changes 
across skill levels (observables and unobservables) with a technology exhibiting 
capital-skill complementarity, neo-liberal policies allowing a decline in the trad-
able sector will translate into the (considerable) disequalization of labour in-
comes during this period (1991-2005).
Given that the free-trade openness is the more relevant structural change 
taking place during the 1990s in Honduras, the next section covers the relation-
ship between international trade and inequality. Moreover, the main conclusions 
of a model by Devillanova et al. (2010) explaining the consequences of a trade-
induced sectoral shift on inequality will be presented. The model is based on 
workers' heterogeneity and capital-skill complementarity, which appear to be 
realistic assumptions for the Honduran economy.
1.1.3 Workers' heterogeneity and capital-skill com-
plementarity
There is much evidence which suggests that income inequality increases after 
trade liberalization takes place. López-Calva and Lustig (2010) state that many 
Latin American governments adopted market-oriented reforms to pull the econ-
omy out of crisis. They argue that the inequality increase during the 1990s was 
partially driven by a significant increase in relative returns to tertiary education 
and that this was consistent with a skill-biased technological change after the 
adoption of trade liberalization reforms.19
According to the predictions of the classical trade models, the 1995-2002 
RER overvaluation and declining commodity prices possibly encouraged a real-
location of factors towards the non-tradable sector in Honduras. Given this, 
there is evidence that the imperfect mobility of workers would translate into low 
levels of labour reallocation reducing the benefits of trade integration (see Papa-
georgiou et al., 1991 and Wacziarg and Wallack, 2004). Additionally, according 
to Devillanova et al. (2010), if moving costs and skills are correlated and there is 
capital-skill complementarity, a trade-induced sectoral shift would increase 
                                                          
19 See Gasparini and Cruces (2010), Cragg and Eppelbaum (1996) and Jaramillo and 
Saavedra (2010). Figure 1.6 shows that this is true for Honduras between 1990 and 
1995, at least in rural areas. This is a period characterized by a strong devaluation and 
the opening up of the economy. Note that the rise in the skill premium can be explained 
by an increasing demand for those with secondary-level education or higher in rural ar-
eas. Thereafter, the Honduran economy faces a continuous appreciation of the RER and 
declining commodity prices until 2002.
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wage inequality between different skill levels in a sector and within skill levels 
across sectors (Figures 2 and 5 in Devillanova et al., 2010).
The assumption of a positive correlation between skills and moving costs is 
based on the idea that highly educated workers develop more general abilities, 
which have a productive value across all sectors and occupations. Contrary to 
this, less-skilled workers are characterized by abilities that are typically less 
transferable. Devillanova et al. (2010) mention a variety of studies supporting 
the hypothesis of higher internal mobility of the more educated workers.20 In 
Honduras, we additionally find that migrants are also more likely to belong to 
the more educated households.21 Thus, the deplorable levels of education in ru-
ral areas will reinforce internal immobility, particularly for those in the tradable 
sector.22
Between 1991 and 1995, the opening up of trade and investment and the de-
valuation of the RER favoured the tradable sector. Here, the capital-skill com-
plementarity might explain the one-time disequalizing effect of skill-biased 
technical change. A confirmation of this can be found in Figure 1.2, where until 
1993, the wage gap between sectors seems to disappear.23
                                                          
20 The more educated workers find jobs easily and have lower transaction costs (Green-
wood, 1975; Bednarzik, 1993 and Helwing, 2001). They also learn faster and are able to 
implement modern technologies and perform new activities more efficiently (Nelson 
and Phelps, 1966; Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987). Moreover, they are more likely to 
change a job voluntarily (Magnani, 2001; Tomkins and Twomey, 2000). Here, internal 
mobility refers to movements across industry, sectors and geographical areas.
Starting in 1994, the 
tradable sector faces important difficulties due to increasing real interest rates, 
the progressive appreciation of the RER together with declining commodity 
prices and Hurricane Mitch in 1998. On the other hand, the non-tradable sector 
shows increasing earnings, due to disproportionate investments as a result of the 
favourable macro-conditions (capital inflows). Consequently, this sector in-
creases its skill intensity and skill premium. At the same time, relative labour 
incomes for unskilled workers also increase in the non-tradable sector (relative 
to those in the tradable sector). This occurs due to the complementarity between 
21 In section 1.5, we show the predicted migration flows accounting for productivity dif-
ferentials. They are based on a structural probability model, which account for the self-
selection bias in the rural-urban migration process. Results suggest that the household 
education is an important determinant of the migration probability. Villalobos Barría 
(2012) reaches the same conclusion for the rural-urban migration pattern in Chile during 
the period 2002-2006.
22 According to EPHPM 1999, rural workers belong to households with an average of 2.32 
and 3.11 years of education in the tradable and non-tradable sectors, respectively.
23 Here, the wage disequalization is explained mainly through increasing returns to educa-
tion (and skills).
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the two types of labour and the insufficient migration of less-skilled workers 
towards the dynamic sector. Consequently, skilled and unskilled workers now 
perform better-off in the attractive sector (relative to those in the tradable sec-
tor), as shown in Figure 1.3. The labour income distribution becomes more un-
equal due to the evolution of the inter-sectoral wage gap taking place across the 
whole ability distribution. 
Section 1.4 proposes a methodology to account for this evolution. It assesses 
the inequality effects of the observed change in the wage gap between sectors 
and aims to isolate the inequality changes related to the distribution of skills 
from those which are exclusively related to changes in the relative competitive-
ness of the tradable sector.
1.1.4 A dysfunctional and highly dualistic educational 
system
Average education in the Honduran labour force has increased only marginally 
over time (see Table 1.2). At the country level, during the period 1991-2007, the 
number of years of education of the Honduran labour force rose from only 5.1 to 
a still very poor 6.0. Furthermore, education lagged behind in rural areas; in 
1991, urban labour force participants had over seven years of education (at 
about a secondary education level) versus 3.6 years of education in rural areas 
(less than a primary education level). Second, there are also marked differences 
regarding changes in the structure of educational levels, most likely linked to 
different educational opportunities as well as rural-urban migration (see below). 
Although the proportion without formal education has been steadily declining in 
urban and rural areas alike, in rural areas this was made up with increasing 
shares of people with intermediate education, while in urban areas the largest 
increase was among those with tertiary education. 
The accelerated expansion of tertiary education in urban areas dominates 
changes in the distribution of education at the country level. Given the (often 
convex) link between education and earnings, educational progress in urban ar-
eas may serve to disperse the labour income distribution.24
                                                          
24 The disequalization of the earnings distribution may occur even when the Gini coeffi-
cient of years of schooling shows a monotonic decreasing trend (1991-2007), which has 
been termed the 'paradox of progress.' In previous studies for Argentina and Mexico, the 
Gini for educational attainment declined while earnings inequality increased; see 
Gasparini et al. (2005) for Argentina and Legovini at al. (2005) for Mexico.
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Table 1.2: Changes in the educational structure of the Honduran labour force, 1991-2007
Per cent Annualized change*
Educational structure 1991 1999 2005 2007 1991-99 1999-2005 2005-07
Country level 
Without 20.0 16.7 14.3 13.2 -0.41 -0.41 -0.57
Less than secondary 57.8 58.0 57.0 56.0 0.02 -0.16 -0.54
Less than tertiary 18.1 20.0 21.9 23.1 0.23 0.33 0.56
Tertiary 4.1 5.3 6.7 7.8 0.16 0.24 0.54
Years of schooling 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.0 0.04 0.06 0.11
Gini coefficient 45.4 43.0 41.3 40.3 -0.30 -0.20 -0.10
Rural areas 
Without 27.4 24.1 21.2 19.3 -0.42 -0.48 -0.92
Less than secondary 64.3 65.5 67.7 67.0 0.14 0.37 -0.35
Less than tertiary 7.8 9.6 10.3 12.2 0.23 0.12 0.96
Tertiary 0.5 0.9 0.9 1.5 0.05 0.00 0.31
Years of schooling 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.2 0.03 0.02 0.15
Gini coefficient 47.6 45.8 43.6 42.4 -0.20 -0.30 -0.20
Urban areas 
Without 10.6 8.7 7.0 6.4 -0.23 -0.30 -0.30
Less than secondary 49.3 49.8 45.6 43.8 0.05 -0.69 -0.94
Less than tertiary 31.4 31.3 34.4 35.1 -0.01 0.51 0.33
Tertiary 8.7 10.2 13.0 14.8 0.19 0.47 0.91
Years of schooling 7.1 7.2 7.8 8.0 0.01 0.10 0.10
Gini coefficient 37.2 35.4 33.1 32.4 -0.20 -0.30 -0.10
Note: * in percentage points; Gini coefficient based on the years of schooling distribution.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
1.1.5 Education reforms and crisis during the 1990s
During the early 1990s, market-oriented reforms designed to pull economies out 
of a crisis were implemented in Honduras, including changes that affected edu-
cational policies. Barahona and Blas (2008) argue that reforms were imple-
mented with the purpose of decentralizing and incorporating the private sector in 
the educational process.25 Despite these efforts, the Honduran educational sys-
tem is still deficient in coverage and quality.26
                                                          
25 Private education has flourished during the last decades. Private schools do not have as 
much academic prestige in Honduras. Nevertheless, wealthy families choose to send 
their children to private schools because they still convey a higher social status and 
more amenities.
Lack of funds, a shortage of 
26 Following Barahona and Blas (2008), coverage was one of the central goals of the re-
form implemented by the government of Carlos Reina. However, decentralization and 
fragmentation of the administrative structure ended up with a reduced investment in ed-
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teachers (particularly in rural areas), poor pedagogic training, and obsolete cur-
ricula are some problems which the Honduran educational system has to deal 
with.27 Such problems are not surprising given the modest spending levels in 
education. Public spending in education in Honduras is far from the more ad-
vanced educational systems in Latin America. While public spending in educa-
tion per-capita in Honduras reached US$40 in 2000, Argentina and Chile were 
spending US$520 and US$208 respectively.28 However, just within the last dec-
ade, public spending in education in 2008 has doubled in absolute terms, reduc-
ing the gap to other countries. Unfortunately, given that public spending on edu-
cation in Honduras is already quite high as a share of the GDP, considerable 
complementary financial flows will be required to enhance educational re-
sources further.
1.1.6 Rural-urban migration
Changes in the structure of education of the labour force are a consequence of 
fertility rates, efficiency and coverage of the schooling system and migration. 
While fertility rates and the nature of the schooling system tend to change 
slowly over time, internal migration may have an extraordinary impact on origin 
and destination areas (rural and urban areas). In order to understand the contri-
bution of internal migration on changes in the educational distribution and thus 
on inequality, we estimate migration flows in the origin controlling for the fact 
that, after migration, migrants in urban areas may decide to enrol or to continue 
current studies, and consequently, ex-post estimates of the structure of education 
overstate the educational attainment of rural-urban migrants at the time of mi-
gration.
For this reason, we estimated a structural model for internal migration based 
on the extended Roy model.29
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ucation during the 1990s. As a result of this, even to this day, coverage deficiencies are 
particularly notorious in preschool and secondary levels and in rural areas.
Table 1.3 compares the educational structure of 
the net migrant group with the observed structure in rural and urban areas in 
1994 and 1999. By comparing both structures, it is clear that rural-urban migra-
27 Additionally, according to the background notes by the U.S. Department of State, Hur-
ricane Mitch damaged more than 3,000 schools nationwide.
28 According to the ECLAC, Social Development Division.
29 The extended Roy model finds a suitable counterpart in a switching regression model, 
presented by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) with endogenous switching (Maddala and 
Nelson, 1975; Maddala, 1983). Technical details about the estimation procedure are 
available upon request.
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tion increases educational inequality in urban areas, as the share of migrants 
with no education by far exceeds the share of urban residents with no education.
Table 1.3: Structures of education for the net migrants and by areas, Honduras, 1994-1999
Urban areas Rural areas Internal migrants
1994 1999 1994 1999 Net migrants Structure
Without 9.34 8.88 22.49 22.07 43,799 23.74
Less than secondary 52.40 50.88 67.39 67.03 110,056 59.65
Less than tertiary 32.05 32.44 9.76 10.36 30,519 16.54
Tertiary 6.21 7.80 0.36 0.54 135 0.07
Note: The educational structure of migrants controls for the fact that some migration has taken place for educa-
tion.  See Villalobos Barría (2012) for further details.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
In contrast, it should reduce inequality in rural areas as migrants are dispro-
portionately drawn from the high end (less than secondary) of the distribution of 
education. This must be kept in mind when interpreting changes in inequality. 
Finally, this result points out the validity of the workers' heterogeneity assump-
tion (correlation between mobility costs and skills).30
1.1.7 Inequality change in Honduras
Figure 1.4 depicts inequality trends in household per-capita income and labour 
earnings. Inequality in household per-capita income increased steadily since 
1991 over a period of more than ten years and started to decrease after 2005, a 
trend which appears to have continued beyond 2007, the last comparable data 
set in our analysis. The inequality increase appears to be heavily influenced by 
an increase of rural inequality (and possibly rural-urban shifts), while urban ine-
quality changed very little during that time period. Moreover, changes in ine-
quality at the country level appear to be closely related to increasing labour 
earnings inequality,31 which also reaches its peak in 2005.32
                                                          
30 This is because migration from rural to urban areas is, to some degree, overlapped with 
the migration from tradable (mainly agriculture) to the non-tradable sector.
31 See Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
32 The inequality peak is not driven by outliers. In order to check the robustness of our 
Gini estimates, we excluded the top and bottom 5% of observations from the income 
distributions. Trends are not affected by outliers and confirm the finding that in 2005 
income inequality reached its highest level within the period of observation.
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Figure 1.4: Monthly earnings and household per-capita income inequality trends, 1991-2007
Based on the discussion above, our hypothesis about inequality trends is that 
extremely low levels of human capital accumulation, particularly in rural areas, 
together with neo-liberal labour market institutions and an appreciated real ex-
change rate worsened rural incomes, in particular, those at the bottom of the dis-
tribution of the tradable sector. To analyze inequality change using various de-
composition techniques, we divide our analysis into three periods, 1991-1999 
(just after Hurricane Mitch), 1999-2005 (the year of highest inequality) and 
2005-2007.
1.2 Micro-econometric decomposition I: The
proximate determinants of changes in income 
inequality
In this section, we present evidence regarding the relative importance of demo-
graphics, labour markets, (international) remittances, government transfers (so-
cial policies) and other non-labour income (principally capital incomes and do-
mestic private transfers) in explaining inequality changes in the distribution of 
household per-capita income between 1991 and 2007. Following the methodol-
ogy proposed by Barros et al. (2006), we are able to identify and quantify these 
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determinants using a series of counterfactual simulations. In this study, our ex-
tended methodology allowed us to assess the impact of government transfers, 
remittances and other non-labour income on inequality changes.
Putting technical aspects of the decomposition aside, the empirical approach 
is based on the following tree of identities:
 =    (1)
 =  +  (2)
 =   	 (3)
 = 
 +  +  (4)
Hence,
 =   [(
 +  + 
) +   	] (5)
Where y is the household per-capita income, a corresponds to the proportion 
of working adults in the household, r the household income per adult, o corre-
sponds to the household non-labour income per adult and t represents the house-
hold labour income per adult. The variable u represents the proportion of work-
ing adults in the household and w is the labour income per working adult in the 
household. Finally, in this extended specification (Identity (5)) remittances per 
adult in the household are symbolized by rem, while government transfers per 
adult in the household are represented by soc, and other represents other house-
hold non-labour income per adult. As mentioned by Barros et al. (2006), since 
we are dealing with identities, any change in the income distribution must be 
related to changes in the joint distribution of these proximate determinants.
To clarify our notation in Table 1.4, in the decomposition presented by Iden-
tity (1), for example, we define  a as the proportion of change of the Gini coef-
ficient, resulting from changes in the distribution of the percentage of adults in 
the household.33
                                                          
33 Since we estimate whole distributions, we strictly decompose distributional changes 
(which are evaluated using the Gini coefficient), rather than a direct change in the Gini 
coefficient.
In the same way r is the proportion of change of the Gini coef-
ficient, resulting from changes in the distribution of the household income per 
adult. Finally,  a captures the proportion of change of the Gini coefficient re-
sulting from changes in the association between the proportion of adults in 
household a and the household income per adult r. Using the same notation, the 
contribution caused by changes in the remaining proximate determinants, and 
their respective associations on changes in labour income inequality, are illus-
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trated in Table 1.4 (Identity (5)). Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix show 
separate results for urban and rural areas.
Table 1.4: Percentage contribution of the proximate determinants to inequality changes







Determinant (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ar -10.77 -10.77 -10.77 11.49 11.49 11.49 11.49 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87
a 0.04 0.04 0.04 -3.16 -3.16 -3.16 -3.16 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93 -2.93
r 110.7 91.7 -98.9
o 11.10 11.10 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -2.72 -2.72 -2.72 -2.72
o -24.23 -24.23 0.80 0.80 -51.2 -51.2
t 123.86 91.41 -45.1
u -47.86 3.61 3.61 19.1 19.1 19.1
u -2.18 10.29 10.29 -6.9 -6.9 -6.9
w 173.89 77.51 77.51 -57.3 -57.3 -57.3
rem 5.10 18.78 18.78






 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Note: r is decomposed in o+ o + t as t in u + u + w , o in rem	
 + rem + nrem and nrem
in socnsoc + soc + nsoc.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
1.2.1 First sub-period: The nineties (1991-1999) – la-
bour market-driven inequality increase
During this period, demographic changes a and their association with the distri-
bution of the household income per adult a contributed towards equalizing 
the per-capita household income distribution y, while the distribution of the 
household incomes per adult r explains about 110% of the disequalizing trend 
during this decade. By decomposing r, it is possible to assess the role of the 
household labour and non-labour income per adult, t and o respectively. While 
non-labour income were equalizing, labour incomes are the main driver in the 
observed inequality increase. When looking at household labour incomes per 
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adult t, the decomposition presented in column (3) allows us to assess the role of 
changes in the proportion of working adults u and the importance of changes in 
monthly earnings per working adult w. While u is not capable of explaining any 
inequality change, changes in monthly earnings are by far the greatest contribu-
tor to the disequalization of y. The association between the distribution of em-
ployment and earnings reduces, to some extent, this extraordinary disequalizing 
force.
While in urban areas, the slight equalization of the household per-capita in-
come distribution is driven by changes in non-labour income per adult, in rural 
areas the story seems to be pretty much the same as what we observe at the 
country level, where the distribution of monthly earnings is the main disequaliz-
ing factor.
1.2.2 Second sub-period: The nineties II (1999-2005) –
labour market-driven inequality increase
This second period shows similar results as the decade of the 1990s; monthly 
earnings are by far the main inequality driver. The only notable difference is that
in urban areas the distribution of employment explains almost one-fourth of the 
2.4 Gini points increase between 1999 and 2005. Information regarding the re-
ception of remittances at the household level became available in the household 
surveys since 1997; this information enables us to assess the impact of remit-
tances on the distribution of household per-capita income. Initially, the decom-
position shown in column (3) shows a limited impact of non-labour income on 
inequality changes. This impact is broken down in column (4) into remittances, 
on the one hand, and other non-labour income (government transfers, capital 
incomes and other private transfers) on the other. At a country level and in rural 
areas, the impact is almost nonexistent, while in urban areas, the impact is
slightly disequalizing.
1.2.3 Third sub-period: Inequality decrease (2005-
2007) – recovery of the tradable sector, equalizing 
remittances and expanding social transfers
The period between 2005 and 2007 is characterized by a strong equalization in 
the household per-capita income distribution with a decrease by 5.2 Gini points 
at the country level, and by 7.3 and 3.2 Gini points in rural and urban areas, re-
spectively. It is worth noting that changes in labour earnings and non-labour in-
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come are responsible, almost in equal proportions, for the equalization pattern 
observed at the country level during this period. However, labour earnings, as a 
driver for reducing inequality, appear to be more relevant in rural areas than in 
urban areas. On the other hand, non-labour income are extraordinarily equaliz-
ing in all areas explaining about 43% of the equalization in rural areas and about 
80% in urban areas.
What explains the equalizing effect of labour markets? Why are they now 
producing more equity after having done the opposite in previous periods? The 
period between 2005 and 2007 is characterized by the commodity boom that 
also affects Honduras' main exports, coffee and bananas (Appendix, Figure A.1), 
thereby improving conditions in the tradable sector for the first time. 
By decomposing the equalizing impact of non-labour income per adult, we 
are able to assess the impact of remittances on inequality. Columns 4 and 5 
show that non-labour income accounts for 51% of equalization and that almost 
44% of this equalization can be attributed to remittances, almost 25% to private 
transfers and capital incomes, and almost 12% to government transfers. The as-
sociation between the aforementioned proximate determinants tends to disequal-
ize the household per-capita income distribution diminishing, to some extent, the 
equalizing trend, suggesting that government transfers and private transfers, 
while both being equalizing on their own, increase inequality due to the rising 
association between them. Remittances have a stronger impact in rural areas, but 
the net impact, considering the association between the distribution of remit-
tances and other-non-labour income, is almost the same in both areas (about 
30%).
With respect to the impact of remittances, Figure 1.5 shows the evolution of 
the amount of per-capita remittance receipts by total household income quantile 
using an index (2002=100). Remittances across income quantiles do not exhibit 
any clear pattern until 2004, which explains why remittances had no equalizing 
or disequalizing effect.
On the contrary, starting from this year, the poorest seem to have benefited 
disproportionately from remittances (both in the number of beneficiaries among 
the poor as well as absolute amounts), leading to falling non-labour inequality as 
shown above. 
Regarding policy changes, the period between 2005 and 2007 is of extraor-
dinary interest due to the political transition that occurred in Honduras at the be-
ginning of 2006, when the government switched from a centre-right conserva-
tive political party, headed by Ricardo Maduro, towards a left-wing populist in-
spired government led by Manuel Zelaya. In particular, cash transfer policies are 
critical here. Already in the early 1990s, a government conditional cash transfer 
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program (PRAF) was created to minimize the undesirable effects produced by 
the neo-liberal adjustment programs implemented during the 1990s.
Figure 1.5: Index of remittances across quantiles of the total per-capita household income, 
1997-2007
The first version of the program (PRAF-I) was implemented between 1992 
and 1998. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) criticized PRAF-I for 
its leakage and poor targeting, as well as for ignoring supply side weaknesses 
(Moore, 2008). An adjusted program, PRAF-II was launched in 1998, being bet-
ter targeted to rural areas. The program was aimed to support areas with the 
weakest infrastructure in the country. This design considered the supply-side 
incentives more importantly. It appears that the rural poor were still underrepre-
sented in the beneficiary composition (Moore, 2008).
A third IADB loan program was launched under Zelaya’s government in 
2007 (PRAF-III).34
                                                          
34 It may be argued that this credit was possible because Honduras reached the HIPC 
(Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) completion point and benefit from the MDRI (Multi-
lateral Debt Relief Initiative) in 2006.
His government aimed to adapt existing components and to 
create new ones, to fight low levels of human capital and chronic poverty. In-
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deed, previously existing PRAF components had not been able to solve these 
problems.35
Table 1.5: Basic Data on Conditional Cash Transfer programme (PRAF), selected years
Conclusions from previous experiences were taken into account 
when designing the new program, particularly regarding the targeting of ex-
tremely poor households and the amount of transfers. During Zelaya’s govern-
ment, approximately 18-20 per cent of PRAF expenditure was transferred to ex-
treme poor rural households (Moore, 2008). In Table 1.5, Zelaya’s approach to 
transfers can be clearly distinguished from today’s (2011) policies and those 
from 2005 and 2006 in terms of scope and transferred amounts per beneficiary.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2011
Total number of beneficiaries 628,476 566,977 672,619 969,744 436,000
Total investment (1000 Lempiras) 407,706 370,009 573,527 639,517 313,830
Total investment (Mio. current US$ ) 21.6 19.6 30.3 33.8 16.5
Investment per beneficiary (current US$ ) 34.3 34.5 45.1 34.9 37.8
Source: Based on PRAF and Ministry of Finance (n.d.).
Table 1.6 shows how the structure of income changed considerably between 
2005 and 2007. While labour incomes became less important, non-labour in-
come grew substantially, mainly because of a considerable increase in govern-
ment transfers, followed by remittances. Consistent with Table 1.4, social policy 
was starting to have an impact on inequality; but the scope of the program ap-
pears to have been cut back since then as shown in Table 1.5.
Even when the IADB loan contributed towards significantly expanding the 
PRAF programs, the impact on inequality depended on the targeting design and 
the implementation of the transfers. Barros’ decomposition gives us information 
regarding both issues.
Our results show that the contribution of government transfers appears to 
equalize the income distribution; however, their rising association with other 
non-labour income cancelled out this impact. This means, that even when gov-
ernment transfers are, for the most part, equalizing, they are received mainly by 
households, which increasingly also rely on other non-labour income sources 
such as remittances, private transfers and capital incomes.
In summary, non-labour income was strongly equalizing the income distri-
bution at the country level, driven by the rising equalization of remittances, pri-
vate transfers, and government transfers. When examining rural and urban areas 
separately, labour incomes are much more important drivers of equalization in 
                                                          
35 For more information about the PRAF components, outcomes and expenditures see 
Moore (2008).
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rural areas while in urban areas, remittances and other transfers play a relatively 
larger role. Government transfers also contribute towards equalization in both 
areas, but the impact remains modest.
Table 1.6: Income categories, 2005 and 2007 (in Lempiras of 1999)
Amount Structure
Income categories 2005 2007 2005 2007
Total per-capita labour incomes 680.39 787.74 78.49 76.71
Total per-capita non-labour income 186.50 239.16 21.54 23.29
Government transfers (mainly PRAF) 45.12 63.02 5.20 6.14
Remittances 90.16 112.55 10.40 10.96
Other income (private transfers & capital incomes) 50.58 63.33 5.84 6.17
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
1.3 Micro-econometric decomposition II: 
Determinants of changes in labour income
inequality
As illustrated in our previous decomposition, changes in the distribution of la-
bour incomes are by far the greatest contributor to the disequalization of the 
household per-capita income distribution between 1991 and 2005, particularly at 
the country level and in rural areas where most of the inequality change took 
place.36
Table 1.7 shows that inequality in labour earnings rose by more than 7% be-
tween 1991 and 1999, and then again, by 4.5% between 1999 and 2005. In the 
two years that followed, labour inequality decreased by more than 3%. Gini co-
efficients for urban and rural areas show very different behaviours over time. 
Changes in inequality seem to be extremely accentuated in rural areas, while 
there are no significant trends in urban areas. Table A.3 in the Appendix shows 
rates of pro-poor growth in labour earnings observed during the periods between 
1991-1999, 1999-2005 and 2005-2007. Earning changes were biased against the 
poor between 1991 and 2005, while in the subsequent period (2005-2007) they 
were strongly pro-poor. Changes in the slope of the growth incidence curves are 
mainly driven by what happened within low-earners (vulnerable) in rural areas.
For this reason, by using another decomposition technique, we analyze 
inequality changes of labour earnings more thoroughly.
                                                          
36 According to household survey data, about 94%, 88%, 78.5% and 76.7% of the house-
hold per-capita income have been generated through labour activities in 1991, 1999, 
2005 and 2007 respectively.
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Table 1.7: Gini coefficient changes - monthly labour earnings distribution 
Period Whole country Urban areas Rural areas
1991 50.80 49.08 49.15
1999 54.52 49.99 55.13
Change 7.3% 1.9% 12.2%
1999 54.52 49.99 55.13
2005 57.00 49.46 60.88
Change 4.5% -1.1% 10.4%
2005 57.00 49.46 60.88
2007 55.01 49.19 55.88
Change -3.5% -0.5% -8.2%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
Many different forces exist behind the long-run changes in income distribu-
tions or, more generally, distributions of economic welfare within a population. 
Some of these forces have to do with changes in the distribution of factor en-
dowments and socio-demographic characteristics, while others have to do with 
the returns these endowments produce and others with changes in the popula-
tions’ behaviour such as labour supply, consumption patterns or the decision of 
whether or not to have children. These forces are not independent from each 
other. This is what makes it difficult to identify fundamental causes and mecha-
nisms behind the dynamics of income distribution.
Decomposition techniques are used to identify drivers of distributional 
changes. Traditional techniques explain differences in scalar summary measures 
of distributions rather than in full distributions. The best known of these tech-
niques is the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of differences in mean incomes 
across population groups with different characteristics (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca,
1973) and the variance-like decomposition property of the so-called decom-
posable summary inequality measures (Bourguignon 1979; Cowell 1980; Shor-
rocks 1980). To assess the relevance of the various factors on income inequality 
changes, handling whole distributions instead with averages, a micro-
econometric decomposition methodology first proposed by Bourguignon et al.
(1998) was adjusted and applied to the Honduran case.37
                                                          
37 Variants of the basic methodology have been applied in Altimir et al. (2000), Bourgui-
gnon et al. (2001), Gasparini et al. (2005), Legovini et al. (1998) and Ferreira and Paes 
de Barros (1998), amongst others. See the basics of this decomposition in the Appendix. 
See also Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005).
In particular, we will 
concentrate principally on returns to education and changes in education struc-
ture at the individual and household level, as well as changes in the returns to 
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occupations and sectors, which reflect the shifts between tradable and non-
tradable sectors.38
1.3.1 Estimation strategy
Changes in inequality are always dependent on the years being compared. For 
this reason, it is crucial to provide reasons for the selection of years. We decided 
to decompose changes in Gini of labour incomes for the periods comprised be-
tween 1991 to 1999, 1999 to 2005 and 2005 to 2007. We include 1991 and 2007 
because we want to have the broadest possible perspective that our data allows. 
We additionally include 2005 because, as shown above, this is where labour in-
come inequality reaches its peak. Through the inclusion of this turning point in 
the decomposition, it is possible to study the determinants of the equalization, 
rather than the disequalization of the labour income distribution. We include 
1999 in the decomposition because it offers the possibility to control for the im-
pact of the 1998 Hurricane Mitch on the labour income distribution.
Let  be the vector of parameters determining market hourly earnings and 
the vector of parameters affecting employment outcomes (hours of work and 
participation). In order to estimate the equations for earnings and working hours, 
it is necessary to estimate the vector parameters and . Since we do not have a 
socio economic panel survey for Honduras, we have to rely on a procedure 
which allows to replicate the structure of observed and unobserved characteris-
tics of the year t into the year t2 and vice versa.
Hi is the number of working hours by worker i and wi indicates the hourly 
earnings received by the same individual. In a process of utility maximization, 
Hi is the optimal number of working hours, being determined based on market 
conditions. Heckman (1974) states that it is possible to derive an estimable re-
duced form, starting from a structural system obtained from a utility maximiza-
tion problem of labour-consumption decisions. Individuals allocate hours to 
work and leisure to maximize their utility given their wealth, earnings, time and 
other constraints. The solution to this problem of maximization can be character-
ized as consumption and leisure functions given relevant prices.
Under general conditions, it is possible to invert these functions to obtain 
prices and labour incomes as functions of consumed quantities and worked
hours. In particular, the earnings obtained in this way (w*) can be interpreted as 
marginal valuations of labour, which are a function of personal characteristics, 
                                                          
38 Note that our methodology allowed us to control for composition effects of factors not 
subject to structure simulation. Composition effects are implicitly considered in the con-
tribution of changes in working hours.
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hours worked (amongst others) and represent the minimum wage for which the 
individual would work for a determined number of hours. On average, if the in-
dividual decides to work, the number of hours worked should be equal to their 
marginal value w* with the wage effectively received. Conversely, an individual 
decides not to go to work if the marginal value is greater than the wage offered.
Consequently, our model consists of two equations; one for hourly earnings
(w*) and one for the number of worked hours (H*). These equations are a func-
tion of exogenous vectors taken as given, affecting earnings (X1) and hours of 
work (X2), which are allowed to have elements in common. The equation for 
working hours includes composition variables, which will reflect in the simu-
lated working hours, compositional changes, or in other words, changes between 






	 1  2 represent unobservable fac-
tors, which affect the determination of endogenous variables. In order to specify 
our model, for individual i, we observe positive values for w* and H* only if the 
individual actually works; if not, we only know that the reservation wage is 
higher than the offered one:
 =  +   = 1, … ,  (6)
 =  +  (7)
We then have the following observation rule:40
 =  if  > 0
 = 0 if   0
 =  if  > 0








	 1  2 are bivariate 
		$#
%& 1i)= %& 2i)=0 and variances  and  are correlated 
                                                          
39 Note that vector X2 also contains variables indicating occupation, economic sector, re-
gions, gender, wage work, current enrolment, marital status, employment status of other 
household members and urban/rural area.
40 Consistent with the data used for the estimation, observed wages for a nonworking indi-
vidual are zero.
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with correlation coefficient . This specification corresponds to the Tobit type-3
model in Amemiya's classification.41 Even though it is possible to estimate all 
the parameters using a full information maximum likelihood method, we 
adopted a limited information approach that has notable computational advan-
tages. We estimate the hours of work equation by means of a Tobit type-1 model 
in Amemiya’s classification in which the variable is observed only if it is posi-
tive. The parameters of interest can be estimated using a standard censored re-
gression Tobit model.42 In order to control for behavioural responses within the 
household, each simulation of hourly earnings and working hours requires con-
ditional estimations for spouses conditional on the behaviour of the head of 
household, and for other household members conditional on heads and 
spouses.43
1.3.2 Returns to education
Figure 1.6 illustrates the evolution of the returns and relative supply of workers 
by educational levels and areas.44 Returns to schooling increased slightly be-
tween 1991 and 1994;45
Between 1991 and 1994, the demand for skills in rural areas outpaced the 
supply, which remained almost constant throughout this period. Consequently, 
the skill premium increased considerably during this period of real exchange 
rate devaluation. Subsequently, slowly rising supply (combined with stagnant or 
falling demand) appear to be driving the falling returns to education between 
1995 and 2005. From 2005 onwards, returns to high levels of education in-
creased even when a significant expansion of a higher level of education took 
place. In urban areas, the situation appears to be much simpler; declining returns 
are explained principally by the educational upgrade.
however, between 1994 and 2005, returns to education 
declined substantially. Why did this trend take place? 
Looking at the results of the decomposition in Table 1.8, changes in the re-
turns to education had an equalizing effect between 1991 and 2005 across the 
                                                          
41 See Amemiya (1985).
42 This strategy is consistent but not fully efficient. In any case, the efficiency loss is not 
necessarily significant for a small sample. Technical details about the estimation proce-
dure are available upon request.
43 Each simulation represents a whole distribution of labour earnings; therefore, based on 
these simulated distributions, it is possible to obtain a variety of other inequality index-
es. These can be provided upon request by the authors.
44 Returns are obtained from the Heckman ML wage regression (excluded category "with-
out formal education").
45 This trend is also observed in Mexico; see López-Calva and Lustig (2010).
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country. Then, the period between 2005 and 2007 is characterized by disequaliz-
ing returns in rural areas and (slightly) equalizing returns in urban areas. Why do 
we observe different patterns in urban and rural areas during this last period? 
We may find some explanation in the commodity boom mentioned before. The 
upsurge of the tradable sector (see Figure 1.3) could have increased the demand 
for skills in rural areas. However, we also need to study the impact of changing 
endowments to get a more complete picture.
1.3.3  Structure of education 
The educational upgrading of the labour force may also have an impact on the 
distribution of earnings. For instance, there is evidence for Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru where improvements in the distribution of schooling attainment led to an 
equalization of the earnings distribution.46 However, as documented in Bour-
guignon, Ferreira and Lustig (2005), the equalization in years of schooling may 
yield in the short run to disequalize the income distribution (dubbed the 'paradox 
of progress').
Figure 1.6: Structure and returns to education, 1991-2007 
                                                          
46 López-Calva and Lustig (2010). 
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At least during the 1990s, we expect that the net flow of migrants from rural 
to urban areas disequalizes the urban distribution (see Table 1.3). Moreover, 
given the fact that in urban areas the educational upgrading is driven by an ex-
panding tertiary education, we expect a strong disequalization due to changes in 
the structure of education. From 1999 onwards, a priori, it is difficult to predict a 
clear pattern regarding expected inequality changes. Even when the expansion 
of tertiary education speeds up, this effect is superseded by an extraordinary up-
grading at the bottom of the distribution.
Table 1.8: Decompositions of the change in the Gini coefficient, labour earnings, selected 
periods




















Individual education -1.35 -1.24 0.62 -1.95 -1.44 1.69 -1.76 -1.29 -0.29
Household education -0.34 -1.01 0.59 0.80 -1.09 0.35 -0.52 -1.20 0.33
Experience (potential) -0.69 0.80 -0.10 -1.02 -0.85 0.62 -0.68 3.27 -0.62
Sectoral occupation 0.36 2.42 -1.52 8.06 2.82 -1.83 -0.15 0.87 0.11
Other 0.20 0.48 -0.48 1.27 0.48 0.00 -0.16 -1.08 0.22
Endowment
Individual education 2.73 -0.75 -0.91 -5.91 -0.99 -3.67 1.48 -0.21 -1.24
Household education -0.11 -0.18 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.16 -0.01
Experience (potential) -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -1.15 -0.01 -0.04 -0.14 -0.03
Population structure -0.28 -0.42 -0.09 0.21 -0.48 -0.13 -0.35 0.44 0.02
Unobservables (returns & 
endowments)
3.35 3.43 -2.31 5.92 6.89 -4.77 2.18 2.97 -0.88
Hours of work, intensity 0.42 -2.72 1.14 -3.78 3.30 0.15 2.66 -6.77 0.24
Hours of work, employment -0.91 1.68 0.84 0.24 -0.95 1.98 -0.93 2.24 1.56
Residual 0.35 0.03 0.26 2.29 -0.78 0.72 -0.78 0.53 0.32
Total Gini change 3.72 2.48 -1.99 5.98 5.75 -5.00 0.91 -0.53 -0.27
Technical note: This table shows the average contribution to the observed Gini change produced by the observed 
change in each determinant. Averages come from changing the base year from t to t 	
simulations required). See Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005). See Klasen et al. (2012) for a technical de-
scription of the model specification.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
In rural areas, structural changes are working in the opposite direction. 
While the expansion of tertiary education in rural areas is almost absent, im-
provements in the bottom tail of the skill distribution took place (albeit, slowly 
and insufficiently). Moreover, individuals placed on average at the extremes of 
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the skill distribution are more likely to migrate to urban areas (see Table 1.3).47
Decomposition results in Table 1.8 confirm this. Changes in the structure of 
education in urban areas were strongly disequalizing during the 1990s and also 
dominated country-level changes. In rural areas, as expected, changes in the 
structure of education were strongly equalizing for all three periods. 
Consequently, changes in the structure of rural education, including rural-urban 
migration, are expected to equalize the rural distribution of earnings.
With both education endowments and returns pointing towards equalization 
in rural areas, other factors must have dominated these trends to produce the 
drastic increase in labour income inequality during the period 1991-2005.
1.3.4  Returns by sectors and occupations as well as sec-
toral change 
In Table 1.8, we grouped the inequality impact on the labour income distribution 
caused by changes in returns to different economic sectors and occupations.48
By comparing two groups of workers from different sector-occupations, it 
can clearly be seen how returns for specific sector-occupations are driving dise-
qualization. Consider the first group of agricultural workers with less than sec-
ondary education (including those who never attended school). They earned, in 
The combination of sectors and occupations yield a rich labour market division 
in many “sector-occupations” of different scopes, with a great number of work-
ers such as agricultural labourers and very small groups, such as, for example, 
management staff in agriculture. Conditional to education and other covariates, 
our results show that in rural areas, the change in returns per sector-occupation 
is the main inequality driver during the 1990s and one of the most important 
drivers between 1999 and 2005. This finding empirically confirms the assump-
tion that the labour income distribution becomes more unequal due to the evolu-
tion of the inter-sectoral earnings-gap taking place across the whole ability dis-
tribution. It supports the predictions by Devillanova et al. (2010) that if moving 
costs and skills are correlated and there is capital-skill complementarity, a trade-
induced sectoral shift would increase wage inequality between different skill 
levels in a sector and within skill levels across sectors.
                                                          
47 In rural areas, the upper tail of the skill distribution corresponds to those with at least a 
secondary education.
48 We identify the following four sectors: agriculture and related sub- sectors; manufactur-
ing; financing, communication and personal services; and other sectors. The occupa-
tions are: professionals and technicians; directors; office workers; agricultural workers; 
drivers; manufacturing workers; transport workers; and service workers. 
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real terms, 28 and 30 Lempiras per hour in 1991 and 1999, respectively. A sec-
ond group of workers in the finance, communication and services sector, with 
more than secondary education earned 75 and 111 Lempiras per hour, for the 
same respective years. While the first group increased their real hourly earnings
by 8% in eight years, the second group’s earnings increased by 48%. Note that 
the first group belongs typically to the more “traditional” agricultural sector, 
while the second group is part of the dynamic non-tradable sector.
In order to confirm the existence of a growing wage gap between the trad-
able and non-tradable sectors, we estimate hourly earnings for those with less 
than secondary education (including no school attendance). Returns to the trad-
able and the non-tradable sectors increased by 13% and 23% per hour, respec-
tively, during the period 1991-1999. This means that, after controlling for educa-
tion, working in the tradable sector makes a huge difference.
Table 1.8 also shows the impact of hours of work in different sectors and 
occupations (dubbed 'employment'), effectively modelling the impact of sectoral 
and occupational change, as well as hours within a sector (dubbed 'intensity'). 
The results show no clear and persistent trends in the country overall, or in ur-
ban and rural areas. This implies that inter-sectoral and occupational mobility 
has not been a major factor explaining inequality in labour earnings, supporting 
the claim of a relatively rigid labour market with little inter-sectoral mobility.
During the period 1991-1999, in rural areas the increasing demand for skills 
and the insufficient mobility of less-skilled workers determines an extraordinary 
dispersion of the returns across sectors and occupations. The fact that low-ability 
individuals in the expanding sector could work more intensively, can explain 
why changes in working hours help to partially compensate this disequalizing 
trend.49
Between 1999 and 2005, in rural areas the disequalization induced by 
changes in the returns to skills, sectors and occupations is reinforced by the im-
pact of changes in the hours of work.50
This effect can be attributed to the increasing demand for skilled labour in 
the dynamic sector, given the imperfect labour immobility constraining less-
skilled workers to escape from the declining tradable sector. Consequently, this 
This effect can be attributed to the in-
creasing demand for skilled labour in the dynamic sector, given the imperfect 
labour immobility constraining less-skilled workers to escape from the declining 
tradable sector. Consequently, this sector demands disproportionately less work-
ing hours by unskilled workers inducing high levels of underemployment.
                                                          
49 This is due to the complementarity between the two types of labour (skilled and un-
skilled).
50 Returns to skill consist of returns to formal education and unobserved ability.
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sector demands disproportionately less working hours by unskilled workers in-
ducing high levels of underemployment.
1.3.5 Unobservables
Many characteristics of workers and circumstances cannot be observed. Our 
methodology allows us to control for omitted variables. Motivation, ethnicity 
and soft skills, amongst others, may be behind significant changes in the distri-
bution of earnings. Some of these could be a direct consequence of unobserved 
differences in quality of education or technological change affecting demand for 
unobservable skills. 
During the 1990s, a technological change took place in Honduras during the 
liberalization phase. Operating new technologies requires skills, but the supply 
of highly-skilled labour was very limited. In such an environment (and given the 
problems of the education system), skills may be less related to formal education 
than to the (unobserved) ability to adapt to these new work environments in the 
modern non-tradable (e.g. high-end services) sectors. Given this, if a growing 
proportion of the valuable skill endowment is unobserved, the impact of unob-
servables on inequality represents nothing different than increasing returns to 
unobserved skills and the intensification of their use. The fact that something is 
unobservable does not mean that it does not exist. Therefore, because much 
more than half of the variance in wage rates or weekly earnings is explained by 
unobserved characteristics, it is also not surprising that the same factors are ex-
tremely relevant in explaining changes in labour income inequality.
Our results in Table 1.8 confirm the disequalizing role of unobserved char-
acteristics between 1991 and 2005, most importantly in rural areas. However, 
how do unobservable characteristics transform into an equalizing force between 
2005 and 2007? We could speculate that the upsurge of the tradable sector, 
mainly based on agricultural (rural) supply, thinned out the inter-sector wage 
gap, reducing the price of non-observed (modern) skills and increasing relative 
returns of old-fashioned (traditional) formal education. An interesting hypothe-
sis would be that, on the one hand, the tradable sector demands relatively more 
traditional skills, highly correlated with years of education; while, on the other 
hand, the non-tradable sector demands, for instance, higher levels of soft skills 
(mostly uncorrelated with the poor rural education). This hypothesis finds sup-
port in our results as the effect on inequality of education and the unobserved 
ability work in opposite directions. Therefore, increasing profitability gaps be-
tween the tradable and non-tradable sectors may also intensify the disequalizing 
power of unobservable characteristics, and vice versa.
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In order to investigate this issue, the final analytical section presents a meth-
odology to assess the role of the tradable and non-tradable earnings gap in ex-
plaining inequality changes of labour incomes.
1.4 Micro-econometric decomposition III: Linking 
the microeconomic evidence to the 
macroeconomic story
In this section, we present a model for linking findings from the microeconomet-
ric decomposition above with the macroeconomic story. Our central argument 
regarding macroeconomic events and inequality trends was that the effects of 
trade liberalization in the 1990s, combined with a large inflow of remittances 
and donor capital, in response to the destruction caused by natural disasters, led 
to a highly overvalued currency that depressed the tradable sector. Adverse 
commodity prices and the destruction caused by Hurricane Mitch further dam-
aged the agricultural exports considerably. The story changes during the mid-
2000s as a consequence of higher commodity prices recovering the highly de-
pressed labour incomes in the tradable sector.
The concept behind our model is that there is underemployment in the trad-
able sector, and labour-market segmentation restricts the access to the predomi-
nantly modern non-tradable sector. Consequently, a earnings-gap between both 
sectors emerges, depending on relative labour demand conditions and levels of 
productivity. In the tradable sector, given adverse international market condi-
tions - such as depressed commodity prices and overvalued exchange rates – it 
may not pay to increase productivity in this sector and labour incomes will stag-
nate. In contrast, the same conditions will increase earnings and revenues in the 
non-tradable sector of investments there, which are also favoured by the external
environment. 
In this model, we assume workers’ heterogeneity (allowing correlation be-
tween mobility costs and skills) causing an insufficient mobility of workers be-
tween tradable and non-tradable sectors (inducing a positive sloped non-tradable 
labour supply) and capital-skill complementarity. Therefore, different equilib-
rium labour incomes across sectors determine the observed earnings-gap be-
tween sectors. Note that this formulation is compatible with the model by Devil-
lanova et al. (2010) which also relies on the complementarity between the two 
types of labour. The prediction of this formulation is that an economy suffering 
a sectoral shift against the backward sector will increase the inequality between 
and within sectors.
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The key issue in this methodology is to decompose a distributional change 
of rural earnings (which is the sum of the tradable and non-tradable sectors) into 
two determinants. On the one hand, a “within-sector” determinant (WS), that is, 
a determinant of inequality changes which is not directly correlated with returns 
to the tradable and non-tradable sectors,51 and on the other hand, a “between-
sector” determinant (BS) which captures inequality changes due to variations in 
the relative returns to the sectors (given a fixed structure of endowments, their 
returns and the sectoral employment shares).52
The BS determinant captures the effect of a structural change in key macro-
economic variables. Given the structure of endowments (observed and unob-
served), their returns and the employment shares by sectors, this determinant
reflects the direct contribution to inequality changes from “macroeconomic” 
variables, which may alter the relative sector competitiveness.53
The impact of a change in the BS determinant can be depicted as a horizon-
tal shift of the tradable or non-tradable labour earnings density function. Conse-
quently, the rural labour income distribution changes its shape even when the 
sectoral density functions do not experience any change in their respective 
shapes or weights. Based on this decomposition idea, we present a methodology 
for decomposing the distributional change in a structural macroeconomic BS
effect (earnings gap effect) and in a WS effect, as a result of changes in endow-
ments, returns and employment intensity (including those caused indirectly by 
macroeconomic changes, see below). More formally, we propose an Oaxaca-
Blinder type of decomposition, which can be illustrated as follows:
For instance, a 
reduction of import barriers, an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, an 
increasing public deficit, the non-adjustment of the obsolete or damaged export 
infrastructure and declining prices of commodities are only a few examples of 
institutional and market changes, partially driven by adverse climatic events, 
that can have an impact on the real exchange rate.
 =  (!", #!") $  ( , #!) (8)
                                                          
51 Imagine that rural earnings are built-up by adding the tradable and non-tradable distri-
butions. This determinant would reflect inequality changes that may arise by changes in 
the shapes and weights of both wage density functions.
52 The “between-sector” determinant captures inequality changes resulting from the hori-
zontal shift of one or both wage density functions, keeping shapes and employment 
shares of the density function(s) constant.
53 However, such macroeconomic variables or events may also have an indirect contribu-
tion to inequality changes. This contribution works through affecting other relevant 
prices of the labour market. In this case, the indirect impact will be captured by the WS
determinant (changes in the shape and shares of the sectoral density functions).
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... where the second period is denoted by “ ' ”. The distributional change may be 
decomposed sequentially as follows:
 = [ (!", #!") $  (" , #!)] + [ (!", #!) $  ( , #!)] (9)
Equation (9) indicates that the distributional change may be decomposed in 
a earnings gap effect (between sectors) in t' and a within sectors effect as in t.54
More precisely, while holding the position of the non-tradable earnings den-
sity function unchanged as in t’ we need to find and isolate the horizontal shift 
of the tradable earnings density function (from t' to t) which combined then with 
the change in the shape and employment levels of both sectoral labour earnings
density functions from t’ to t consistently simulate the whole rural distribution in 
t. or:
In order to perform the decomposition, we need to isolate the earnings gap 
change between sectors maintaining the shapes and employment shares of the 
sectoral earnings density functions constant. In other words, we need to find the 
maximal horizontal shift of the tradable labour income density function in t'
which is consistent with the observed rural labour earnings density function in t.
% = min {|%(')|, !"******} (10)
... where % stands for quantile and %(') is a function indicating the earnings gap 
change as a function of the quantile and !"****** represents fixed endowments and 
returns in both sectors in t'. If the gap change is positive, then the minimum 
earnings gap change will disequalize the distribution of rural earnings; however, 
if the gap change is negative, then the minimum earnings gap change will equal-
ize the distribution. Even when the solution of the above minimization problem 
may yield closed-form first-order and second-order conditions, in the case of 
non-monotonic earnings gap change functions, we rely in a non-parametric 
technique to find the solution.
By calculating and constructing sectoral Pen's parades, it is possible to de-
rive a growth incidence curve of the between-sector earnings gap %('). Each 
Pen's parade is estimated for the tradable and non-tradable labour earnings dis-
tributions in t and t'. Figure 1.7 is a representation of the mentioned growth inci-
dence curve for the three periods analyzed. Once % in the equation (10) is de-
rived, we shift the tradable distribution by adding % to the entire distribution of 
                                                          
54 As we can see, there is no path dependence arising in this methodology. As ' is ob-
served, the decomposition only requires an estimation of D(WS’,BS). The BS effect can 
be easily calculated estimating the first term in equation (9).
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earnings in the tradable sector in t'. Thus, we simulate  (!", #!) in (9), which 
is the simulated rural distribution with returns, endowment and shares as in t'
and the earnings gap as in t. As we already know ( , #!), which is the ob-
served rural distribution in t, and (!", #!"), which is the observed rural dis-
tribution in t', it is possible to estimate equation (9), and decompose labour in-
come inequality changes as mentioned.
One should emphasize that this method is likely to underestimate the com-
plete impact of macro conditions on the sectoral distribution of labour incomes.
In particular, one can well imagine that the macro conditions that caused a fa-
vourable shift towards the non-tradable sector not only shifted the entire earn-
ings distribution to the right but also affected different portions of the distribu-
tion differently. For example, the shift towards non-tradables and the adverse 
shift from tradables might have worsened the employment conditions of poorly 
paid agricultural workers more than better paid workers in the tradable sector. In 
that sense, our analysis probably represents a lower bound.
We can now examine to what extent the gap in earnings between the two 
sectors is actually driving changes in the labour earnings distribution. In Figure 
1.7 below, we show changes in the earnings gap between the tradable and non-
tradable sectors by quantiles of the earnings distribution in rural areas. While 
changes in the shapes of the curves are also a consequence of changing returns 
to skills and employment levels in the two sectors, the minimum vertical shift of 
the curves can be understood as the contribution of the general shift of condi-
tions favouring the tradable vs. the non-tradable sector. Between 1991 and 2005, 
this shift increases, widening the gap between the two sectors; between 2005 
and 2007, however, the gap is shrinking.55
Table 1.9: The ‘macroeconomic’ (between sectors) earnings-gap effect on labour income 









Rural Country Rural Country Rural Country Rural Country Rural Country
1991 49.15 50.80 –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––
1999 55.13 54.52 54.95 54.24 54.73 53.98 3.06 7.53 6.74 14.52
2005 60.88 57.00 60.44 56.03 60.00 55.73 7.66 39.11 15.31 51.21
2007 55.88 55.01 56.50 55.68 56.66 55.60 -12.38 -33.67 -15.60 -29.65
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
                                                          
55 Using the above methodology, g is equal to 0.43, 0.14 and -0.14 log points for the peri-
ods 1999-1991, 2005-1999 and 2007-2005, respectively.
Carlos Villalobos Barría - 978-3-653-01949-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:08:12AM
via free access
60                  THE DYNAMICS OF INEQUALITY CHANGES IN A HIGHLY DUALISTIC ECONOMY
Table 1.9 shows the (minimum) contribution to inequality changes as a re-
sult of an exogenous change in the earnings gap between the tradable and non-
tradable sectors (Simulation I - sectors) and between the tradable and non-
tradable occupations (Simulation II - occupations).56 As expected, the contribu-
tion to inequality changes of increasing conditional gaps being consistent with 
the observed inequality changes over time. In other words, given a structure of 
endowments, their returns and employment shares, an exogenous change favour-
ing the non-tradable sector (occupation), yields to higher levels of labour earn-
ings inequality and vice versa. Between 1991 and 1999, results show that the 
exogenous macroeconomic shift between the tradable and non-tradable sectors 
(occupation) explains a minimum of 7.5-14.5% of the observed disequalization 
at the country level, depending on the simulation.
Figure 1.7: Growth incidence curves for the inter-sectoral earnings gap in rural areas
                                                          
56 The tradable sector includes many occupations that are not directly related to trade ac-
tivities (e.g. personnel transport in agriculture). On the other hand, tradable occupations 
include only occupations, which are directly related to trade activities (e.g. agricultural 
workers in the same sector). Here, the tradable occupation should narrowly reflect the 
consequences on inequality arising from changes in the relative Honduran export com-
petitiveness.
Carlos Villalobos Barría - 978-3-653-01949-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:08:12AM
via free access
1.4. LINKING THE MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE TO THE MACROECONOMIC STORY 61
The contribution tends to be higher in the later periods contributing up to 
50% of the disequalization between 1999 and 2005. However, many other intra-
sectoral and inter-occupational gaps exist, which are not controlled for. In this 
sense, our results point out the disequalizing effect of other occupational sorting, 
some of which was indirectly induced exogenously by trade, but some that could 
be related to other shifts in demand for different types of labour within the sec-
tors. This finding suggests that the shifts between tradable and non-tradable sec-
tors, plus structural shifts that increase the demand for unobservables, combined 
with structural rigidities in labour markets that limit mobility, combine to drive 
up labour earnings inequality between 1991 and 2005. Note that the effects are 
larger at the country level than in rural areas as the rural income distribution is at 
the bottom of the overall country distribution and a widening of it has a larger 
proportionate effect on the overall country distribution. After 2005, the com-
modity boom seems to have reversed the tradable-non-tradable shift, but 
whether it is able to overcome the other structural causes of rising inequality, is 
hard to predict at present.
1.5 Conclusions and remaining challenges
In Honduras, increasing income inequality throughout the last two decades has 
mainly been a rural phenomenon, occurring within a context characterized by a 
fall in demand for tradables (linked to an overvalued exchange rate) trade-
induced skill-biased technological change and a low labour mobility between a 
shrinking and increasingly less dynamic tradable sector and the more dynamic 
non-tradable sector. A lack of policies oriented towards the promotion of ex-
ports, an appreciated real exchange rate, increasing flows of capital and more 
recently, remittances after Hurricane Mitch, have contributed towards support-
ing a trade deficit, encouraged by a disappointing performance of the commod-
ity exports (coffee during the 1990s and bananas during the 2000s). All these 
elements establish the framework, which helps to explain the inequality increase 
during the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s.
A variety of decomposition methodologies were used to understand the de-
terminants and drivers of observed income inequality changes. First, we imple-
mented an extended methodology proposed by Barros et al. (2006), finding that 
distributional changes in labour incomes are a strong determinant of inequality 
changes in the household per-capita income. However, between 2005 and 2007, 
the decrease in inequality is a consequence of equalizing trends in labour as well 
as non-labour income; for changes in non-labour income, remittances played a 
significantly equalizing role. However, HIPC debt relief and the resulting in-
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creased social transfer policies of the Zelaya government played only a rela-
tively small equalizing role.
Second, the use of a micro-econometric decomposition methodology, based 
on Bourguignon et al. (2005), helped to assess factors determining inequality 
changes in labour earnings between 1991 and 2007. Changes in unobservables
(prices and endowments) and in the structure of education, together with a pro-
nounced occupational sorting associated with an increasing productivity gap be-
tween the tradable and non-tradable sectors, represent the main drivers of the 
disequalization between 1991 and 2005. Regarding unobservable factors, it is 
plausible that the relative expansion of the non-agricultural sector during the 
1990s, which demands a wider set of skills, is behind the extraordinary contribu-
tion of the unobservable to the increase in labour income inequality. Contrary to 
this, during the 2000s the equalizing contribution of changes in the structure of 
formal education, together with a recovery of the tradable sector - driven by fa-
vourable external conditions and improved export revenues - promoted equality 
by increasing earnings in the tradable sector, expressed as a reduction in the 
price to occupations (occupational sorting), and an equalizing impact of changes 
in unobservable factors on inequality.
We argue that the underlying determinant of the disequalization is the low 
mobility between sectors and occupations, where typically a poor agricultural 
worker is unable to abandon his sector and change to other sectors or occupa-
tions. As shown in our model, improvements in productivity tend to cancel the 
earnings-gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors and also ensure 
higher labour income levels, while improvements in mobility between sectors 
leads to an accelerated decrease in this gap. We argue that the rising interna-
tional competitiveness through policies promoting the productivity of the trad-
able sectors, at the expense of other sectors, increases the standard of living in 
the country, when compared with treating the other sectors equally. 
Regarding the structure of education, and contrary to a general Latin Ameri-
can trend since the second half of the 1990s, where many countries were able to 
compensate the increasing negative impact of technological change in income 
inequality by having simultaneously achieved a more equal distribution of edu-
cation, Honduras did not begin this compensation process until the mid-2000s. 
Additionally, we present evidence linking internal migration and labour income 
inequality changes. Based on a structural probability model, it was possible to 
estimate that the educational structure of migrants at the origin (1994), actually 
affects the structure of education in urban and rural areas. As a result, educa-
tional structure worsened in urban areas and improved in rural areas. Addition-
ally, the impact of educational shifts in urban and rural areas at the country level 
are extremely disequalizing during the period between 1991 and 1999. Further-
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more, a lack of income generation opportunities in rural areas - partly due to a 
depressed tradable sector - contributed to the formation of urban poverty ghettos 
encouraging high levels of criminality and prompting people to leave the coun-
try. 
Our decomposition methodology supports the conclusions by Devillanova et 
al. (2010) suggesting a channel through which trade integration can affect the 
earnings inequality in a context of capital-skill complementarity and imperfect 
mobility of workers. The story that follows is that a shift towards the non-
tradable sector increases the skill intensity and skill premium in this sector (ob-
served and unobserved ability). This evolution regarding skill intensity and skill 
premium is backed up by our results regarding the impact of unobservables on 
inequality in a rural economy characterized by duality. At the same time, rela-
tive earnings for less-educated workers also increase in the dynamic sector com-
pared to those in the tradable sector (due to the imperfect mobility). Conse-
quently, skilled and unskilled workers now perform better in the non-tradable 
sector (relative to those in the tradable sector). In the same manner, the labour 
income distribution becomes more unequal due to the evolution of the inter-
sectoral earnings gap taking place across the whole ability distribution. How-
ever, an important proportion of the inequality increases and resulting equaliza-
tion in the earning distribution cannot be attributed to labour-market forces, but 
rather to changes in the relative competitiveness coming exclusively from mac-
roeconomic conditions.
Given the fact that inequality is partly a consequence of declining rural trad-
able earnings and inter-sectoral and inter-occupation immobility, policies ori-
ented towards increasing labour force mobility and productivity, together with 
encouraging the competitiveness of the tradable sector are highly recommended 
in order to achieve desirable social-economic outputs. Given that almost 80% of 
the extremely poor live in rural areas, most of them working in the agricultural 
sector, it is critical to increase smallholder competitiveness, including export 
promotion policies, an adjustment of the real exchange rate and investments in 
rural infrastructure. However, a more promising step towards increasing rural 
earnings equity in the long-run is to provide a non-segmented education with 
productive and non-discriminatory values in rural areas that reduces the friction 
costs associated to internal migration (between sectors, occupations, and geo-
graphic regions). 
The observed decrease in inequality between 2005 and 2007 should not be 
misunderstood as an already guaranteed change from the previous disequalizing
trend. The evolution of inequality will depend heavily on the impact of the cur-
rent international crisis, commodity prices and the flow of remittances. Even if 
social policies have so far shown only a neutral impact on inequality, they 
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should be reinforced, since their possible success offers a limited set of tools to 
partly overcome the purely exogenous character of inequality trends so far.
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Essay 2 - Sectoral shifts and inequality. How to 
relate macroeconomic events to inequality 
changesii  
Abstract
This paper presents a way to explore how macroeconomic shifts may cause ine-
quality changes. It is based on the backwardness observed in certain sectors in
developing countries. It shows why highly dualistic economies tend to be more 
unequal than economies with flexible and integrated labour markets. Assuming 
that an inter-sectoral earnings gap exists, this methodology offers a lower bound 
estimate of the direct impact on inequality changes caused by macroeconomic 
changes that affects the relative competitiveness between the tradable and non-
tradable sectors. The methodology aims to find the earnings gap change (in log 
units) taking place between two points in time, which is not dependent on the 
distribution of endowments, their returns (observed and unobserved) and on the 
sectoral employment shares. The decomposition methodology proves to be con-
sistent under few assumptions (log normal distribution of earnings and inter-
sectoral stochastic dominance) and was tested using observed and simulated 
data. We suggest a channel through which trade integration can affect labour 
income inequality in a context of capital-skill complementarity and imperfect 
mobility of workers supporting the findings by Devillanova et al. (2010). Since 
segmentation is the underlying disequalization condition, policies oriented to 
encourage labour mobility appear to be highly desirable in such economies to 
reduce inequality and fight poverty.
                                                          
ii This work won the "Best Paper Award" in the Arnoldshain Seminar XI conference on 
“Migration, Development, and Demographic Change – Problems, Consequences, Solu-
tions”, June 25 – 28, 2013, University of Antwerp, Belgium. International Society for 
Comparative Economic Studies. ISCES. 
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2.1 Introduction
Boeke (1953) describes the simultaneous existence of both a traditional and a 
modern economic sector in a colonial economy. The traditional sector is labour 
intensive, with insufficient levels of capital stock and labour division; it takes 
place in rural areas mostly in the form of small-scale agricultural activities. In 
contrast to this, the modern sector is based on capital-intensive industries and 
large-scale agricultural activities oriented towards international markets. It is 
also argued that the large-scale agricultural modern sector mostly favours for-
eign enterprises without affecting rural labour incomes and living standards. 
The descriptions made by Boeke during the last century seem to be also ex-
perienced by many developing countries in Latin America. Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) argue that the Spanish and Portuguese colonization strategy consisted of 
establishing a complex trade system of monopolies and trade restrictions in or-
der to maximize the extraction of resources from the colonies. Unfortunately, 
extractive institutions continue to exist (to use the terminology of Acemoglu and 
Robinson) and are reflected nowadays in many political systems in the develop-
ing world. Robinson (2010) states that political systems tend to generate inegali-
tarian forces if political power is concentrated amongst narrow elites. As a mat-
ter of fact, developing countries are usually dominated by non-consolidated 
forms of democracy, thus allowing institutions to encourage or sustain an un-
equal distribution of incomes.57
Cornia (2012) argues that the desired inequality reduction in South America 
was achieved through macro policies favouring the labour-intensive tradable 
sector, as well as through changes in labour market policies and institutions. 
However, highly dualistic economies are usually characterized by the lack of 
such policies supporting the tradable sector and as a result, the dual structure of 
the economy appears to be a sort of equilibrium based on labour vulnerability 
and underemployment.58
The main purpose of this work is to consider the existence of a backward 
sector as a disequalizing condition. It raises the question how to define sectors in 
a consistent way. Because of the possibility to establish linkages with macro-
economic variables, this paper explores the backwardness of the tradable sector, 
encompassed by the agricultural, mining, and manufacture sectors. The tradable 
                                                          
57 Contrary to this, the natural conjecture is that democracy would imply income redistri-
bution toward the relatively poor. In fact, Cornia (2012) suggests that during the last 
twenty years, many Latin American countries experienced a return to and consolidation 
of democracy, which possibly affected income inequality through the introduction of
more progressive policies.
58 See Klasen, Otter, and Villalobos Barría (2012) on Honduras over the last 20 years.
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sector produces goods that could eventually be exported. The approach of this 
paper is based on the idea that rural areas are the natural space where backward-
ness may take place. Figure 2.1 shows the rural income distribution in Chile and 
Honduras, illustrating both a non-dualistic and a well-recognized dualistic econ-
omy, respectively. The Honduran case clearly shows that the tradable sector lags 
behind the non-tradable sector. In order words, at each percentile, it is possible 
to observe a positive earnings gap between the tradable and non-tradable sectors 
(first order stochastic dominance). Interestingly, the impact of the minimum 
wage appears to be less important in Honduras than in Chile. While in Chile, it 
contributes to back both distributions on its value, in Honduras, the minimum 
wage framework contributes to spread the distribution. According to the Hondu-
ran Secretary for Labour (SENAEH), the minimum daily wage in 2005 ranged 
between 61.26 and 97.77 Lempiras in the agricultural and financial sectors, re-
spectively. This evidence raises the question regarding the role of the minimum 
wage as an equalization instrument.
Figure 2.1: Non-dualistic and dualistic economies, Chile and Honduras in the mid 2000s
The tradable and non-tradable linkages to macro-economic variables have 
been studied in the literature. Agosin (2007) shows that the real exchange rates 
(RERs) in Latin American countries have been unstable, exhibiting strong cycli-
cal fluctuation, associated to financial capital flows. This has proven to nega-
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tively affect the evolution of the tradable sector in terms of their volume (ex-
ports), diversification, and degree of integration of national economies. Ffrench-
Davis (2011) argues that the highly cyclical evolution of RERs produces mis-
aligned rates, affecting the volatility of the capital flows. Such volatility distorts 
investment decisions, promoting speculative and short-run investments, artifi-
cially displacing tradables (many produced by small- and medium-scale enter-
prises). Additionally, it discourages adding value to traditional exports, with re-
gressive effects on employment and employment quality. Moreover, Damill and 
Frenkel (2012), using a panel OLS estimation with yearly data covering the pe-
riod 1990-2010 for the 18 Latin American countries, find that depreciated real 
exchange rates (RERs) tend to significantly reduce unemployment (and also un-
deremployment) with a time lag of two years.59
Ffrench-Davis (2011) argues that profound adjustments in the exchange pol-
icy are required and states:
“Neoliberal views tend to state any exchange intervention involves going against the 
market, and that this is always defeated by that market. On the contrary, it is about 
an alternative approach, to achieve the real market forces – export producers and 
importers, and the producers of importable goods – who are the key players for pro-
ductive development and equity, should prevail in determining the exchange rate. 
This is the market that must prevail, and not the market of short-term operators and 
rent seekers instead of innovation creators and greater productivity. To achieve this 
consistent and selective intervention by the economic authority is fundamental, and 
of course is not free of flaws.”
Besides the economic policy aspects, other macro forces are behind the dual 
equilibrium, such as in the case of Honduras. For instance, natural catastrophes, 
destroying the rural stock of capital, contribute to sustain low productivity levels 
in the traditional sector. Commodity prices may also affect the relative competi-
tiveness of the tradable sector. It is possible that highly volatile commodity 
prices may discourage investment in the tradable sector increasing non-tradable 
competitiveness. Knight and Johnson (1997) find evidence on this for the trad-
able and non-tradable sectors in Australia. Trade policies can also change the 
relative competitiveness of the tradable sector. Trade frameworks that do not 
                                                          
59 Damill and Frenkel (2012) estimate an equation that is a variant of Okun’s law and
takes into account the influence of the RER on the employment-output ratio. The esti-
mations included fixed country-effects to control for the continually diverging levels in 
national poverty and unemployment rates that are caused by differences in the meas-
urement and definitions as well as in the labour market structures. The estimations also 
included fixed time-effects controlling for the external shocks.
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take into account rural backwardness can also accelerate the expansion of im-
port-related sectors and the non-tradable sector. Finally, exogenous capital 
shocks should be also considered; in particular, aid flows after catastrophes and 
remittances. These factors are relatively important for small economies. In the 
same way, Dutch Disease types of impacts are also expected in medium-sized 
economies due to highly competitive industries. For example, Ruehle and Kul-
karni (2011) find that the Copper boom actually contracted the Chilean econ-
omy. As expected, such events would increase the gap showed in Figure 2.1 for 
the Honduran case, and consequences would be expected on the income inequal-
ity.
This paper will explore a methodology for isolating the impact on inequality 
changes produced directly by changes in the relative competitiveness of the 
tradable sector (instrumented as the earnings gap across quantiles between the 
tradable and non-tradable sectors). However, one should emphasize that this 
method is likely to underestimate the complete impact of macro conditions on 
the labour earnings distribution. In particular, one can well imagine that the 
macro conditions that caused a favourable shift towards the non-tradable sector 
not only shifted the entire earnings distribution to the right but also affected dif-
ferent portions of the distribution differently by changing relevant prices in the 
labour market.
This paper is broken down as follows: Section 2.2 reveals a theoretical 
model supporting the linkage between macroeconomic events and inequality 
changes, while Section 2.3 presents an illustration using simulated data. Section 
2.4 offers a description of the proposed methodology. An application using real 
and simulated data is presented in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 concludes this 
study.
2.2 Tradable and non-tradable sectors in the rural 
economy
Consider the rural economy consisting of two sectors: the tradable sector and the 
non-tradable sector. The tradable sector consists of agriculture, manufacture and 
mining. The non-tradable sector comprises all other economic activities. In this 
“classical” model, the tradable sector has an “unlimited” labour supply at the 
subsistence wage S available because there is an excess supply of unskilled la-
bour, such that real earnings remain unchanged over time.
The non-tradable sector (or at least a significant portion of it) develops more 
sophisticated activities, which require a higher level of skills; this consequently 
does not often appeal to individuals in the subsistence sector since, according to 
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Lewis (1954), these will be forced to abandon / relinquish the carefree / easy-
going way of life of the subsistence sector.60
In this model, the wage gap and the underlying underemployment are con-
sidered a function of the relative competitiveness of the tradable sector. Regard-
ing this issue, Lewis (1954) argues:
The non-tradable sector on average 
requires higher skills than the tradable sector so that the non-tradable sector has 
to pay a higher wage W which is typically higher than the subsistence wage S. 
Moreover, this model assumes inter-sectoral imperfect mobility; this means that 
only a few workers of the tradable sector may quit their work and compete for a 
job in the non-tradable sector. For this reason, we observe a positive-sloped la-
bour supply in the non-tradable sector. If the non-tradable sector increases the 
proportion of workers, it has to pay progressively higher wages over the labour 
supply line. Figure 2.2 shows the main features of the model.
“Owners of plantations have no interest in seeking knowledge of new techniques or 
new seeds conveyed to the peasants, and if they are influential in the government, 
they will not be found using their influence to expand the facilities for agricultural 
extension.”
Besides the possibility that plantation owners behave as Lewis states, the 
context of low profit levels, high depreciation rates, overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate and volatile international commodity prices can contribute to ex-
plain why developing countries evolve in such a dual equilibrium. In the context 
of an extremely unskilled labour force, the optimal profit strategy can be fo-
cused on exploiting cheap labour without an interest in increasing labour pro-
ductivity levels in the tradable sector.
Higher commodity prices or improved rural education may be seen as an upward 
shift in the marginal product of the tradable labour curve. High levels of inter-
sectoral mobility can contribute to reach in the rural economy the famous “turn-
ing point” (see Lewis, 1954). This would induce a positive sloped labour supply 
in the tradable sector. So that increasing productivities in the non tradable sector, 
may translate into declining shares of labour in the tradable sector with less un-
deremployment. From here onward, the classical assumption of unlimited labour 
supply ceases to hold. As a consequence of this, the wage gap will decrease. In 
the same way, low levels of inter-sectoral mobility determine that productivity 
improvements in the non-tradable sector will produce an increase in the wage 
gap.
                                                          
60 Lewis (1954, p. 150) makes reference to the rural sector in contrast to the urban or 
modern sector.
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Figure 2.2: The labour market between the tradable and non-tradable sectors
This is only possible because workers in the tradable sector are unable to aban-
don this sector and represent an “unlimited” labour supply at the subsistence 
wage. The underlying force here is the inter-sectoral immobility encouraged by 
dualistic educational systems.
In summary, the concept behind this model is that there is underemployment 
in the tradable sector, and labour-market segmentation restricts the access to the 
predominantly modern non-tradable sector. Consequently, a wage gap between 
both sectors emerges, depending on relative labour demand conditions and lev-
els of productivity. In the tradable sector, given adverse international market 
conditions – such as depressed commodity prices and overvalued exchange rates 
– it may not pay to increase productivity in this sector and wages will stagnate. 
In contrast, the same conditions will increase relative wages and revenues in the 
non-tradable sector of investments, which are also favoured by the external envi-
ronment.
In this model, we assume workers’ heterogeneity (allowing correlation be-
tween mobility costs and skills) causing an insufficient mobility of workers be-
tween tradable and non-tradable sectors (inducing a positive sloped non-tradable 
labour supply) and capital-skill complementarity. Therefore, different equilib-
rium wages across sectors determine the observed wage gap between sectors. 
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Note that this formulation is compatible with the model by Devillanova et al. 
(2010) which also relies on the complementarity between the two types of la-
bour. The prediction of this formulation is that an economy suffering a sectoral 
shift against the backward sector will increase the inequality between and within 
sectors.
2.3 An illustration using simulated distributions
Consider the rural labour income distribution as the combination of the distribu-
tions in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Given the first-order stochastic 
dominance of the non-tradable log-earnings distribution over the tradable distri-
bution, the aggregated rural distribution will be more unequal if both distribu-
tions separate each other keeping their respective shapes and sizes unchanged.61
The key issue in this methodology is to decompose a distributional change 
of rural earnings into two determinants. On the one hand, a “within-sector” de-
terminant (WS), that is a determinant of inequality changes, which is not directly 
correlated with returns to the tradable and non-tradable sectors,
The earnings gap described above comes from different skill price-endowments 
in each sector expressed as different “efficiency wages” (see Mirrlees, 1975 and 
Basu, 1984).
62 and on the 
other hand, a “between-sector” determinant (BS), which captures inequality 
changes due to variations in the relative returns to the sectors (given a fixed 
structure of endowments, returns and sectoral employment shares).63
To illustrate the fundamentals of this methodology, consider that the graphs 
in Figure 2.3 were obtained based on the generation of two normal random dis-
tributions, assuming sectoral sizes and distributional moments observed in Hon-
duras in 2005.64
                                                          
61 Klasen, Otter, and Villalobos Barría (2012) show evidence on this for Honduras.
They represent the tradable and non-tradable sectors of the rural 
economy.
62 This determinant would reflect inequality changes that may arise from changes in the 
shapes and sizes of both earnings density functions.
63 The “between-sector” determinant captures inequality changes resulting from the hori-
zontal shift of one or both wage density functions, keeping the shapes of their density 
function constant.
64 Based on the Honduran specification, the simulation assumes that the tradable sector 
accounts for the 72% of the employment in rural areas. Urban and rural areas account 
for 51.6% and 48.4% of the employment respectively. All parameters for the simulated 
distribution were estimated based on EPHPM 2005.
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The top-right graph shows the same distributions depicted in the top-left 
graph with the only difference that the whole tradable distribution is horizontally 
“displaced” to the left in one log unit, thus inducing an “artificial” earnings gap 
between sectors. It is additionally assumed that the WS determinant does not ex-
ist (implying that the shapes and sizes of both density distributions remain un-
changed). The bottom panels show the rural distributions obtained by merging 
the random distributions directly above.
Figure 2.3: Inter-sectoral earnings-gap and inequality in rural areas
It is possible to see that the bottom-left distribution is more equal than its 
counterpart on the right. In order to estimate effects at the country level, a single 
urban log-earnings distribution is considered. It was generated also based on the 
distributional moments observed in the Honduran labour market in 2005.
Table 2.1 shows the (minimum) contribution to inequality changes as a re-
sult of an exogenous change in the earnings gap of one log-unit between the 
tradable and non-tradable sectors. Given a structure of endowments and their 
returns, an exogenous change favouring backwardness of the tradable sector 
yields to higher levels of labour earnings inequality and vice versa.
Carlos Villalobos Barría - 978-3-653-01949-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:08:12AM
via free access
74 SECTORAL SHIFTS AND INEQUALITY
Table 2.1: The macroeconomic (between sectors) earnings-gap effect on labour income
inequality changes (Gini Index) due to a one unit log earnings-gap shift
Gini coefficient in t Gini coefficient in t’ Gini change (t-t’)
Area Mean Sd. Mean Sd. Points Percentage
Rural 62.40 0.0029 68.20 0.0024 5.86 9.40
Country 60.29 0.0019 65.28 0.0017 5.02 8.33
Note: Each distribution consists of 100,000 observations.
Source: Authors' calculations based on 100 Gini simulations of distributions randomly generated.
Here, the impact is easily to observe because the simulation explicitly holds 
returns to endowments, endowments and sectoral employment shares constant
(shapes unchanged). However, in the real economy, everything changes. Macro-
economic conditions contribute to change returns, and these changes affect the 
path of endowment accumulation. In highly dualistic economies, a shift towards 
non-tradables and the adverse shift from tradables might have worsened the em-
ployment conditions of poorly paid agricultural workers more than better paid 
workers in the tradable sector. In that sense, our analysis probably represents a 
lower bound of the impact of macroeconomic conditions on inequality changes.
2.4 The methodology
Based on this decomposition idea, a methodology for decomposing the distribu-
tional change in a structural macroeconomic BS effect (earnings gap effect) and 
in a WS effect is presented, as a result of changes in endowments, returns and 
employment shares by sectors (including those caused indirectly by macroeco-
nomic changes, see below). More formally, we propose an Oaxaca-Blinder type 
of decomposition, which can be illustrated as follows:
 =  (!", #!") $  ( , #!) (1)
... where the second period is denoted by “ ' ”. The distributional change may be 
decomposed sequentially as follows:
 = [ (!", #!") $  (" , #!)] + [ (!", #!) $  ( , #!)] (2)
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Equation (2) indicates that the distributional change may be decomposed in an
earnings gap effect (between sectors) in t' and a within sectors effect as in t.65 In 
order to perform the decomposition, we need to isolate the labour earnings gap 
change between sectors maintaining the shapes and weights of the earnings den-
sity functions constant. In other words, we need to find the maximal horizontal 
shift of the tradable earnings density function in t' which is consistent with the 
observed rural labour income density function in t. More precisely, while hold-
ing the position of the non-tradable labour income density function unchanged 
as in t' we need to find and isolate the horizontal shift of the tradable labour 
earnings density function (from t' to t) which combined then with the change in 
the shape and the weights of both sectoral earnings density functions from t' to t
consistently simulate the whole rural distribution in t. or:
% =  {|%(')|, !"******}        (3) 
... where % stands for quantile and %(') is a function indicating the earnings gap 
change as a function of the quantile and !"****** represents fixed endowments, re-
turns and employment shares in both sectors in t'. If the earnings gap change is 
positive, then the minimum earnings gap change will disequalize the distribution 
of rural labour incomes; however, if the gap change is negative, then the mini-
mum gap change will equalize the distribution. Even when the solution of the 
above minimization problem may yield closed-form first-order and second-order 
conditions, in the case of non-monotonic earnings gap change functions, we rely 
in a non-parametric technique to find the solution. By calculating and construct-
ing sectoral Pen's parades, it is possible to derive a growth incidence curve of 
the between-sector earnings gap %('). Each Pen's parade is estimated for the 
tradable and non-tradable labour earnings distributions in t and t'. Once % in the 
equation (3) is derived (in the simulation above % equals the unity), we shift the 
tradable distribution by adding % to the entire distribution of earnings in the 
tradable sector in t'. Thus, we simulate  (!", #!) in (2), which is the simu-
lated rural distribution with returns, endowments and employment shares as in t'
and the earnings gap as in t. As we already know ( , #!), which is the ob-
served rural distribution in t, and (!", #!"), which is the observed rural dis-
tribution in t', it is possible to estimate equation (2), and decompose labour ine-
quality changes as mentioned.
                                                          
65 As we can see, there is no path dependence arising in this methodology. As  is ob-
served, the decomposition only requires an estimation of D(WS’,BS). The BS effect can 
be easily calculated estimating the first term in equation (9).
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2.5 An application using observed and simulated 
data
The application using observed data is taken from Klasen et al. (2012). Figure 
2.4 shows three growth incidence curves of the earnings gap or gap(') observed 
in Honduras during the periods 1991-1999, 1999-2005 and 2005-2007. In this 
set up, % = min {|%(')|, !"******} is equal to 0.14, 0.43 and -0.14 log units for the 
three periods respectively.
The simulated data is based on the distributional moments observed in Hon-
duras in 1999 and 2005. Assuming that is % is equal to 0.43,  (!", #!) is
simulated. Table 2.2 shows the contribution of the BS determinant to the ine-
quality change using simulated data.
As expected, the contribution to inequality changes of increasing conditional 
gaps being consistent with the observed inequality changes in Honduras over 
time.66 Between 1991 and 1999, results show that the exogenous macroeco-
nomic shift between the tradable and non-tradable sectors explains a minimum 
of 7.5 percent of the observed disequalization at the country level.
Figure 2.4: Honduran growth incidence curves of the inter-sectoral earnings-gap in rural 
areas
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Table 2.2: The macroeconomic (between sectors) earnings-gap effect on labour income ine-





Year Rural Country Rural Country Rural Country
1999 56.73 56.54 - - - -
2005 62.40 60.29 61.95 58.93 7.96 36.24
Note: The BS determinant or [D(WS',BS')-D(WS', BS)] is obtained by comparing the observed distribution in 
2005 and the displaced distribution (g=0.43). 
Source: Authors' calculations based on simulated data.
The contribution tends to be higher in the later periods contributing up to 
almost 40% of the disequalization between 1999 and 2005.67
Now, Table 2.3 shows the contribution of the BS determinant to the inequal-
ity change using the observed data in the Honduran economy. Appended in this 
table are the contributions depicted in Table 2.2.
Results based on 
simulated data are surprisingly similar to those based on real data. This means 
that the procedure can rely on the assumption that log-monthly earnings are 
well-behaved, and it can therefore be used to isolate the contribution to inequal-
ity changes caused by the BS determinant.
Table 2.3: The macroeconomic (between sectors) earnings-gap effect on labour income ine-
quality changes (Gini Index), observed and simulated data
Percentage change – Rural 
distribution
Percentage change – country-level 
distribution
Year Observed gap Simulated gap Observed gap Simulated gap
1991-1999 3.06 - 7.53 -
1999-2005 7.66 7.96 39.11 36.24
2005-2007 -12.38 - -33.67 -
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data from EPHPM I, EPHPM II and random data.
A growing economy incapable to reduce poverty 
This paper provides interesting insights to the question why the Honduran econ-
omy was incapable to reduce poverty during the first part of the 2000s (see Fig-
ure 2.5). The poverty headcount ratio increased more than six percentage points 
                                                          
67 Note that the effects are larger at the country level than in rural areas as the rural income 
distribution is at the bottom of the overall country distribution and a widening of it has a 
larger proportionate effect on the overall country distribution.
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from 1998 to 2005 while the GDP grew in real terms on average almost 4 per-
cent per year.68
The low correlation between poverty reduction and GDP growth can be ex-
plained by the inequality dynamics during this period of time. According to 
Klasen et al. (2012), the Honduran Gini coefficient of the household per-capita
income rose from 0.55 to almost 0.61 between 1999 and 2005. The authors ar-
gue that the income disequalization during the period 1999-2005 was a rural 
phenomenon and can be mainly explained by declining labour earnings in the 
tradable sector (mainly agriculture) and the upsurge of the non-tradable sector.69
Figure 2.5: Honduran GDP growth rates and the poverty headcount ratio
Thus, the Honduran path of growth during the early 2000s did not meet the 
basic pro-poor growth conditions enounced by Klasen (2009) which appear to 
be very important beyond the specific country context. First, growth did not pre-
dominantly take place in neither agriculture nor rural areas where 80% of the 
poor population actually lives. Secondly, potential workers were not able to di-
versify into nonfarm sectors or to move to more dynamic regions. Finally, there 
                                                          
68 If we consider only the period 2000-2005, poverty rose by 2 percent while the economy 
grew on average five percent per year.
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was not an ex-post pro-poor redistribution of the benefits from growth through 
the tax and transfer system. 
The outcome in terms of poverty during this period of time is not surprising. 
The poor were seized in rural areas suffering from underemployment or unem-
ployment while earners in other sectors and/or urban areas expanded their labour 
per-capita incomes over proportionally. Increasing inequality explains why 
growth does not translate into poverty reduction.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper presents a way to explore how macroeconomic shifts cause inequal-
ity changes. It is based on the backwardness observed in the agricultural sector 
in rural areas. Assuming that an inter-sectoral labour earnings gap exists, this 
methodology allows to control over the direct impact on inequality changes 
caused by macroeconomic changes that affect the relative competitiveness be-
tween the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The methodology aims to find the 
labour income gap change (in log units) taking place between two points in time, 
which is not dependent on the distribution of endowments of the employed 
population by sectors (observed and unobserved characteristics) and their re-
turns.
First, this paper shows why highly dualistic economies tend to be more un-
equal than economies with flexible and integrated labour markets. Second, the 
methodology allows for quantifying the role of direct macroeconomic events on 
inequality changes. The application here presented shows that almost 40% of the 
disequalization experienced by the Honduran economy may find their primary 
cause in macro-conditions (though it does not consider how it affects microeco-
nomic conditions). Klasen et al. (2012) argue that the Mitch Hurricane, declin-
ing commodity prices and the appreciation of the RER are the main macroeco-
nomic forces behind the labour income disequalization between 1999 and 2005. 
Simulated data confirms the results in Klasen et. al. (2012).
The decomposition methodologies support the conclusions by Devillanova 
et al. (2010) suggesting a channel through which trade integration can affect the 
labour earnings inequality in a context of capital-skill complementarity and im-
perfect mobility of workers. The story that follows is that a shift towards the 
non-tradable sector increases the skill intensity and skill premium in this sector
(observed and unobserved ability). This evolution regarding skill intensity and 
skill premium is backed up by our results regarding the impact of unobservables 
on inequality in a rural economy characterized by duality. At the same time, 
relative earnings for less-educated workers also increase in the dynamic sector 
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compared to those in the tradable sector (due to the imperfect mobility). Conse-
quently, skilled and unskilled workers now perform better in the non-tradable 
sector (relative to those in the tradable sector). In the same manner, the labour 
income distribution becomes more unequal due to the evolution of the inter-
sectoral earnings gap taking place across the whole ability distribution. 
Policies oriented towards eliminating the systematic backwardness appear to 
be highly desirable in such economies. Improvement in the relative competitive-
ness of the small-scale agricultural activities is consistent with increased rural 
employment, a reduction in rural underemployment, increasing labour earnings
in the tradable sector, a reduction in the earnings gap and consequently, declin-
ing inequality levels. As usual, poverty levels are higher in rural areas and 
amongst those related to agricultural activities. To fight backwardness is thus 
very similar to reducing poverty and decreasing inequality.
Finally, using fiscal and monetary policy to support the depressed tradable 
sector appears to be consistent with a rational development strategy in such 
countries. Among the set of policies that may be used to achieve this goal, it is 
possible to mention the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, the attain-
ment of asymmetric trade agreements that recognize the backwardness (fair 
trade), allowing the imposition of import tariffs and/or export incentives when 
such backwardness is observed, and the improvement of the rural infrastructure. 
However, in the long run, it is more important to eliminate the sources of labour 
immobility across sectors. Immobility forces usually find their explanation in 
insufficient and outdated educational systems. Therefore, international devel-
opment assistance should focus principally on improving the coverage and qual-
ity of education and infrastructure mainly in rural areas reducing the worker's 
heterogeneity. Additionally, to guarantee minimum prices for the production of 
the backward sector may also be considered in such economies, since poverty 
and inequality are extraordinarily sensitive to the developments in the traditional 
sector.
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Essay 3 - Internal migration and its impact on 
reducing inter-communal disparities in Chileiii  
Abstract
Based on the affirmation that internal migration in Chile has become increas-
ingly less important as an equalizing mechanism for regional income disparities, 
this paper aims to look at the causes of such immobility. The estimation proce-
dure allows for obtaining a non-endogenous potential wage differential which 
controls for the selectivity process involved in the migration decision (based on 
observed and unobserved characteristics). This study finds that the productivity 
differential is the leading factor explaining migration. However, migration not 
only depends on individual characteristics, but strongly relies on the level of 
household education. Unfortunately, the initial disadvantages related to adverse 
family backgrounds determine that the one who faces attractive potential wage 
differentials is at the same time constrained by its household. The conclusion is 
that household-related migration costs are a source of inefficiency in labour al-
location. Consequently, supporting the infrastructure in the rural economy is not 
the only way to achieve convergence across the territory. Subsidies aimed to re-
duce migration costs can be also considered in a framework oriented towards 
encouraging functional migration flows.
                                                          
iii  This paper was presented at the interdisciplinary conference: "Migration: Global De-
velopment, New Frontiers" jointly organized by the NORFACE Research Programme 
on Migration and the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM) at 
UCL in 2013, University College London and at the Arnolshain Seminar XI confer-
ence by the International Society for Comparative Economic Studies, ISCES, at the 
 University of Antwerp in 2013, Belgium. 
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3.1 Introduction
Inter-communal migration movements are relatively minor in Chile. From April 
2002 to 2006, the Chilean socio-economic household survey (CASEN 2006) 
reports a flow of 130,197 individuals from communes with less than 40,000 in-
habitants to communes with more than 40,000 inhabitants reaching almost 4% 
of the population at origin.70 In spite of the dynamic growth experienced in 
Chile during the past two decades, there is a consensus that the improvement of 
the standards of living has not been equally distributed across regions or com-
munes. In a context where it is expected that internal migration may work as a 
mechanism to equalize relative resource scarcities over regions, Soto and Torche 
(2004) show evidence that migration has become increasingly less important as 
an equalizing mechanism for regional disparities.71
Based on this evidence, this paper focuses on the determinants of inter-
communal movements of workers aiming to understand how the selection proc-
ess of the migrant population works.72
In general, individuals are assumed to move if the returns (expected) to mi-
gration are greater than the sum of all opportunity costs and the moving costs 
(Borjas, 1987 and Mincer, 1978). Given this benefit-cost analysis, only a deter-
mined group of individuals and households will have an economic incentive to 
migrate.
It considers observed and unobserved 
characteristics, productivity differentials and initial conditions allowing to asses 
which factors are currently discouraging migration and thus hampering the 
equalization of living standards.
73
There have been many theories trying to explain the migration phenomena 
at different scales. For instance, the Neoclassical Economic Theory regards mi-
gration as a consequence of regional differences on demand and labour supply, 
which result in wage gaps. Pull factors at destination and push factor at origin 
                                                          
70 Individuals moving in the opposite direction reached 128,915; equivalent to 1.1% of the 
population at origin.
71 Busso (2006) argues, based on evidence by Cuervo González (2003) and Aroca (2004), 
that migration can also increase regional disparities in Chile.
72 In this paper, rural-urban and urban-rural migration patterns are considered. In 2006, 
Chile was divided into 13 regions, which are further divided into provinces. Finally, 
each province is divided into communes. In 2010, Chile consisted of 54 provinces and 
346 communes.
73 In this context, positive selection means that, relative to the home-region population, 
movers are of above-average quality. While common wisdom maintains that movers are 
the most motivated individuals of the home-region population, it may be possible that 
persons from the bottom tail of the quality distribution have the economic incentive to 
migrate.
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are the underlying determinants of migration.74 The micro-economic version 
considers migration as a result of a rational decision-making process of indi-
viduals in which cost-benefit analysis is essential.75
Under the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) Theory, migration 
is a joint decision by household members and not an individual decision (Stark 
and Bloom, 1985). Following this line of thought, minimizing risk plays a key 
role in determining migration. In addition, other factors such as capital, credit 
and insurance market availability also play a role; however, wage differentials 
are not considered as a necessary condition for migration. The NELM theory 
considers migration as a household strategy to enhance the income sources. 
Therefore, remittances play an important role here and migration will thus occur 
only when the structure and characteristics of the household allow for net gains 
in welfare.
Todaro (1976) considers 
that migration is triggered by wage differentials and equilibrium is only reached 
when the wage differentials tend to be nonexistent. Similarly, Sjaastad (1962) 
and Becker (1962) propose that migration is an investment decision.
76
The Social Network Theory is based on the idea that the flow of information 
is extremely relevant for potential migrants and their households. It is assumed 
that family and friends contribute to obtain pertinent information about possible 
destinations. These networks reduce cost and migration-related risks for new-
comers (Tilly and Brown, 1967 and Lomnitz, 1977). Thus, former migrants and 
non-migrants share information in origin and at destination reducing the risk as-
sociated to migration. This is complemented by the theory of cumulative causa-
tion, which states that migration reinforces itself by encouraging new migration 
flows (Massey 1990).
As Tsegai (2007) states, the various theories of migration, though with dif-
ferent policy implications, are not necessarily contradictory to each other. This 
paper supports the main conclusions of the Neoclassical Economic Theory con-
sidering wage differentials as the leading factor explaining migration (triggered 
by regional differences on demand and labour supply).77
                                                          
74 Well known pull factors at destination are job opportunities, high incomes, amenities, 
etc. Push factors are usually criminality, poverty, pollution and unemployment amongst 
others.
This paper additionally 
shows that migration not only depends on individual characteristics, but strongly 
75 This micro-economic approach is based on an expected positive net return due to migra-
tion (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1976).
76 Net gains in welfare can be understood, for example, as declining risk and increasing 
expected incomes.
77 See Borjas (1987), Mincer (1978), Sjaastad (1962), Todaro (1969 and 1976).
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relies on household education.78
This paper also supports the following ideas by the NELM Theory (Stark 
and Bloom, 1985):
Unfortunately, this evidence indicates that it is 
highly possible that the migrant is not necessarily the one who may benefit from 
higher wages at the destination (contributing to equalize outputs across regions), 
but the one who is not constrained by its household. Contrary to this, the one 
who probably could take advantage from labour market differentials, but be-
longs to a household with low levels of education, would probably be forced to 
stay.
“It does not view the family as an entity that is split apart as its independence seek-
ing younger members move away in an attempt to dissociate themselves from famil-
ial and traditional bondage, regardless of the negative externalities thereby imposed 
upon their families.” 
“...this approach shifts the focus of migration theory from individual independ-
ence (optimization against nature) to mutual interdependence (optimization against 
one another), that is, it views migration as a "calculated strategy" and not as an act 
of desperation or boundless optimism.”
The empirical approach of this paper consists of a switching regression 
model presented by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) with endogenous switching 
(Maddala, 1983) which can be properly used as a counterpart from an extended 
Roy model in the migration context. This methodology contributes through the 
provision of a structural form for internal migration, which is derived from a 
powerful theoretical framework. This paper shows that controlling for the selec-
tivity process involved in the migration decision appears to be indispensable. 
Ignoring the self-selection of the migrant and non-migrant working populations
yields to an important underestimation of the potential wage differential. Thus, 
the estimation of an unbiased potential wage differential for those at origin al-
lows the estimation of a parsimonious structural probability model. This equa-
tion has the advantage of accounting for the distribution of unobservables allow-
ing to consistently assess the role of productivity differentials on the migration 
decision.
The main conclusion is that household matters not only regarding its com-
position, but also regarding relevant characteristics such as its educational level. 
The household education captures many underlying migration determinants such 
as the importance of the loss of income, the access to better information and 
                                                          
78 The household education refers to the average education in years, excluding the poten-
tial migrant.
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networks and their use to reduce migration costs. It might also proxy for the ease 
of letting go and some demographic components. However, this study is devoted 
to test the idea that the potential migrant is household-dependent. The mecha-
nisms through which this dependence takes place go beyond the scope of this 
study.
This study also reveals an interesting conclusion regarding how women 
(relative to men) are intrinsically motivated to move towards rural communes or 
remain there (in the case of those already residing in rural communes). At the 
same time, due to labour market differentials, women are more likely to move 
towards urban areas or remain there. Such a decomposition of the gender-related 
effects shows the advantages of using a structural model approach.
Accepting the role of migration costs and amenities in discouraging migra-
tion, this paper recognizes that the way to ensure a long-run regional conver-
gence in welfare should be based precisely on lowering migration costs and on 
the improvement of the rural infrastructure. Such interventions will lead migra-
tion to be an effective mechanism in ensuring an efficient allocation of labour 
between rural and urban communes.
This paper is broken down as follows: Section 3.2 reveals the data and the 
population of interest. Section 3.3 offers a brief characterization of the migrants 
and non-migrant groups. The theoretical framework based on the extended Roy 
model is presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the results of the reduced 
and structural forms for the probability to move as well as the selectivity ad-
justed wage equations, while Section 3.6 concludes this study.
3.2 The data
For this study, the official data was provided by the Ministerio de Planificación 
del Gobierno de Chile (MIDEPLAN), and in particular the Encuesta de Carac-
terización Socioeconómica Nacional 2006 (CASEN 2006) was used.79
This study defines rural communes as those with less than 40,000 inhabi-
tants. For the purpose of robustness, another relevant threshold for this paper 
was set at 20,000 inhabitants and different specifications regarding the selection 
of explanatory variables are considered. This paper uses the aforementioned ru-
ral-urban definition based on the idea that moving towards another commune 
Accord-
ing to MIDEPLAN, the size of CASEN 2006 reaches 73,720 households, with 
representativeness at country, urban, rural, regional and provincial levels and 
301 communes of the country.
                                                          
79 Some variables at origin were obtained from CASEN 2003 by MIDEPLAN.
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implies a radical lifestyle change, the adoption of housing and job searching de-
cisions, amongst other consequences.
This study is consistent with Coeymans (1983) and Raczynsky (1980). Both 
studies considered as rural those communes without cities with more than 
20,000 inhabitants. The definition in this paper is somewhat different because it 
instead considers the total communal population. However, the definition 
adopted in this study considers as urban communes a slightly larger number of 
communes than those in Coeymans (1983), which is consistent with the urbani-
zation pattern during the last two decades (Pinto da Cunha, 2002). The urban 
population increased from 85.67% to 87.15% between 2000 and 2006, respec-
tively. Moreover, CASEN 2006 reports that 79% of the population lives within
communes of more than 40,000 inhabitants.
This study focuses on the rural-to-urban and urban-to-rural migration pat-
terns. According to this, four categories of individuals can be defined. Rural and 
Urban Movers are the individuals who moved within the last four years from 
rural and urban areas towards urban and rural areas anytime, respectively. Rural
and Urban Stayers are the individuals who remained at origin.
The nature of the data makes it impossible to define a migrant as an individ-
ual who has moved to a different commune within the last few years (recent mi-
grant). Consequently, workers who have migrated and later returned to their 
communes of origin during this period are not considered as migrants. There-
fore, the estimates on self-selectivity could be potentially biased towards posi-
tive selection regarding the ability distribution. In this study, the population of 
interest is restricted to non-enrolled workers aged 25 years and older reporting 
monthly labour earnings in 2006. In order to prevent the endogeneity of the 
schooling decisions and migration, this study excludes currently enrolled indi-
viduals and those who could be enrolled in 2002.
3.3 Ex-post characteristics of inter-communal 
migrant workers
Table 3.1 shows descriptive information for stayers and movers originating from 
rural and urban communes.80
                                                          
80 The information presented here was collected at destination in 2006. To restrict the 
sample to those older than 24 years and not being enrolled contributes to approximate 
the figures to those actually observed at origin (ex-ante).
As a matter of fact, movers are younger than and 
not as experienced as stayers. Rural movers have on average 10.91 years of edu-
cation, in comparison with the 7.99 years of education for non-migrants origi-
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nating from rural communes. Looking at the average household education, rural 
movers belong to households with 8.16 years of education per-capita, while the 
figure for rural stayers reaches only 6.55 years.81
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for workers in 2006, by groups
These figures indicate a posi-
tive correlation between education levels and migration from rural to urban 
communes. Within those originating from rural communes, movers have more 
children, consist of a slightly larger proportion of women and receive higher 
monthly earnings than stayers.
Rural origin Urban origin
Variables Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
Age (in years) 46.52 38.56 44.55 39.56
Potential experience (in years) 32.53 21.66 28.25 22.47
Education (in years) 7.99 10.91 10.31 11.09
Average household education (in years) 6.55 8.16 8.17 8.09
Number of children per household 1.63 1.67 1.73 1.40
Aboriginal origin (Mapuche) (%) 9.54 7.64 5.89 6.15
Bi-Parental household (%) 67.42 71.18 67.16 75.14
Female (%) 32.70 34.71 38.73 32.70
Adjusted monthly wage (in Current US$*) 234.60 388.91 380.80 385.04
Note: Based on non-enrolled workers 25 years old and older reporting monthly labour earnings in 2006.
*Average US$ in 2006 equals 524.48 Chilean Pesos. 
Source: own elaboration, based CASEN on 2003 CASEN 2006 and Banco Central de Chile.
Regarding those originating from urban communes, the selection of movers 
seems to be slightly positive in terms of the years of education, but on average, 
migrants belong to less-educated households. They are also younger, not as ex-
perienced, with fewer children and earn slightly more than their non-migrant 
counterparts.
                                                          
81 The calculation of the average household education (in years) excludes the potential 
migrant.
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3.4  Theoretical framework
Borjas (1987) used the Roy (1951) model to derive an economic selection model 
based on unobserved characteristics. In this model, migrants are negatively se-
lected if they have below-average wages and productivities given their observ-
able characteristics. Inversely, positively selected immigrants have above-
average earnings and productivities. Thus, there is no relationship between the 
selection process generated by unobserved characteristics, and the selection 
process generated by observed characteristics, such as education. In concor-
dance with the kernel of the Harris-Todaro (1970) model, well-educated indi-
viduals are more able to access good-quality information on the labour market in 
potential destinations and therefore, highly educated people are more likely to
get a job than unskilled workers if the correlation between labour markets in 
both regions is strong enough. However, as Borjas (1988) states:
 “It is completely possible for the most educated persons to migrate to the U.S. (i.e. 
positive selection in education), but for these persons to be the least productive per-
sons in the population of highly educated persons (i.e. negative selection in unob-
served characteristics).”
There are consequently two dimensions of “quality”, therefore, generaliza-
tions based only on observed characteristics are misleading, because much more 
than half of the variance in wage rates or weekly earnings is explained by unob-
served characteristics.
The standard Roy model predicts that migrants will be negatively selected if 
the inequality in the distribution of incomes is lower at destination than at origin 
and if the correlation between wages in both regions is strong enough. Neverthe-
less, a generalization of the Roy model that relaxes the assumption of constant
moving costs by allowing correlation between non-observed abilities and mov-
ing costs shows that the type of selection may change in either direction (Borjas, 
1987).82
                                                          
82 The standard Roy model does not consider any switching costs. As a consequence of 
this, important information is not taken into account if the costs of moving are inversely 
related to the amounts of human capital. If this is the case, it is plausible that individuals 
on the top of the income distribution at home (origin) decide to move to a host area with 
a more equal wage distribution (positive selection). One of the conclusions of this study 
shows that, in fact, the costs of moving are inversely related to the amount of human 
capital.
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3.4.1 Extended Roy model
This model, presented by Borjas (1988), considers random mobility costs. The 
log wages at home area are described by:
- =  + 
         (1) 
Where  is the average log wage at the home area and 
 is the zero mean dis-
turbance with variance .. In the same way, the log wages at host area are de-
fined such that:
- =  + 
 (2) 
Both wage distributions have a joint normal distribution, where 
 and 

can be interpreted as unobservable abilities of individuals.
Assuming that C represents the migration costs which, in this extension of 
the standard Roy model, are not fixed but rather a proportion of the monetary 
and non-monetary cost of migration as a proportion of home income. Migration 
occurs if:83
/45/6/6 > 7
The extended version of the standard Roy model assumes that 7 = 8 +  (3) 
 	( 	$#
  
 )  error ~(0, .9). With this informa-
tion, an individual moves if the index function : = ( $  $ ; + 
 $ 
 $) > 0 and stays if :  0. Assuming the normality conditions and defining:
? = @A(
 $ 
 $ ),       B = $ C45C65DEF     and G = H45H659EF
The probability to move is given by:
I( G > B) = 1 $ J(B)        (4) 
Where J() is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal and following 
Heckman (1979), the unobserved wage of a mover in the region of origin is 
given by:
                                                          
83 This inequality approximates - $ - > 7.
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L(-|: > 0)  =  + M1M2N O(1,2 $ M1M2) $ 1,P MQM2R  (5)
and the observed wages at destination as:
L(-|: > 0)  =  + M6M4EF O(M4M6 $,) $ ,P MQM6R  (6)
Where , represents the correlation coefficient between the disturbances 
 and 
. ,P and ,P are the correlation coefficients between 
 and the error 
of the moving cost S and between 
 and S respectively. (B) = T(U)5V(U) is the inverse of Mill´s ratio where W() is the standard normal den-
sity function.
Brücker and Trübswetter (2007) decompose the second terms in (5) and (6) 
in order to identify composition and scale effects.84 It reveals important implica-
tions about the selection biases in terms of unobserved and observed characteris-
tics. Borjas (1988) shows that positive selection in observed characteristics (i.e. 
schooling) occurs if the labour market in the host region offers a higher return in 
comparison to the home region. The estimation strategy presented in the next 
section achieves the assessment of a structural probability model for internal 
migration, controlling for observed characteristics as well as for the impact of 
unobservables.
3.4.2 Estimation
The extended Roy model presented in this paper finds a suitable counterpart in a 
switching regression model presented by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) with en-
dogenous switching (Maddala and Nelson, 1975; Maddala, 1983).85
: = X(-2i $ -1i) $ ZiY $   (7)
Where equation (1) and (2) can be rewritten as:
                                                          
84 The composition effect measures how a change in the ability mix of a constant-sized 
immigrant pool affects the selection bias, holding the size of the flow constant. The 
scale effect captures what happens to the selection bias as the size of the flow is in-
creased for any given mix of abilities.
85 Endogenous switching satisfies that (^, ^, ) ~(0, _), where
=`. . .9. . .9.9 .9 1 a is the covariance Matrix.
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- =  + ^        (8) 
- =  + ^        (9) 
Here,  is a vector of personal and household characteristics determining 
wages. As standard in the literature, it contains educational levels and the poten-
tial experience (and its square). It additionally includes the average years of 
education for the other household members. Controls for those belonging to the 
Mapuche ethnic group, gender, wealthy communes, rural areas, occupations, 
economic sectors, the public sector and dummies for the region of residence (at 
destination) are also considered.
However, the index function cannot be estimated in a structural form be-
cause - $ - is endogenous. To solve this endogeneity problem, Lee 
(1978) and Willis and Rosen (1979) propose a three step strategy.
In the first step, a reduced form of the migration index function is estimated 
by using a probit Maximum Likelihood estimator where : = 1 if : > 0 and : = 0 otherwise. This index function is based on the migration cost identity ZiY +   = C (counterpart of (3)), which depends on personal and household 
characteristics in Zi and unobservable . 
Vector Zi consists of the level of education of the potential migrant. Here, a 
positive association is expected owing to the relevance of education in the mi-
gration decision. Education allows individuals to reduce risk and improves their 
employment probabilities abroad.86
Following Stark and Bloom (1985), the degree in which the remaining 
members of the household can generate income is important information for the 
potential migrant. So this paper includes the average household education (ex-
cluding the potential migrant) in the model. Other variables usually considered 
in the literature and included in this study are: the potential experience and its 
square, gender, the number of children in the household, a control indicating bi-
parental households, indigenous status (as above), and controls for the regions at 
origin. All these variables are expected to be proxies of the characteristics of 
interest at origin (ex-ante). Additionally, the communal unemployment rates at 
origin are included to reflect the held notion that unemployment (and the subse-
quent poverty and lack of opportunities) encourages migration. The log-
population at origin aims to control for the availability of public goods, as two 
indicators accounting for changes in the relative communal connectivity are ex-
                                                          
86 Greenwood (1975) argues also that education may reduce the psychological costs of 
migration.
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pected to control the fact that migration flows are not homogeneously distrib-
uted across the territory. The inclusion of interaction terms between these in-
dexes and the household education are expected to additionally show the rele-
vance of the human capital accumulation within the household in shaping the 
observed migration patterns (see below).
In a second step, the ML function uses the estimated parameters from the 
reduced form probit model as starting values for the estimation of the Heckman 
corrected wage equations.87 In order to identify this system, at least one variable 
in Zi must be not included in .88
: = X( $ ) + X(^ $ ^) $  = ef +      (10) 
Now, the parameter vector fg in (10) can be suitably estimated and there-
fore, the inverse Mills' ratio for stayers and migrants can be calculated. Equa-
tions (11) and (12) can be estimated for each worker, so that the potential differ-
ential wage can be calculated. For stayers:
- =  $ .hj T(klop )V(klop ) + ^ (11)
And for movers:
- =  $ .hj T(klop )5V(klop ) + ^ (12)
Both wage equations (for stayers and movers) allow the estimation of a po-
tential wage differential for each worker without selection bias. The potential 
wage differential (in logs) and its square (allowing for nonlinearities) are then 
included in the third step to estimate structurally the index function for the mi-
gration probability (10). Besides the potential wage differential, the structural 
equation includes as explanatory variables the communal unemployment rates at 
                                                          
87 This paper uses the Heckman Maximum Likelihood estimator for survey data, which 
also takes into account the correlation between primary sample units avoiding the un-
derestimation of standard errors and, consequently, avoiding the overestimation of sam-
ple selection bias or possible self-selectivity of migrants. The maximum likelihood 
method has been shown to produce consistent estimates under a few plausible condi-
tions. Maximum likelihood estimates have the further advantage of being normal and 
efficient if sample sizes are large enough (Gujarati, 2003: p.113).
88 This identification problem was solved using the marital status and the indexes of 
changes in connectivity as exclusion variables in (11) and (12) to identify (10).
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origin and the provision of public goods proxied by the population at origin (in 
logs). Additionally, in order to control for the life cycle of the potential migrant, 
the age is included.89 In order to test the hypothesis that migration is a house-
hold-dependent decision which is also affected by channels unrelated to the la-
bour market, the average household education is included in the structural model 
specifications. Finally, other relevant characteristics are also considered i.e. the 
bi-parental household condition, the number of children in the household, in-
digenous status (Mapuche) dummies for the regions of origin, interaction terms 
and connectivity indices as well.
3.4.3  The role of geographic connectivity - Adjacency 
at the communal level 
This paper uses a social network method to understand the role of the “connec-
tivity” in determining migration. The migration literature has extensively de-
picted the role of the distance affecting the decision to migrate (Greenwood, 
1995).90 However, distance itself is not a migration determinant, but it can be 
seen as an inverse function of the connection between origin and destination. 
Consequently, how connected are communes at origin and destination can be 
considered as a proper proxy for underlying migration determinants such as in-
formation flows, transport cost, psychological and opportunity costs (Schwartz, 
1973 and Greenwood, 1995). To capture the impact of changes in connectivity, 
an index is elaborated following Boots and Kanaroglou (1988). The index relies 
on the principal eigenvector of the connectivity matrix.91
Due to the peculiar geographical distribution of the Chilean communes, two 
connectivity index variables are needed. 7q is expected to control for 
changes in the relative connectivity at the regional level and rst at the country 
level based on migration flows between regions. These variables can comple-
ment the evidence found decades ago by Herrick (1965) and Elizaga (1970) 
showing that migration in Chile follows a “stair-shaped” process, where indi-
viduals migrate initially from small towns towards intermediate cities and there-
after towards metropolitan areas.
Each element of the 
principal eigenvector e is a measure of the location relative to the “centre”.
                                                          
89 Following Greenwood (1993) the migration propensity decreases with age. 
90 See also Beaudreau (1990). 
91 This squared matrix is also known as the adjacency matrix. In this matrix, adjacent 
communes (regions) are denoted by the unity, while the diagonal of the matrix and non-
adjacent communes (regions) have only zeros.
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The index of the relative location change between communes is obtained as 
follows:
7q,st = uHv,w5Hx,yHv,wzHx,y (13)
Where e represents the elements of the principal eigenvector of the connectivity 
matrix and subscripts i and a denote the commune and region of origin respec-
tively. In the same way, subscripts j and b represent the commune and region of 
destination. Communes j and i may or may not belong to the same region. In the 
same way:
rst = OHw5HyHwzHyR (14)
Both indices take values between -1 and 1 including the zero, which mean no 
change in the relative location by region and/or commune. Therefore, using a 
single multiplicative index is unsuitable. Values close to 1 indicate a location 
change from an extreme peripheral commune (region) towards a central com-
mune (region). Values close to -1 indicate the opposite.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the mentioned indexes described above. 
Regarding migration flows between different regions rst, migrants tend to 
move towards relatively more peripheral regions. An unconditional view of the 
data shows that, except for Puente Alto (Región Metropolitana), the most pre-
ferred destinations for inter-regional migrants are placed in relatively non-
central regions such as: IV (La Serena), IX (Temuco), II (Antofagasta) and I 
(Iquique). When considering inter-communal migration at a regional level, the 
opposite occurs. Migrants move more frequently from peripheral communes to-
wards those with a higher connectivity index. Note that in this study, the impact 
of changes in the index of connectivity is predetermined by the migration pat-
tern. However, this control is needed in order to obtain consistent estimates of 
the other determinants of migration. Additionally, interaction terms relating the 
household education to the connectivity indexes are also considered (Interaction 
1 = average household education × 7q and Interaction 2 = average house-
hold education ×  rst). The interaction terms aim to test whether the decision to 
move towards a more connected/unconnected region or commune depends on 
the household education. It is expected to find a significant coefficient for these 
interactions, at least for those coming from rural areas. This would be an indica-
tion that migration flows consist, in a major part, of those who belong to house-
holds with relatively high levels of education. The evidence in CASEN 2006 is 
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quite clear regarding this issue. Two-thirds of the migrant population comes 
from relatively well-educated households (above average).92
Figure 3.1: Distribution of the connectivity change indexes (all flows, 2002-2006)
3.4.4 Household education
As Stark and Bloom (1985) state, the degree to which the remaining members of 
the household can generate income is important information for the potential 
migrant. It is not risky to believe that the household income generation capacity 
is correlated with the stock of education in the household.93
                                                          
92 See also Table 3.1.
Thus, less-educated 
households are more dependent on the monetary and non-monetary contribution 
of each member. The cost in case of migration will be somewhat proportional to 
the household welfare dependence on any household member and therefore, an 
individual would be able to move, given other conditions, if he or she knows
that in the case of migration the household will not suffer a considerable reduc-
tion in welfare.
93 This variable was generated excluding the years of education of the potential migrant. 
More important than to avoid the endogeneity problems, it is possible to figure out what 
the potential migrant is observing in its own household in terms of education.
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This variable is also highly correlated with the dependency ratio, but condi-
tional on the stock of education within the household. Poor levels of household 
education would reflect high levels of dependency, which translate into high op-
portunity costs in the form of higher reservation wages for potential migration 
(discouraging migration). Contrary to this, high levels of average household 
education would be associated with lower dependency ratios, lower reservation 
wages and better mobility prospects.
In summary, the household education captures many underlying migration 
determinants such as the importance of the loss of income (opportunity costs in 
terms of household income at origin), but also the access to better information 
and networks and their use to reduce migration costs. It might represent the ease 
of letting go (more educated parents may find it easier to let their children leave 
the household) and some demographic components (younger siblings will typi-
cally have higher educational levels than their parents). This paper aims to as-
sess whether the theoretical reasons briefly depicted above find some empirical 
support and can easily help to characterize the initial constraints that potential 
migrants might face. However, the mechanism through which this dependence 
takes place goes beyond the scope of this study. 
It would appear that this variable has rarely been used in empirical studies. 
For instance, and for a variety of micro and macro model specifications to test 
for self-selection of migrants, Yashiv (2004), Brücker and Jahn (2008), Cobb-
Clark (1993), Cohen and Haberfeld (2007), Brücker and Defoort (2007), Par-
rado and Cerrutti (2003) and Abramitzky (2009) used only individual education 
variables in their models. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) additionally use the fa-
ther's education level in the migration selection equation. Tsegai (2007) uses the 
average years of education of the adult household members and finds a probit-
coefficient for average education years for adults in the household equals 0.126 
at the 1% significance level in the probability model of the migration decision 
equation at the household level in the Volta Basin of Ghana.
3.5 Estimation results
As mentioned earlier, the three-step strategy aims to obtain consistent estimates 
of the individual probability to migrate. In the first step, the probit model for 
migration serves as the starting point for the estimation of a wage equation al-
lowing to independently evaluate wage determinants for migrants and stayers 
accounting for the role of unobservables and their self-selection (second step). 
Finally, in the third step, the structural probability model explores, amongst 
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other determinants, the role of the non-endogenous potential wage differential 
and the average household education in the migration probability.
3.5.1 Probit - reduced form (first step)
Rural-urban migration
Table 3.2 shows the reduced forms of the migration probability models.94
The potential experience discourages the migration. As expected, higher 
communal unemployment rate at origin increases the migration probability to-
wards urban areas. The statistical significance of the connectivity change indices
shows that the geographical network structure should be taken into account in a 
conditional framework. At the regional level, the net migration flow goes from 
the centre towards communes placed in the periphery. However, many important 
cities are located in peripheral areas within a region. At the country level, the net 
migration flow originating from rural communes goes from “isolated” regions 
towards regions in the “centre”.
The 
probit estimates indicate a positive relationship between education and the prob-
ability to move. This effect is stronger for individuals with higher levels of edu-
cation. Bi-parental households are significantly associated with higher probabil-
ity to migrate. The number of children per household does not have any signifi-
cant impact on the probability to move. As expected, average household educa-
tion positively affects the probability to move, while having an indigenous 
background does not affect the probability to move.
95 Finally, the significant coefficient on the log-
population variable indicates that the provision of public goods works as a pull 
factor discouraging migration. Interaction terms appear to be insignificant.
Urban-rural migration
Here, the probability of migrating is statistically significantly dependent on the 
level of education. The idea that education allows individuals to reduce risks, 
improving their employment probabilities abroad appears to be confirmed. 
                                                          
94 Table C.1 in Appendix shows the same models using the alternative threshold (set at 
20,000 inhabitants).
95 This finding cannot be interpreted as contrary to the conclusions by Herrick (1965) and 
Elizaga (1970).
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Education encourages migration independently of the flow direction. As ex-
pected (due to the nature of the flow), the index of relative connectivity change 
indicate that migration flows towards regions in the periphery.96
Table 3.2: Reduced form of the index function, probit ML. Threshold set at 40,000 inhabi-
tants, 2002-2006 (first step)
Dependent variable: migrant status
Rural-Urban Urban-Rural
Variables \ Model M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Basic education 0.35*** 0.23** 0.21** -0.0122 0.069* 0.069*
Secondary education 0.60*** 0.39*** 0.33*** -0.0386 0.098** 0.098**
Tertiary education 0.72*** 0.38** 0.34** -0.0488 0.17*** 0.17***
Potential experience >5 <11 -0.328 -0.247 -0.199 0.021 -0.0283 -0.0282
Potential experience >10 <16 -0.58** -0.497* -0.44* -0.064 -0.138* -0.138*
Potential experience >15 -0.89*** -0.86*** -0.84*** -0.39*** -0.42*** -0.42***
Avg. household education - 0.05*** 0.06*** - -0.03*** -0.03***
Commij -2.8*** -2.8*** -4.7*** - - -
Rab 1.97*** 1.93*** 0.745 -3.00*** -2.99*** -3.05***
Interaction 1 - - 0.21 - - -
Interaction 2 - - 0.139 - - 0.008
Bi-parental household 0.27*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.22***
Number of  Children -0.01 0.017 0.028 -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.12***
Mapuche -0.072 -0.059 -0.06 -0.035 -0.054 -0.054
Female 0.027 0.03 0.037 -0.09** -0.09*** -0.09***
Unemp. rates at origin 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.04*** -0.045*** -0.045***
Log of population at origin -0.172** -0.19** -0.19** 0.031 0.039 0.039
Constant -0.58 -0.76 -0.93 -2.2*** -2.01*** -2.01***
Regional controls Yes Yes
Observations 51278 47452
Non-migrant Population 1006382 3990350
Migrant Population 41501 47592
Population Size 1047883 4037942
F 12.04 12.11 11.56 20.76 23.34 22.49
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Based on non-enrolled workers 25 years old and older reporting monthly labour wages in 2006.
Source: Own calculations based on CASEN 2003 and CASEN 2006.
The number of children and the labour experience are significantly asso-
ciated to lower probabilities of moving. Finally, women are less likely to mi-
                                                          
96 The coefficient of the index at the communal level could not be calculated due to the 
insufficient number of observations with positive output.
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grate, while the indigenous background appears to be uncorrelated with the 
probability to move.
3.5.2  Selectivity adjusted wage equations and the po-
tential wage differential 
Accounting for the selection process involved in the migration decision, Table 
3.3 shows the monthly wage equations for movers and non-migrant workers 
(threshold set at 40,000 inhabitants).97Although unbiased wage estimates are 
needed to consistently obtain the migration probabilities, they also deserve at-
tention. With independence of the threshold being used, wage equations for 
movers and stayers show the expected influence of the standard determinants on 
wages.98 However, some interesting results can be found in these equations. For 
example, consistent with the fact that women are relatively over-represented in 
the sample of rural movers and under-represented in the sample of urban movers 
(relative to their stayer counterparts, see Table 3.1), women's earnings appear to 
be “less-penalized” for movers than for stayers originating from rural com-
munes. Contrary to this, women originating from urban communes are expected 
to earn less in the case of migration. It is important to keep in mind that women 
movers perform differently than their stayer counterparts. This can help to ex-
plain the findings in the structural model.99
The same tables show that returns to education are higher for movers than 
for stayers. This finding points out that the observed positive selection in educa-
tion is related to the observed outputs in the labour markets. However, the earn-
ing distribution is not only dependent on the relative returns to education and its 
distribution, but also on the distribution of unobservables and its returns. For 
movers originating in rural areas the results indicate that, in terms of unobserved 
ability, they can be considered a random sample of the population at origin.
Contrary to this, for stayers originating from rural communes, the inverse 
*+	#	#,
"ificant and positive impact on wages. This 
indicates that the self-selection process involves only those who decide to stay at 
origin. Equations (11) and (12) show that the total impact of self-selection on 
expected incomes can be calculated by the difference between the coefficients 
associated to inverse Mill's ratio for movers and stayers.
                                                          
97 Table C.2 in Appendix shows the wage equations using the alternative threshold set at 
20,000 inhabitants. 
98 For robustness purposes, we estimate the adjusted wage equations using the best re-
duced form model (M2) and the alternative threshold set at 20,000 inhabitants. 
99 The structural effect of being a woman on migration excludes the consequences of be-
ing a woman working through the labour market (affecting the wages at origin and des-
tination).
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On average, the effect of self-selection on expected incomes is about 36% 
and 4% for those originating from rural and urban communes, respectively. 
Therefore, ignoring this issue would strongly underestimate the potential wage 
differential for those originating from rural communes.
Table 3.3: Wage equations adjusted for self-selection. Movers and stayers. Threshold set at 
40,000 inhabitants using M2 (second step)
Dependent variable: monthly wages (threshold set at 40,000 inhabitants)
Rural Origin Urban Origin
Variables / Migrant status Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
Basic education 0.164 0.107*** 0.168** 0.135***
Secondary education 0.208 0.294*** 0.380*** 0.317***
Tertiary education 0.853*** 0.637*** 0.756*** 0.685***
Potential experience >5 <11 0.788*** 0.175*** 0.0811 0.219***
Potential experience >10 <16 0.626** 0.310*** 0.194 0.355***
Potential experience >15 0.757*** 0.383*** 0.197 0.425***
Average household education 0.00442 0.0364*** 0.0501*** 0.0364***
Number of children in household      -0.00859 0.0269*** 0.0759*** 0.0360***
Mapuche -0.122 0.0226 0.0421 -0.022
Female -0.342*** -0.500*** -0.552*** -0.415***
Public sector 0.023 0.0532*** 0.0147 -0.0275
Rich commune 0.543*** - 0.0724 0.263***
Rural sector -0.00436 0.0923*** 0.0321 -0.124***
Inverse Mill’s ratio (Lambda) -0.0767 0.292*** 0.0102 0.0499
Constant 9.105*** 9.105*** 9.276*** 9.276***
Occupational controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51278 51278 32234 32234
Population size 1047883 1047883 4037942 4037942
Censored population 1006382 41501 3990350 47592
F 155.9 401.6 29.73 242.2
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Based on non-enrolled workers 25 years old and older reporting monthly labour wages in 2006.
Source: Own calculations based on CASEN 2003 and CASEN 2006.
The potential wage differential and education
Now, after controlling for the selectivity of the migration decision (to stay or to 
move), it is possible to analyze the relationship between the potential wage dif-
ferential conditional on the education of the potential migrant and on the average 
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education of its household. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the potential 
wage differential for the bottom and upper tails of the educational distribution. 
The left panel shows that a significant portion of those with tertiary education 
“observe” a potential wage differential larger than 0.5 log-points.
Figure 3.2: Distribution potential wage differential, tertiary versus basic education or less 
(threshold: 40,000 inhabitants, 2002-2006) 
Following the idea that migration is an investment decision (Becker, 1962 
and Sjaastad, 1962), migration is more likely to occur when the potential wage 
differential overcomes all moving costs. Table 3.4 shows that migration is not a 
rare event for workers at origin facing potential wage differentials larger than 
0.5 log-points (mostly tertiary educated). Contrary to this, migration is signifi-
cantly less frequent for those with potential wage gaps smaller than 0.5 log-
points.
Turning the relationship between the average household education and the 
potential wage differential, Figure 3.3 shows that for those originating from ru-
ral areas, lower levels of household education are associated with large produc-
tivity differentials.
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On average, only those belonging to households with about 10 years of edu-
cation or less actually observe positive potential wage gaps. This finding is cru-
cial in the interpretation of the structural probability model.
Figure 3.3: The potential wage differential and the average household education (threshold: 
40,000 inhabitants, 2002-2006) 
Table 3.4: Migration incidence by groups
Wage gap < 0.5 log points Wage gap > 0.5 log points
Migration status Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Movers 29,015 2.69 12,486 17.94
Stayers 1,050,752 97.31 57,103 82.06
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CASEN 2006. 
3.5.3 Probit, structural form (third step)
Table 3.5 confirms that there is a significant causal relationship between the 
potential wage differential and the migration decision.100
                                                          
100 Table C.3 in the Appendix shows the results of the structural form using the alternative 
threshold set at 20,000 inhabitants.
This relationship is de-
picted in Figure 3.4. Interestingly, when the potential wage differential is 
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smaller than a certain threshold, the probability to move is almost independent 
to small changes in the potential wage differential. However, beyond the thresh-
old, the migration probability increases exponentially.101
Figure 3.4: Potential wage differential and migration probabilities (at the mean characteris-
tics, 2002-2006)
Household education
The average household education appears to be highly significant in all specifi-
cations for reduced and structural forms of the probability models. Figure 3.5
shows for a worker with average characteristics originating from a rural com-
mune, how the migration probability grows with additional years of household 
education. The relevance of the household education on migration can be driven 
from an example based on the results of the structural probability model.
                                                          
101 The mentioned threshold can be understood as the cost term in an indirect utility func-
tion, and consequently, the bigger the threshold, the higher the migration costs.
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of the household education and migration probabilities from rural 
to urban communes (at mean characteristics, 2002-2006)
According to these results, the “average” worker originating from rural areas 
has 8 years of education (being non-tertiary educated), 6.6 years of household 
education and faces a potential wage differential of 0.125 log-points. Looking at 
the figure 3.4, it is possible to realize that this average worker has an extremely 
low probability of moving. Now, imagine that the same worker belongs to a 
household with an average of 20 or 25 years of education. In this case, this 
worker would have a migration probability of about 24% and 43%, respectively 
(extraordinarily high in the context of migration).
This example points out that migration is not an individual decision, and that 
it depends largely on the household education. Moreover, the structural prob-
ability model allows to decompose the impact of the household education into 
labour and non-labour market effects. The effect working through the labour 
market discourages migration.
Potential migrants belonging to well-educated household face lower produc-
tivity differentials than those having families with low levels of human capital 
and they are therefore less likely to migrate.
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Table 3.5: Structural form of the index function, probit ML, 2002-2006. Threshold set at 
40,000 inhabitants using M2 (third step)
Dependent variable: migration status.
Rural-Urban Urban-Rural
Variables M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Log-wage differential 0.76*** 1.21*** 1.28*** 3.16*** 3.56*** 3.59***
Log-wage diff. (squared) 1.15*** 0.69*** 0.624** 4.84*** 4.89*** 4.89***
Age -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.008***
Avg. household educ. - 0.107*** 0.10*** - -0.05*** -0.05***
Commij -2.63*** -2.62*** - - - -
Rab 2.15*** 2.03*** - -2.92*** -2.89*** -2.91***
Interaction 1 - - -0.22*** - - -
Interaction 2 - - 0.24*** - - 0.0032
Bi-parental household 0.28*** 0.332*** 0.34*** 0.334*** 0.304*** 0.304***
Number of children -0.021 0.0386 0.044 -0.223*** -0.28*** -0.275***
Mapuche -0.029 0.099 0.092 -0.209*** -0.29*** -0.298***
Female -0.123* -0.20*** -0.20*** 0.230*** 0.301*** 0.301***
Unemp. rates at origin 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.09*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.061***
Log of pop. at origin -0.16** -0.234*** -0.23*** 0.06* 0.09*** 0.09***
Constant -0.319 -0.664 -0.69 -2.24*** -2.12*** -2.12***
Regional controls Yes Yes
Observations 51,278 47,452
Non-migrant Population 1,006,382 3,990,350
Migrant Population 41,501 47,592
Population Size 1,047,883 4,037,942
F 15.7 16.16 17.98 43.2 40.94 39.28
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Based on non-enrolled workers 25 years old and older reporting monthly labour earnings in 2006.
Source: Own calculations based on CASEN 2003 and CASEN 2006.
Contrary to this, the structural impact, which is not related to the labour 
market, encourages migration.102
The correlation between the potential wage differential and the household 
education is statistically significant for all patterns and all specifications in this 
study. Thus, to ignore the household education yields biased estimates of the 
productivity differentials on migration probability.
As a result, the one who could take advantage 
from a labour market differential, but belongs to the segment of less-educated 
households will probably be forced to stay.
103
                                                          
102 Such decomposition arises by comparing structural and reduced form estimates.
103 As a consequence of this, the role of education on the migration probability is overesti-
mated in reduced form equations.
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Thus, household-level migration costs are a source of inefficiency when la-
bour markets allocate workers between rural and urban communes.
Regarding the urban-rural pattern of migration, the household education re-
duces the migration probability. However, the impact is small and can be inter-
preted as a pull factor resulting from larger returns of this variable in more popu-
lated areas. As migration here is not positively dependent on the household edu-
cation and the distribution of the potential wage differential is similar across 
educational levels (right panel in Figure 3.2), it can be argued that potential 
movers are not being constrained by their initial conditions and therefore, migra-
tion is probably working efficiently at least in the urban rural migration pattern.
The gender issue
Looking at our results, it is possible to draw some conclusions based on a gender 
perspective. The structural model shows that there are two channels in which 
being a woman affects the migration probability. The first one is related to the 
labour markets, in particular, to the potential wage differential which captures 
the fact that women movers are “less penalized” in terms of monthly earnings 
than their stayer counterparts as they originate from rural areas (Table 3.3). The 
second channel is related to the women's preferences which are non-related to 
the labour markets. As a result, reduced form estimates show the (confounded) 
combined effect of these two forces working in opposite directions. Thus, the 
gender issue is not irrelevant in designing and implementing migration-related 
policies.
The same reasoning follows for those originating from urban areas. The 
structural form actually shows that females are more likely to migrate than 
males towards rural communes. However, because women are worst-off regard-
ing earnings in case of migration (and this discourages migration relative to 
males), the aggregate effect is significantly negative. Thus, women (relative to 
men) are intrinsically motivated to move/stay towards (or stay in) rural com-
munes while labour market differentials push and pull women towards urban 
areas.
Other determinants
To be part of a bi-parental household increases the migration probability. This 
result should be carefully interpreted because it might reflect the notion that mi-
gration can be a sequential process. Therefore, this variable eventually contains 
information related to migration experience and is consequently not only captur-
ing the restriction imposed by the structure of the household. The number of 
children per household appears to be not correlated with the migration probabil-
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ity for those originating from rural communes. However, for those with origin in 
urban areas, the decomposition of the effect indicates that children appear to in-
crease the potential wage differential (this is based on the idea that workers with 
children behave differently than those without children in terms of productivity). 
Contrary to this and as expected, the direct impact of the number of children in 
the household discourages migration.
Regarding the ethnic background (Mapuche), the structural model helps to 
disentangle its impact for those originating from urban areas. Here, labour mar-
kets appear to push those with indigenous background towards rural areas, while 
other factors non-related to the labour market appear to work in the opposite di-
rection. Hence, the global impact appears to be insignificant (showed in the re-
duced form). For those originating in rural areas, the ethnic background does not 
play any significant role. Regarding the life cycle variable (age), this shows as 
expected a negative association with the studied probability. Looking at the in-
teraction terms, they are only significant towards urban areas keeping the direc-
tion of the original indexes. This means a significant relationship between the 
connectivity change and the household education. Thus the migration pattern 
appears to be also influenced (shaped) by the geographical distribution of the 
stock of household education.
The initial disadvantage
The fact that migration has become increasingly less important as an equalizing 
mechanism for regional disparities (Soto and Torche, 2004) can be explained by 
the fact that the effect of productivity differentials on the migration decision, 
which are supposed to guide the migration process, is being annulated by initial 
disadvantages related to the family background of the potential migrant. The fact 
that relatively highly educated individuals belonging to poorly educated house-
holds observe attractive potential wage gaps means that rural-urban migration 
has the potential to benefit rural households and movers by allowing to increase 
their expected wages and, in this way, to reduce regional disparities. However, 
the structural impact of the household education on the migration probability 
predicts that those individuals, even when facing attractive potential wage dif-
ferentials, will have extremely reduced migration probabilities in case of having 
the initial disadvantage of belonging to a poorly educated household. Unfortu-
nately, the initial disadvantages related to the household background determines 
that the one who is migrating is not always the one who could profit most from 
labour market differentials, but the one who is not constrained by its household. 
The big issue is that both circumstances, on the one hand, to observe high-
potential wage differentials and on the other, to be constrained by the low level 
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of education of its households, come together. Thus, the only way to promote an 
equalizing rural-urban flow is by reducing the household dependence of the po-
tential migrant.
Unemployment and probability models
Ignoring unemployment in the analysis may bias the estimates if unemployment 
affects movers and stayers unequally after controlling for observed and unob-
served characteristics. The inclusion of unemployment would additionally intro-
duce a second selectivity process. However, given the overall low rates of un-
employment for the underlying population in 2006 (ranging from 3.5% to 7.7%)
it is safe to conclude that unemployment does not affect the fundamental find-
ings of this study. In order to prove the validity of this assumption, Table C.4 in 
the Appendix shows results of the structural models, including and excluding 
unemployed potential migrants. The evidence shows that ignoring unemploy-
ment is not a big issue, and it is therefore possible to extend with some precau-
tion the main findings of this study to the labour-market participants at origin.
3.6 Conclusions
Based on the idea that migration is an investment decision (Becker, 1962 and 
Sjaastad, 1962), this paper uses an endogenous switching regression model to
determine whether migrant workers are somehow selected according to their 
observed and unobserved characteristics. The estimation procedure allows to 
obtain a non-endogenous potential wage differential between origin and destina-
tion for each worker with control for the selectivity process involved in the mi-
gration decision (to stay or to move). On average, the effect of self-selection on 
expected incomes is about 36% and 4% for workers originating from rural and 
urban communes respectively. Thus, ignoring the selection process involved in 
the migration decision would strongly underestimate the potential wage differ-
ential for those originating from rural communes. As a consequence, the effect 
of productivity differentials on migration would be miscalculated. Moreover, the 
results are robust across thresholds and model specifications.
Evidence has been found that the potential wage differential strongly deter-
mines the probability to move, but only when the differential reaches some de-
termined threshold for individuals with mean characteristics (about 0.5 and 0.3 
log-points for workers originating from rural and urban communes respectively). 
This evidence supports the Neoclassical Economic Theory approach in the sense 
that potential wage differentials determine migration and can be seen as an in-
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vestment decision. However, the potential wage differential for most individuals 
is relatively small compared to the migration costs. This explains why migration 
is a rare phenomenon being unable to reduce regional disparities.
This paper simultaneously uses the main idea of the New Economics of La-
bour Migration Theory, considering migration as a household decision (Stark 
and Bloom, 1985 and Stark 1993). Furthermore, it shows that migration not only 
depends on individual characteristics, but strongly relies on the household edu-
cation. In this sense, households matter not only for their composition itself, but 
also for their intrinsic capacity to generate welfare. 
The fact that migration has become increasingly less important as an equal-
izing mechanism for regional disparities (Soto and Torche, 2004) can be ex-
plained by the fact that the effect of productivity differentials on the migration 
decision, which are supposed to guide the migration process, is being annulled 
by initial disadvantages related to the family background of the potential mi-
grant. The fact that relatively highly educated individuals belonging to poorly 
educated households observe attractive potential wage gaps means that rural-
urban migration has the potential to benefit rural households and movers by al-
lowing an increase in their expected wages and, in this way, to reduce vulner-
ability. However, the structural impact of the household education on the migra-
tion probability predicts that those individuals, even when facing attractive po-
tential wage differentials, will have extremely reduced migration probabilities in 
the case of having the initial disadvantage of belonging to a poorly educated 
household. Unfortunately, the initial disadvantages related to the household 
background determines that the migrant is not always the one who could profit 
most from labour market differentials, but rather the one who is not constrained 
by its household. The big issue is that both circumstances, on the one hand, ob-
serve high-potential wage differentials and on the other, to be constrained by the 
low level of education of its households, come together. Thus, the only way to 
promote an equalizing rural-urban flow is by reducing the household depend-
ence of the potential migrant.
This study also reveals an interesting conclusion regarding how women 
(relative to men) are intrinsically motivated to move towards rural communes or 
stay there. At the same time, due to labour market differentials, women are more 
likely to move into urban areas or remain there. Such decomposition of the gen-
der-related effects shows the advantages of using a structural model approach.
Finally, this study suggests that supporting the supply side in the rural econ-
omy is not the only way to achieve convergence across the territory. Subsidies 
aimed at reducing migration costs can be also considered under a framework 
oriented to encourage migration as an effective mechanism to reallocate labour 
between communes.
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Essay 4 - Determinants of student achievements 
in the primary education in Paraguayiv
Abstract
The idea that schooling scores depend on a combination of family background 
characteristics, ability and school-institutional related variables is quite clear. 
Regarding the issue of intergenerational transmission of inequality in the educa-
tional system, the degree in which a better institutional performance of the 
school service can compensate problems originated in the family background is 
crucial. Through the estimation of a reduced form equation for selected scores, 
we investigate the impact of institutional performance on scores after controlling 
for family background and individual characteristics. We do this by using a 
novel data set and an OLS and quantile regression approach to analyze how het-
erogeneous the process of score generation can be. By providing integral health 
solutions, minimizing malnutrition and providing ideal conditions in the class-
room, training teachers can impact positively on low and mean learning out-
comes, thus contributing to an improved educational quality and breaking cycles 
of intergenerational transmission of inequality. Increasing learning above-
median outcomes only strengthens the transmission of inequality. Consequently, 
the equality approach should focus on trying to improve the bottom tail of the 
score distributions. Our results show that this can be significantly reached by 
closing gaps in the training of teachers, improving classroom conditions, health 
and nutrition.
                                                          
iv Based on a joint work with Thomas Otter,. This study was published as background 
paper for the Regional Human Development Report for Latin America and the Carib-
bean 2010: “Acting on the future: Breaking the intergenerational transmission of ine-
quality.” 
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4.1  Introduction
This paper addresses the question: why and how does an education system fail 
to provide its students with quality education? To find the answers, schools are 
one of the first places to search. In Paraguay, education quality is not con-
strained by the amount of expenditure because the country is spending a larger 
share of GDP than other Latin American countries and teacher salary levels or 
expenditure per student are also above the Latin American average. However, 
the qualifications of teachers, their performance within the classroom, the qual-
ity of textbooks and materials and the motivational aspects of pupils seem to 
make up a recipe which leads to poor educational quality. 
We propose to estimate the impact of the different vectors on schooling 
achievements (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006) as a whole and in a second approach 
using quantile regressions (quantiles of levels of achievements). Quantile regres-
sions will indicate whether the impact of each explanatory variable changes 
along the score’s distribution or not. Learning achievement indices can be 
ranked by school stratification. By doing so, we are able to analyze to what ex-
tent the differentiation by schools and by socio-economic sectors contribute to 
score’s inequality. To achieve this, we use an inequality measure, traditionally 
used to measure income inequality. 
4.2  Education in Paraguay – an overview
Primary education lays the foundations for a wide range of competencies, 
mainly comprehensive reading, basic mathematical reasoning, the ability to do 
homework, or to work as part of a group. Students who do not master these 
abilities get stuck at a primary level, or if even enrolled at a secondary level, 
cannot move forward and eventually drop out of high school. Students from 
poor family backgrounds are especially affected by these limitations. For exam-
ple, average national rates of repetition are estimated between 17 and 27% for 
first grade, but are practically double (30 to 50%) for the poorer half of the stu-
dents‘ population (Schiefelbein and Brunstein, 2003). Furthermore, these high 
repetition levels (and their associated low achievement) have been almost con-
stant since at least the 1980s (Zea-Barriga et al., 1981, 37; Schiefelbein and 
McGinn, 1980).
Results both from the SNEPE testing system and the UNESCO Adult liter-
acy survey confirm low achievement levels in primary education (which gener-
ates high repetition rates). SNEPE scores show that less than half of Grade 3 
students can understand a brief text (less than 50 words) and that, eventually, 
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only a third of the Grade 6 students will understand a 100-word paragraph in a 
front-page article of a national newspaper (Schiefelbein and Brunstein, 2003). In 
each case rural children (from families who are in the lower half of the income 
distribution) are achieving below the national average. Besides, the UNESCO 
Adult literacy survey found that only two thirds of the Paraguayan urban popula-
tion sampled between 15-34 years old selected five or more right answers in a 7-
item test rated as easy to answer (“literal” identifications). This score suggests 
that only half of the sample knew the correct answer for at least 5 of the 7 items 
(net score near 50%), the balance is close to the result of random success 
(Schiefelbein and Brunstein, 2003).
Low achievement levels in primary education in Paraguay may be linked to 
a lack of access to pre-school for children from poor family backgrounds. “In-
vestment in early childhood education is of key importance for building a strong 
foundation for lifelong learning and to ensure equitable access to learning op-
portunities later in school” (OECD, 2002: p.182). Paraguay has a high “net pre-
school enrolment rate”, but there may be few opportunities for children from 
low income families to attend pre-school (Table 4.1). Lack of resources is an-
other possible cause; therefore, data on expenditure is analyzed in the next sec-
tion to verify whether resources are an effective constraint to delivering educa-
tion of the required quality.
Paraguay provides universal access to the first grade of primary school104
and keeps the newcomers enrolled for six or more years, but only 64% of each 
cohort finish primary education because teaching low-income students is inef-
fective and many students repeat grades.105
                                                          
104 This figure is sometimes questioned, but Household Survey information on access is 
98.3% while the Ministry of Education reports 99.4%.
105 The analysis is focused on the “access to first grade of primary school” because the high 
coverage now offered in Paraguay reduces the reliability of usual indicators. For exam-
ple, the “literacy rate” (self-assessment reported to the Census interviewer) is near 
100% and the “Net Enrolment Rate” (for the 7-12 age group) is an ambiguous average 
of a distribution of single age rates (the range limits for “Enrolment Rates by single 
ages” in ages 7 to 12 are 89.3 to 99.4%). The graduation rate from sixth grade has an 
upper limit near 64% (some 60% enter secondary education according to the Household 
Survey data).
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Table 4.1: Enrolment rates and school expectancy in 2000
Country Years and range of high enrolment1






sec. Tertiary <4 <5<14 <15<19
Paraguay 5 years G. 7-11 48.4 98.3 57.3 9.2 1.4 0.6
Brazil 8 years G. 7-14 24.6 90.1 78 10.9 2.6 0.9
Chile 9 years G. 6-14 23.6 92.7 66.7 8.4 3.5 1.7
Mexico 7 years G. 6-12 35.5 94.8 41 9.4 1.4 1
Uruguay* 9 years G. 6-14 23.5 97.8 60.7 9.9 2.4 1.8
Avg. OECD 12 years G. 4-15 63.8 97.9 77.3 9.4 3.6 2.5
Notes: 1At which over 90 % of the population are enrolled. Lower secondary usually consists of three to six years 
of schooling. Upper secondary could be terminal (preparing for a direct entry into working life) or pre-
paratory. School expectancy must be compared with the length of "primary and lower secondary edu-
cation" in each country.
Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2002. OECD Indicators 2002: pp. 220-1.
Almost 97% of children aged seven are "timely" enrolled. Dropping out be-
gins between the ages of 9 and 11 when 10% of the cohort leaves school. Drop-
ping out at the age of 11 or younger corresponds mainly to students that need 
personalized attention to learn.106
Enrolment data show that primary education coverage increased by about 
five percentage points relative to the previous decade (UNESCO-OREALC, 
2001: p.316) even though enrolment data could have an error of up to 3% (be-
The impact of economic pressures begins at 
the age of 13 when 12% of the age group drops out. Dropping out accounts for 
9% of the group aged 14 and similar rates are observed for the subsequent age 
groups. About 90% of the students remained enrolled in primary school for at 
least six years. However, only 60% of each population cohort enrols in first year 
of secondary education. This attrition is linked to family income and education 
levels and poor reading comprehension that is associated with repetition. Both 
causes may also be linked to not attending pre-school education.
                                                          
106 About 10% of the population needs personalized attention (and facilities) for learning. 
Most Paraguayan schools cannot offer such special care. Therefore, students that need 
special attention either do not enrol or drop out early. There are economic variables 
linked to those earlier drop-outs involving special needs. In a richer country an equiva-
lent student would not end up dropping out partly because in some cases parents would 
pay for special attention, in other cases the schools would have the economic and hu-
man resources needed to deal with such cases, and in part because both parents and 
teachers would identify the problem better and earlier (in those cases where what is 
needed is not so much additional special resources as simply a proper diagnosis). De-
pending on the magnitude of the problem, the unit cost per student (to provide them a 
fair instruction) may be three to ten times higher than the current average unit costs.
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cause enrolments may be over-reported or age dispersal may be underesti-
mated). However, figures from different sources are consistent enough. The 
2001 Household Survey shows that only 1.7% of the group aged between 10-15
years did not enrol in school (DGEEC, 2000) and therefore at least 98.3% had 
access to grade one in primary education. Hence, the probable level of error in 
enrolment data does not significantly affect the analysis of students’ flows (car-
ried out by comparing the net enrolment rates for each single age) presented be-
low.
Teachers make a student repeat Grade 1 when the student cannot decode 
simple words. Most Grade 1 students who are aged eight or older are repeating 
Grade 1 because there was timely enrolment of 96.5% of the group aged seven 
years. At most 5070 newcomers who enrolled in 1999 in Grade 1 at the age of 8 
([100.0-96.5%] multiplied by 143,843) and 869 who enrolled in 1999 in Grade 1 
at the age of 9 (0.6% multiplied by 141,694) should not be counted as repeat-
ers.107 However, some 10% of the students aged 6 that enrolled in 1998 (some 
98,000, because the figure was 99,237 in 1999) may be repeaters in 1999. For 
the sake of simplicity both “corrections” have not been included in the “low es-
timate” of first grade repetition presented in the next paragraph.108
A “low estimate” of repetition in Grade 1 (data from 1999) corresponds to 
students of 8 years and older (given than 96.5% of the seven year olds enrolled 
on time). The 34,578 repeaters represent 17% of repeaters in Grade 1, but some 
have repeated several times. In fact, the total first grade repetition is 57,615 stu-
dent-years (the number of “over-aged students” multiplied by the number of 
“extra years”) and represents a high cost in resources (because most of those 
students should have learned to “decode a short written text” in one year, and be 
promoted to second grade). The “low estimate” of the repetition rate (Table D.3 
in the Appendix) slightly exceeds the repetition rates reported by the school 
principals (UNESCO-OREALC, 2001: p.318), but is below the 20.2% failure in 
first grade reported in 1999 (PNUD, 2003: p.172).
A “high estimate” of repetition in Grade 1 assumes that the share of new-
comers aged between 5 and 8 years is near constant over time (according to dis-
                                                          
107 This assumes that 100% of the cohort was enrolled and that (100-99.4%) dropped out 
after one or two years of schooling.
108 There is a difference between the “number of repeaters in grade 1 of primary as of 
1999” and the “total number of years repeated by students that are in grade 1 of primary 
in 1999”. Most children with normal talent and behaviour would not repeat grade 1 
more than three or four years. However, parents with children with learning difficulties 
or requiring special assistance may keep them more years in first grade (because there 
may be no work opportunities for them or consider the school as a low-cost caring al-
ternative).
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tance to school, sex, talent distribution, or traditions) and that the percentages -
for each of these four ages (regarding each population) -##.

100% (newcomers should be in a range of 97.7 to 99.4 or 100% of the popula-
tion of the normal entrance age according to the Household Survey and institu-
tional data). Given that over 90% of newcomers are aged 6 or 7 years and the 
small difference in both populations (the difference between 145,878 and 
143,843 being less than 2%) the 7 year old group is used as the basis.
The repetition figures for Paraguay are well above the levels in OECD coun-
tries, but they are similar to the averages in other Latin American countries 
(UNESCO, 2008: p.4 and p.44; Wolff et al., 2002). The rate of repetition is usu-
ally low (about 4 or 5%) in schools for students in urban non-marginal areas, 
and rather high (between 30 and 50%) in urban-marginal and rural areas. If 
Paraguayan schools were split into two halves (according to family income), the 
national average would correspond to half of the sum of the repetition rates of 
the wealthier and poorer halves. For example, repetition would approach 30% in 
poorer areas if the rate were 4% in the wealthier areas -..	"
/
estimate” for Paraguayan schools in 1999 -
.rresponding figures would 







the need for estimating repetition by family income levels.
If most of the average students enrolled in Grade 1 are students from the 
lower half of the income distribution, their teachers will have a tough task teach-
ing such heterogeneous classes. High repetition constrains the education levels 
of children from low-income families (few of them reach secondary education) 
and increases the age-heterogeneity in classrooms reducing the effectiveness of 
frontal teaching. Furthermore, repetition is also linked to dropping out (and to 
family income levels) as discussed in the rest of this section.
In general, dropping out is generated by several causes. It is probable that 
children with physical or mental limitations are forced to drop out first because 
the regular system does not deliver the special attention that they need. Most of 
these early dropouts (aged 11 and 12) would correspond to students with special 
attention needs that are not available in the regular schools where they are en-
rolled, although only one out of ten (1% of the population) needs to be in special 
institutions outside the regular system of education. Dropping out generated by 
other reasons –mainly pressure to contribute to the family income– really begins 
around the ages of 13 and 14 years when some 10% of that age group drops out. 
This group of dropouts was enrolled for some eight years, although some 
dropped out temporarily during harvest periods. Paraguayan data suggest that 
these students did not complete primary education because they repeated several 
times due to poor achievement.
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In summary, the school system has built enough space to take care of each 
new population cohort reaching school age, but substantial repetition linked to 
poor achievement and eventual dropping out distorts the enrolment pyramid re-
ducing the access to higher grades. Repetition and dropping out (more recurrent 
in students from low-income families) generate a large gap between newcomer 
students to grade 1 in primary education and the subset starting secondary edu-
cation. Grade repetition and early dropouts eventually reduce the number of 
children from low-income families enrolled in secondary or higher education. 
Repeaters and dropouts tend to be members of low-income families.
Despite the significant progress Paraguay has achieved in recent years re-
garding access to education and school permanence, the country still faces great 
challenges. These include the problems of internal efficiency, quality in learning 
and equity. For instance, retention rates indicate that half of school children fin-
ish their 6th grade without having to repeat any grade (44% in rural areas and 
62% in urban areas). Regarding children’s learning, the low scores achieved in 
the SNEPE’s tests of 2004 (3rd grade: 54% for language and literature and 58% 
for math; 6th grade: 60% for language and literature and 63% for math) show 
that the quantitative growth of the system is not ensuring an adequate level of 
learning.
In Paraguay, education quality is not severely constrained by the amount of 
expenditure because the country spends a larger share of GDP than other Latin 
American countries and teachers’ salary levels or expenditure per student are 
also above the Latin American average. However, the qualifications of teachers, 
their classroom performance, the quality of textbooks and materials and the mo-
tivational aspects of pupils seem to form a recipe which results in poor educa-
tional quality.
Total expenditures on education as a percentage of GDP in Paraguay are 
higher compared with other countries of the Southern Cone, Mexico and even 
the average (Table 4.2). The percentages for upper secondary are over twice as 
high than all other countries, and only expenditures in tertiary education are be-
low the figures for Chile and for the average OECD country. However, given 
that GDP figures may be underestimated, this conclusion should be eventually 
revised. Furthermore, there is a balanced contribution of both public and private 
sources (Table 4.2). Funding for education is provided both by direct public ex-
penditure (4.8% of GDP) and through private spending in educational institu-
tions (3.7%). Paraguay spends on public education the same as the median 
spending of “countries with high human development” and above the 4.2% in 
“medium human development countries” where Paraguay is included (UNDP, 
2003: p.93).
Carlos Villalobos Barría - 978-3-653-01949-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:08:12AM
via free access
118                   DETERMINANTS OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE PRIMARY EDUCATION
Table 4.2: Total expenditure on education as percentage of GDP in 1999




1 Public Private Estimated total2
Paraguay 4.0 2.8 1.5 8.5 4.8 3.7 8.5
Argentina 3.2 0.8 1.1 5.8 4.5 1.3 5.8
Brazil3 3.4 0.6 1.1 5.1 5.1 n.a. 6.2
Chile 3.6 1.4 2.2 7.2 4.1 3.1 7.2
Mexico 3.3 0.8 1.1 5.2 4.4 0.8 5.2
Uruguay3 1.9 0.5 0.6 3.0 2.9 n.a. 4.0
Avg. OECD 2.3 1.3 1.6 5.8 4.6 1.1 5.8
Notes: 1This includes undistributed expenditure and advanced research programs. 2This includes estimated 
private expenditure similar to the average OECD. 3This includes only direct public expenditure by 
educational levels.
Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2002; OECD, Indicators, 2002: pp. 170-72.
These figures show a comparatively high level of resources being allocated 
to education. However, it is necessary to confirm whether funds are used to pay 
teachers suitable salary levels and to assess the level of expenditure per student 
comparing it with the expenditure per student in other Latin American countries.
Mid-career salaries for Paraguayan teachers relative to GDP per-capita are 
high compared with the countries of the Southern Cone and Mexico (Table 4.3). 
Teacher salaries is a key variable for attracting good candidates for initial 
teacher training, keeping trained teachers in the profession, and reducing the real 
school calendar for time spent on strike. A high salary should have a positive 
impact on these three aspects and should also improve students’ achievement, 
reduce repetition and raise the quality of Human Capital in Paraguay. On the 
other hand, teacher salaries make up near 90% of the cost of providing education 
in Paraguay, making this variable a crucial element in decision making in educa-
tion. There is a trade-off between better-paid teachers and a balanced education 
budget.
“Salaries and working conditions of teachers, including starting salaries and 
pay scales, and the costs incurred by individuals in becoming teachers, com-
pared to salaries and costs in other high skill occupations are key factors in de-
termining the supply of qualified teachers” (OECD, 2002: p.332). The compari-
son of teachers’ salaries to GDP per-capita provides an indicator of the relative 
value of teachers’ salaries and also of the affordability for countries (Table 4.3). 
Paraguayan teachers obtain salaries that are equivalent from 2.0 to 3.1 times the 
GDP per-capita in the country. These ratios are better than Brazil (1.5 and 2.4), 
Chile (1.4), Mexico (1.6 and 2.1) or even Uruguay (1.6 assuming full-time 
workload). The Paraguayan ratio is also higher than the average OECD country 
(1.3). In fact, “the ratio of the average upper secondary teacher’s salary to GDP 
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per-capita is the second of all WEI [World Education Indicators] countries at 
3.13 and above all OECD countries” (OECD-WEI, 2003, 137).
In Paraguay, teachers’ salaries increase with the level of education (Table 
4.3). There is no increment linked with years of experience, while such an in-
crement is near 40% in Brazil, 10% in Chile, 30% in Mexico, 20% in Uruguay, 
90% in New Zealand and 40% in the average OECD country. The salary in Sec-
ondary Education (with training) is 60% higher than the salary in Primary Edu-
cation. 
Table 4.3: Ratio of teacher salaries after 15 years of experience to GDP per-capita in
20001
Country 
Wages in primary education 
(with training)
Wages in secondary education
(with training)
Starting 15 Years Ratio to GDP/P Starting 15 Years
Ratio to 
GDP/P
Paraguay 8,874 8,874 2.0 13,911 13,911 3.1
Brazil 7,420 10,176 1.5 14,820 16,240 2.4
Chile 10,716 12,038 1.4 10,716 12,038 1.4
Mexico 11,235 14,824 1.6 14,383 18,760 2.1
Uruguay 5,749 6,891 0.8 5,749 6,891 0.8
New Zealand 17,354 33,653 1.7 17,354 33,653 1.7
Avg. OECD 21,469 29,407 1.3 22,727 31,221 1.4
Note: 1Equivalent US dollars converted using purchasing power parities PPP. Salaries based on a 20 hour per 
week workload. Most teachers hold two positions. Figures in the last column should be further revised 
given that the GDP estimations are distorted for certain years. This includes estimated private expen-
diture similar to the average OECD.
Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2002; OECD, Indicators, 2002: p.339.
This percentage is similar to the situation in Brazil (also 60%), and higher 
than in Mexico (30%) or the other countries presented in Table 4.3. In the aver-
age OECD country the salary in Secondary Education (with training) is only 
10% higher than the salary in Primary Education. Of course, salaries per teach-
ing hour in Paraguay are also higher in secondary education, since secondary 
teachers (as in most countries) are required to teach fewer hours than primary 
teachers. Even though the Paraguayan expenditure per primary student is the 
lowest, the country invests in each student a higher percentage of its GDP per-
capita than the rest of the countries of the Southern Cone and Mexico (Table 
4.4).
The analysis of the “expenditure per primary student” indicator is tricky be-
cause the short-term and long-term effects must be taken into account. For ex-
ample, the expenditure per primary student depends on the salary paid to the 
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teacher, but a sudden salary increment cannot change the training of the teacher. 
The same teacher will still be teaching tomorrow, in spite of receiving more 
money than today. 
“The expenditure per student indicator shows direct public and private expenditure 
on educational institutions in relation to the number of full-time equivalent students 
enrolled in each level. . . . The variation in expenditure on education per student may 
reflect not only variation in the material resources provided to students (e.g., varia-
tions in the ratio of students to teaching staff) but also variation in relative salary 
levels” (OECD, 2002: p.147).
Teachers’ salaries have a major impact in overall unit costs given the tradi-
tionally labour-intensive teaching processes. Increments in salaries have a pro-
portional increment in the expenditure per student. Student-teacher ratios also
have an important effect; Paraguay had 21 students per primary teacher in 1996,
therefore an increment up to a 30 student teacher ratio would reduce the “annual 
expenditure per student” (a proxy of the unit cost) by 30%. On the other hand, a 
drop in enrolments may lead to a significant increase in spending on education 
per student (OECD, 2002: p.150).
The annual expenditure per student in Paraguay increases significantly with 
the level of education as it happens throughout the OECD countries (see the 
OECD averages in the last row in Table 4.4). At the secondary education level, 
the annual expenditure per student is 1.8 times the expenditure per student at the 
primary education level (80% higher). This increment is higher than in other 
countries of the Southern Cone (1.1 to 1.4), Mexico (1.4) and the OECD average 
(1.3). At the tertiary level, the annual expenditure per student is 6.2 times the 
expenditure per student at the primary education level. This increment is lower 
than the increment in Brazil (14.2), but higher than the rest of the countries of 
the Southern Cone (ranging from 2.2 to 4.1), Mexico (4.4) and the OECD aver-
age (2.2).
Table D.3 in the Appendix shows a summary of descriptive schooling statis-
tics in Paraguay.
Carlos Villalobos Barría - 978-3-653-01949-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:08:12AM
via free access
4.2. EDUCATION IN PARAGUAY – AN OVERVIEW 121
Table: 4.4: Annual expenditure per student by level of education and as a percentage of 
GDP per-capita in 19991
Country
Expenditure per student by 
level of education
Expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP per-capita
Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Paraguay 877 1,545 5,465 20 35 125
Argentina 1,629 2,327 5,606 13 19 46
Brazil 956 1,100 13,567 14 16 195
Chile 1,701 1,941 6,911 20 22 80
Mexico 1,096 1,480 4,789 13 18 57
Uruguay 1,000 1,275 2,239 11 14 25
Avg. OECD 4,148 5,465 9,210 19 25 44
Note 1Equivalent US dollars converted using purchasing power parities PPP.
Sources: OECD, Education at a Glance, 2002; OECD, Indicators, 2002: pp.158-59.
4.3 The data
We use three different data sets, namely the Paraguayan household survey (En-
cuesta Permanente de Hogares – EPH 2005), the World Education Indicators’ 
Survey of Primary Schools (WEI-SPS) prepared by UNCESO (data from 2006),
and data from the SNEPE (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Proceso Educa-
tivo) survey in Paraguay in 2003. The WEI-SPS survey was applied to students 
in grade 4 and SNEPE exams were applied to students in grade 3 as well as to 
teachers in training (future teachers). The idea of this research was to use the 
learning outcomes score variable provided by the SNEPE data base as the de-
pendent variable and build up a combined data set with information from 
SNEPE, EPH and WEI-SPS for the explanatory variables.
The SNEPE data base provides information on the results of mathematics 
and reading / writing tests as a percentage of correct answers and as the associ-
ated qualification in school grades. We used the mathematics and communica-
tion scores in its pure form (non-logarithmic) as dependent variables. In general, 
the way our model is specified, it can be understood as a reduced form specifica-
tion where the coefficients change in their scope according to the specification 
of the production function.
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4.4  Previous research
Since the mid-1960s, a vast amount of literature has unfolded in the United 
States and Europe in an attempt to estimate some production function of learn-
ing. Hanushek (1997) accounts for 376 published estimates of US education 
production functions from 89 separate articles published in peer reviewed jour-
nals or books until 1994. 
Apart from the US and European evidence, there are also several studies on 
education production functions in developing countries, summarized e.g. in Ha-
nushek (1997) and Glewwe (2002). While many of the older studies for devel-
oping countries have been criticized for their lack of methodological and data 
quality, several more recent studies have presented convincing evidence on edu-
cation production functions for countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (see 
the references in Glewwe 2002). In particular, several studies use data from ran-
domized trials to estimate the impact of distinct educational policies on student 
performance, most recently in Kenya (see the overview by Kremer 2003), and 
quasi-experimental evidence on class-size effects exists for South Africa (Case 
and Deaton 1999), as well as Israel (Angrist and Lavy 1999). While nearly all of 
these studies are confined to individual countries, recent internationally compa-
rable evidence exists for several countries in francophone sub-Saharan Africa 
(Michaelowa 2001) and for several newly industrializing countries in East Asia 
(Wößmann 2003).
4.5  Approach and methodology
Glewwe and Kremer (2006), propose to estimate the production function for 
learning that may lead to future earnings according to a structural relationship 
that can be depicted as:
   = (!, , 7, , :)         (1)
where A represents the skills learned (achievement), S represents the years of 
schooling, Q represents a vector of school and teacher characteristics (quality), 
C represents a vector of child characteristics (including “innate ability”), H 
represents a vector of household characteristics, and I represents a vector of 
school inputs under the control of parents, such as children’s daily attendance 
and purchase of textbooks and other school supplies (endogenous vector). Based 
on the data available in Paraguay, primarily a national survey on educational 
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achievements for grade 4 (see below), we propose to estimate the reduced form 
relationship.
 = (7, , , LI) (2)
Where all vectors are exogenous, L represents the local community characteris-
tics and EP the education policies. L and EP may interact to determine the qual-
ity (Q) of a school and even the prices (P) of educational inputs such as fees.
 = '(, LI) (3)
I = (, I) (4)
In principle, a reduced form equation can be estimated as A=h(Q,C,H,P), 
but because of the impossibility of getting all prices (P) and schools characteris-
tic which determine quality (Q) and given our available data, we abandoned at-
tempts to estimate the reduced form and we estimate the above reduced form 
relationship which directly links education policies and local characteristics to 
our available educational outputs. 
In our case, achievements and skills can be operationalized throughout 
scores of standardized tests for the areas of reading / writing and mathematics. 
We propose to estimate the impact of the different vectors on schooling 
achievements as a whole and in a second approach via quantile estimations 
(quantiles of levels of achievements). Quantile regressions will indicate whether 
each explanatory variable’s effect changes along the score’s distribution or not. 
Additionally, we are able to analyze to what extent differentiation by schools 
and by socio-economic sectors contribute to score’s inequality.
To achieve this, we use an inequality measure, traditionally used to measure 
income inequality: the Theil 2 Index. The Theil 2 measure -the mean logarith-
mic deviation measure- is defined as:
 = 1  ln   


Where  represents the student i test score,  represents the total number of 
students and  represents the mean test score of the distribution. This index is 
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zero for the case of perfect equality, approaches infinity in the case of perfect 
inequality, and can take intermediate values between the two.
We choose this inequality index because it satisfies a set of axioms and 
properties that are convenient when measuring inequality: symmetry (the meas-
ure is unchanged if there is a permutation of test scores between two persons; 
this principle is also called the anonymity principle); replication invariance (the 
measure is unchanged if the population is doubled, tripled, and so forth), mean 
independence (the measure is unchanged if all scores in the distribution are mul-
tiplied by a scalar); and the Pigou-Dalton Principle (the inequality measure in-
creases with any regressive shift in the (same total) scores from low to high per-
formers. The Gini Index also satisfies these properties so we will report results 
of both indices further ahead.
4.5.1 Quantile approach – Median regression
Consider the following distribution function from a random variable 
() = Pr(  ) (5)
For any (0,1) the quantile of  is defined as:
() =  {: ()  } (6)
The quantile function gives a complete characterization of . Q(0.5) is the me-
dian, the first quartile is Q(0.25), the first decile is Q(0.1) and so on. We can 
now write (3) in a different way. Let ,  = 1, … ,  a ( × 1) vector of ex-
planatory variables, then:
C( $ "|) = I (  |) (7)
This equation is equivalent to:
 = " +  (8)
Where the only constraint is that (|) = 0 and the distribution of this er-
ror term left unspecified. From this we now write the linear conditional quantile 
function as:
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(| = ) = "        (9)
Where  can be estimated solving:





Where () =   $ :( < 0)¢ is the piecewise linear “check function” and :() is the indicator function. The quantile regression estimator achieves a more 
complete description of the conditional distribution of given  = . The partial 
derivate of the conditional quantile of  (see(7)) with respect to one of the re-
gressors, j-th, could be interpreted as the marginal change in the  $  quantile 
due to a marginal change in the j-th regressor. Note that this marginal effect is 
related with  and not with some particular individual, which changes their  $  quantile simultaneously when some value of their explanatory variable 
changes.
There is a major advantage using Quantile regression. We can detect and 
deal with the plausible heteroskedasticity in the data allowing different slopes 
for each conditional quantile in the wage distribution. Using the method sug-
gested by Koenker and Bassett (1978, 1982) to obtain the standard errors, 
Rogers (1992) reports that these standard errors are suitable in the homoskedas-
tic case but that they look to be understated in the presence of heteroskedastic 
errors. Accepting the heteroskedastic nature of our data, we proceed to bootstrap 
the estimated coefficients in order to obtain the standard errors relaxing the ho-
moskedastic assumption and improving our inference power.109
The median regression is also more robust than an OLS regression in pres-
ence of outliers and a difference of Heckman ML estimators, it does not relay on 
the normality of the residuals because the estimation is only influenced by the 
local behaviour of the conditional distribution near the specified quantile.
                                                          
109 The bootstrap is a computational intensive procedure for assessing uncertainty in esti-
mation, in which through resampling data replaces mathematical analysis. We use the 
bootstrap to attach a standard error of the estimated parameter.
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4.5.2 Some comments on applied econometrics
The first estimation method applied in this paper is a linear OLS regression for 
survey data. This estimation technique relies on the normal distribution of re-
siduals with zero mean. The fact that unobserved characteristics could be corre-
lated with some explanatory variable potentially introduces a bias in our esti-
mates. In order to avoid this source of bias, we exploit our data base in order to 
minimize the possibility of observed characteristics remaining in our residual, 
and in this way reducing the probability of an error of specification (omitted 
variable problem).
Although extensive reviews of related literature exist,110
The main data base used in our work is SNEPE, which identifies cluster 
(school id) and strata (public-urban, private-urban, public-rural and private-
rural), and therefore we adopt the sample design in order to optimize the preci-
sion of our estimators. In order to incorporate other indicators, we merge our 
main data base with the mean values for each variable of interest at the district 
level, provided by the WEI-SPS and EPH data bases.
much controversy 
remains over what conventional estimates of education production functions can 
and do tell about the causal relation of student performance, for example with 
respect to the effectiveness of class-size (Krueger, 2003).
This methodology is more powerful than the usual (frequently cited in litera-
ture) weighted OLS regression approach, given that it controls for cluster corre-
lations. Control for cluster correlations in our case basically means that we take 
into account the fact that in certain sectors we might have several schools that 
are quite homogeneous. In this case, variation will not be a pure (100%) random 
effect. Ignoring these cluster effects would imply considering each observation 
as independent, which would create artificially higher variation coefficients, an
underestimation of standard errors and possibly accepting statistically significant 
results when in reality they do not exist. Standard errors in our estimation are 
robust because they are clustered at the school level.
For quantile regressions we used the bootstrapping procedure considering 
the clustered structure of our data and ran these with R software.111 This way we 
basically get almost the same statistical rigor in quantile regressions as in OLS, 
via bootstrapping with 500 replications.112
                                                          
110 About the specification and interpretation of education production functions, Hanushek 
(1986; 2002) offers an excellent discussion.
111 We use the quantreg package developed by Roger Koenker.
112 Efron and Tibshirani (1993) demonstrates that 200 replication provides enough infor-
mation to properly compute the standard deviations of our estimates.
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The bootstrapping procedure which takes into account the clustered design 
of our database, additionally allows to avoid any assumption about the underly-
ing score distributions. Thus, it is a proper way to relax those exigent distribu-
tional assumptions concerning the nature of the residual structure in the regres-
sion models given the fact that our data set contains variables at different aggre-
gation levels.
4.6 Results
Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix show descriptive statistics of our joint data 
base of EPH, WEI and SNEPE data, expressed as quintile means. Note that 
since we have no income data in our data base, quintiles refer to test scores (T); 
this is true for the descriptive statistics below as well as for the quantile regres-
sions further below in the text. 
We have divided our results into four different groups: students’ personal 
characteristics (C) such as age, gender, perspectives indicator; family back-
ground (F) such as parental education, language, coeducational vocation of par-
ents; Local Characteristics (L) such as district average child sickness rate, dis-
trict average health insurance rate, district undernourishment rate and ur-
ban/rural public/private status; and Educational Policies Variables (EP) such as 
school language, optimal classroom conditions and school size, which are 
treated as exogenous. Since there is no self-selection into the sample as 3rd 
grade schooling is compulsory,113
According to Wößmann (2003), as to the main family-background effects 
we have the education level attained by the parents, which is strongly related to 
student performance; the social and economic background of the students in 
general and families’ unobserved aspects of family background, such as parent’s 
motivation or their willingness and capability to help with homework. In gen-
eral, it seems to be that a larger family-background effect materializes in terms 
of better educational performance of the children rather than in terms of higher 
attainment levels.
least-squares estimates should represent 
causal family-background effects. It helps to clarify in advance what the esti-
mates of the coefficients on the family-background variables stand for. Given 
the technical constraints on the pedagogical process, the size of the effect of any 
family-background characteristic on students’ educational performance should 
be the same everywhere. If this is not the case, this implies that there must be 
differences in how the school system works.
                                                          
113 According to data from EPH 2005, the gross enrolment rate for boys and girls aged 8 
(official age for 3rd grade) is 97.8% (self-processed data).
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Additionally, least-square regression results of student performance on 
schools’ resource endowments and of teacher characteristics, controlling for 
family-background influences, might suffer from endogeneity bias. The resource 
endowments that students face may be particularly prone to endogeneity, in that 
resources and student performance are simultaneously determined by other fac-
tors or that the latter is even directly used to determine a reverse causality 
(Hoxby, 2000). For example, school systems may sort weaker students into 
smaller classes, giving rise to a negative correlation between performance and 
the teacher-student ratio in classes (West and Wößmann, 2003). Also, parents of 
high performing students may choose to move into areas where schools are bet-
ter resourced, giving rise to a positive performance-resource correlation. None 
of these correlations say anything about the causal effect of resource endow-
ments on student performance. In short, parents, teachers, schools, and adminis-
trators all make choices that may give rise to a non-causal relationship between 
resources and student performance, so that least-squares estimates of resource 
effects may be biased.114
Tables D.4 and D.5 in the Appendix respectively show results of the OLS 
baseline and the full specifications, while Tables D.6 and D.7 show results of the 
same specifications estimated using the quantile regressions technique.
Of course, there are some possibilities to control for 
this effect. For example, some recent influential studies have tried to avoid en-
dogeneity biases in the class-size estimates by using experimental evidence from 
the Tennessee Project STAR (Krueger, 1999) and quasi-experimental research 
design for data from Connecticut (Hoxby, 2000); one of them finding substantial 
class-size effects while the other finding none at all. Nevertheless, in practice it 
is almost impossible to control for all possible biases, mainly due to limitations 
in the data itself.
4.6.1 Language (F, EP)
Surprisingly, students from Guaraní speaking families in our data show a higher 
performance than those from Spanish or other language speaking households. 
By looking at the tables (ols math, ols com, quant math, quant com), it is clear 
that the family language effect on communication score concentrates towards 
the upper tail of the distribution, while for Mathematic scores the effect appears 
to be more equally distributed and of greater magnitude. This result, contrary to 
                                                          
114 Hoxby (2000) shows that simple least-squares estimates of resource effects are biased 
upwards in the case of class-size effects in the US state of Connecticut; i.e., the least-
squares estimates are biased in the direction of finding positive effects of smaller classes 
on student performance.
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the expected outcomes and inconsistent with other empirical evidence,115 could 
be produced by a problem of selective sample design, where schools with a 
higher native or indigenous background were over-represented, and thus sub-
representing at the same time (elite or higher qualified) schools of non-native 
urban students.116
The impact of the language usually spoken in the household is smaller than 
the impact of the teacher’s language. This way we observe that teachers who are 
teaching in languages other than Guaraní have a negative impact on student per-
formance compared to teachers teaching in Spanish.
Nevertheless, Spanish speaking teachers on average have 
higher performing students (ceteris paribus) than teachers who speak any other 
language. 
The institutional language variable (language spoken by the teacher) is pow-
erful and controls for the language spoken in the household. This way we ob-
serve a pure association (correlation and non-causality proved) between the 
teacher’s language and the student’s performance. Quantile regressions and OLS 
show for communication (Spanish) and mathematics a robust impact in all 
specifications. Our findings could indicate a “low teaching quality” of “native”, 
mostly rural or sub-urban Guaraní speaking teachers. A differentiated teacher’s 
training for non-Spanish speaking teachers might help to improve this situation.
The effect on scores follows an inverted U-shape, where students who are 
concentrated precisely around the median obtain approximately one score point 
more than students who are taught in a language other than Spanish. These is-
sues therefore limit the progress of good students, while also precluding the im-
provement of poorly performing students.
                                                          
115 For instance, the JICA Report on the Paraguayan education sector (JICA and Instituto 
Desarrollo, 2004) mentions a double limitation which arises from the dilemma of a 
population of which at least 75% speak Guaraní as mother tongue but implements (as a 
teacher) and attends (as a student) a Spanish speaking schooling system. Many pupils 
do not speak Spanish adequately when entering school and have difficulties keeping 
pace with the classes; meanwhile teachers whose mother tongue is Guaraní frequently 
show limited capacities in adequately transmitting curricular contents in Spanish.
116 The number of well-performing urban schools with Spanish speaking teachers is in fact 
lower than the number of poorly-performing rural, sub-urban and even urban schools. If 
sub-representation of these generally better performing schools is so low that we get 
only a very limited number of cases, thus there is space for a random selection of the 
worst performing Spanish speaking urban schools, which could create this kind of bias.
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4.6.2 Under-nutrition (L)
Under-nutrition is defined as the mean district under-nutrition rate and belongs 
to the local community characteristics (vector L). This variable shows the ex-
pected negative outcomes on schooling performance. Given its nature, it can be 
considered as exogenous from the point of view of households only and only if
we suppose that there are local factors that determine the district rates of under-
nutrition and the nutrition of each of the children in the district. 
Our results clearly show that higher under-nutrition rates impact negatively 
on schooling performance concerning the median and below. Nevertheless, the 
impact of nutritional problems is higher in mathematics than in communication. 
This variable has a U-shaped impact on scores. Since the nutrition variable is a 
district mean and not individual information, it does not clearly show that nutri-
tional problems might explain poor schooling performance on the average. Nev-
ertheless, it shows that good school performance is immune to nutritional prob-
lems basically because we can suppose that good performing students do not 
suffer problems of under-nutrition. The overall nutritional impact is quite impor-
tant. School performance of districts with zero under-nutrition is 3 to 6 points 
higher than the districts with the highest levels of nutritional problems. It is im-
portant to keep in mind that the nutritional variable ranks from 0 to 1. We can 
therefore roughly conclude, for example, that reducing average under-nutrition 
from 0.5 to 0.4 could improve schooling performance between 0.3 and 0.6 
points (according to our data).
Consequently, our data show that poor parents are likely to produce poorly 
nourished children with low schooling performance, and therefore low human
capital accumulation, resulting later on in probable low incomes and ongoing 
poverty. But given that there also exist spatial patterns of poverty (poorer areas 
or poverty pockets within better-off areas), under-nutrition can simultaneously 
have endogenous and exogenous characteristics.
4.6.3 Optimal class room conditions (EP)
This is a constructed variable that includes information provided by the students 
on the existence of chairs, desks, electricity and the individual feeling of being 
comfortable in the classroom. Even if this variable seems to have a subjective 
background, it is objective in the sense that students who do not feel comfortable 
will not express the opposite feeling. The variable is operationalized as a 
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dummy variable and is robust in OLS and quantiles.117 Its impact is stronger on 
mathematics than on communication and homogeneous impacts throughout the 
distribution, which basically reflects that both good and bad students benefit in a 
similar way from good classroom conditions. Additionally, if students have var-
ied backgrounds, optimal conditions would be a progressive factor, given that 
they offer an environment of equality in the classroom for students coming from 
unequal homes.
4.6.4 Small-scale school (EP)
We have to be quite careful with the interpretation of this variable, given its 
problems of endogeneity. Small schools are defined following a classification 
adopted by the Paraguayan educational authority.118
Thus we discuss their estimates only in terms of correlations. Small schools 
are associated, on the average, with higher performance. Quantiles show an in-
verse U shape indicating that students performing at a mean level benefit from 
attending a small school (according to the official classification from the Minis-
try of Education). Behind this observation, we might have the fact that small 
schools offer a less competitive or more familiar environment, which might be a 
limitation for better performing students or might be the consequence of the ex-
istence of small schools for students with whatever kind of inability or small 
schools as a response to the lack of resources. Whatever the real cause of the 
inverse U shape may be, small schools seem to be ideal for median performing 
students. Even if we do not have a strong evidence of causality for this, we can 
at least state that small schools would do no harm and offer the possibility to 
create an environment where other variables, positively related to schooling 
scores, could start to have a positive additional impact.
Small schools can impact 
the score, but at the same time the score can impact on the school’s scale. For 
example, a small school can in fact benefit the median, but at the same time the 
scale can be a consequence of better families who select small schools for their 
children in order to get personalized teaching in small groups; this way a higher 
score can determine the school’s scale. Within our data set, the school size vari-
able is most affected by endogeneity meanwhile the literature cites school scale 
and class size as the most affected variables.
                                                          
117 Defined as 1 if the student reports to have adequate chair, desk and ventilation and that 
he additionally feels comfortable. Only if all four conditions are fulfilled is the dummy 
1, otherwise 0 is assigned.
118 For details see http://www.mec.gov.py/cms.
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4.6.5 District mean level of health insurance (L)
Our evidence seems to indicate that bad students benefit most from higher dis-
trict levels of health insurance. We cannot, however, understand our quantile 
estimate results in a way that once we increase the health insurance level at a 
given district, students will perform better. We rather should think about it in a 
way that health insurance rates are part of a more favourable learning environ-
ment and contribute to a better performance. So it is not that higher insurance 
rates make poor performance as bad as it is, but that without the positive impact 
of higher insurance rates, poor performance rates would be even worse.
4.6.6 Inequality analysis
Estimating inequality of scores and comparing them with the variation of regres-
sion coefficients by income quantile allows us to understand to what extent dif-
ferentiation by schools and by socio-economic sectors contributes to score’s 
inequality.
Table 4.5: Inequality indicators and regression coefficients for mathematic scores
Inequality Index Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Theil 1 0.04408 0.00659 0.00278 0.00126 0.00125
Theil 2 0.03957 0.00656 0.00277 0.00126 0.00126
Gini 0.15702 0.06499 0.04197 0.0280 0.02811
Spanish speaking teacher 0.80575 0.8656 0.86778 0.88219 0.89165
Classroom conditions 0.84633 0.8825 0.89580 0.90953 0.94688
Small size school 0.17021 0.16318 0.19282 0.26735 0.28568
Source: Own estimates based on joint database EPH 2005 (DGEEC), SNEPE 2003 (MEC) WEI-SPS 2006 
(UNESCO).
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show that, within lower score quintiles, inequality is gen-
erally higher for any inequality indicator we use and inequality generally de-
creases towards higher quintiles. This is entirely true for mathematic scores and 
is true for quintile 1 to 4 regarding communication scores. Nevertheless, we ob-
serve an inequality increase for communication scores in the highest quintile. At 
the same time, regression coefficients of our three selected institutional (school) 
variables are higher for higher quintiles, so they have a bigger impact to increase 
score results.
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Table 4.6: Inequality indicators and regression coefficients for communication scores
Inequality Index Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Theil 1 0.0376 0.0046 0.0026 0.0018 0.0042
Theil 2 0.0337 0.0046 0.0026 0.0018 0.0042
Gini 0.1431 0.0531 0.0400 0.0331 0.0513
Spanish speaking teacher 0.7958 0.8594 0.8703 0.8813 0.9038
Classroom conditions 0.8429 0.8860 0.8981 0.9164 0.9376
Small size school 0.2034 0.2046 0.2012 0.2533 0.2702
Source: Own estimates based on joint database EPH 2005 (DGEEC), SNEPE 2003 (MEC) WEI-SPS 2006 
(UNESCO).
If score inequality is to be reduced most efficiently, considering the com-
plete distribution, increasing scores in lower quintiles, we clearly find the oppo-
site situation here. In a way, learning outcomes even seem to be “regressive”. So 
even if it’s true that improving the impact of our selected variables would have a 
positive effect on scores, we would only reduce inequality if this happens for
low income quantiles, but not for the higher ones. If we improve the impact of 
our institutional variables throughout the complete distribution, inequality might 
even increase or at least remain the same.
4.6.7 Test of robustness
Our reduced form assumes exogeneity of our explanatory variables. Table D.4 
in Appendix shows the results for the mean regressions for the determinants of 
Communication and Math scores based only on household and student charac-
teristics (vectors C and H). By comparing this mean regression with those which 
include additional explanatory variables and with the median quantile regres-
sion, it is clear that vectors C and H are well defined and appear to be robust in 
all specifications.
4.7 Conclusions
The idea that schooling scores depend on a mixture of family background char-
acteristics, ability and school (institutional) variables is quite clear. Regarding 
the issue of intergenerational transmission of inequality in the educational sys-
tem, the most important question would be if and to what extent a better institu-
tional performance of the school service could compensate for problems related 
to family background.
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By providing integral health solutions, minimizing under-nutrition and pro-
viding good conditions in the classroom, training teachers (according to their 
gaps) can impact positively on low and mean learning outcomes, thus contribut-
ing to an improved educational quality and breaking cycles of intergenerational 
transmission of inequality. Increasing learning outcomes for levels above the 
median only strengthens the transmission of inequality. Consequently, the equal-
ity approach should focus on trying to improve the worst scores and our results 
show that this can be reached at a significant level closing teacher training gaps, 
improving classroom conditions and improving health and nutrition.
Score inequality can be reduced most efficiently, considering the complete 
distribution, by increasing scores in lower quintiles. So even if it is true that im-
proving the impact of our selected variables would have a positive effect on 
scores, we would only reduce inequality if this occurs for low income quantiles, 
but not for higher ones. If we improve the impact of our institutional variables 
throughout the complete distribution, inequality might even increase or at least 
remain the same.
To ask education policies to focus their efforts regarding inequality-reducing 
measures on lower income quintiles should not be that difficult, given that an 
important part of students from higher income quantiles are enrolled in private 
education. Any action taken by public policies to reduce inequality will have a 
limited impact regarding its possibility to reduce the intergenerational transmis-
sion of (welfare) inequality, since family background is a much stronger force in 
determining inequality in welfare levels. Nevertheless, since parents’ education 
levels are a much stronger determinant regarding levels of welfare inequality, 
better performing education policies will not have a short term impact. But they 
can have an important long term impact, not only improving test scores but help-
ing students to reach a higher level of education.
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The Basic Model of Decomposition of a 
Distributional Change
The decomposition of a distributional change essentially consists of contrasting 
representations of the income-generation process (evaluating differences in es-
timated parameters) for two different distributions (two points in time) on the 
one hand, and accounting for changes in the joint distribution of endowments, 
on the other. Consider that monthly earnings y depend on hourly wages w and 
monthly hours of work H. Using counterfactual's distributions for hourly wages 
and working hours, estimates of the contribution to the observed distributional 
change  between t and t' due to the change in prices , endowments X, pref-
erences related to working hours , residuals  and possibly of all changes taken 
together may be found through a Oaxaca-Blinder type of decomposition, which 
can be depicted as:
 =  (	£, £) $  (	, ) =  (", ", ", ") $  (, , , )   
This distributional change can be decomposed into price effects , the ef-
fect of changing unobservable factors  (after having changed prices), changes 
in endowments  (after having changed prices and unobservable factors) and 
the effect of changing working hours  (after having changed all other factors). 
The change from the distribution of labour income from t to t' can be defined as:
 = [ (", ", ", ") $  (, ", ", ")] + [ (, ", ", ") $  (, ", , ")]+ [ (, ", , ") $  (, , , £)]+[ (, , , ") $  (, , , )]
Simplifying notation:
 =  ¤(", ", ") +  ¤¥(, ", ")  +  ¤¦(, , ") + ¤§(, , ) (1) 
Equation (1) represents a sequential decomposition of a distributional 
change between t and t' in price, unobservable factors, endowments and working 
hours. This equation does not keep final conditions t' constant in all terms on the 
right hand side (steps for simulations). Nevertheless, with the use of some alge-
bra, this equation can be rewritten as:
 =  ¤§(", ", ") +  ¤(", ", ") +  ¤¥(£, ", ")  +  ¤¦(, , ") + r (2) 
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Where R is the remainder, in other words, R is the distributional change that 
has not been isolated in this multidimensional space. It is possible to observe 
that the first three terms on the right side of equation (2) consider t' as the base 
year. Due to the path dependency property in this decomposition, it is also nec-
essary to calculate all simulated distributions using t as the base year.119
Table A.1: Selected characteristics of the Honduran labour force, 1991-2007
Percentage Annualized rate of change
Year / Period 1991 1999 2005 2007 1991-1999 1999-2005 2005-2007 
Dependency ratio* 
Household - Country Level 0.66 0.62 0.56 0.54 -0.65 -1.63 -2.16
Household - Rural Areas 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.6 -0.51 -1.05 -4.2
Household - Urban Areas 0.59 0.56 0.48 0.48 -0.53 -2.39 0.00
Employment status 
Country Level 
  Wage employment 51.48 53.6 57.18 53.74 0.51 1.11 -3.01
  Self-employment 46.67 40.78 39.62 43.27 -1.58 -0.47 4.61
  Mixed Activities 1.85 5.62 3.19 2.99 25.47 -7.21 -3.13
Rural Areas 
  Wage employment 37.12 42.59 46.94 45.12 1.84 1.7 -1.94
  Self-employment 61.23 53.18 50.43 52.56 -1.64 -0.86 2.11
  Mixed Activities 1.65 4.24 2.63 2.32 19.62 -6.33 -5.89
Urban Areas 
  Wage employment 68.29 64.07 66.6 62.47 -0.77 0.66 -3.1
  Self-employment 29.62 29 29.68 33.87 -0.26 0.39 7.06
  Mixed Activities 2.09 6.93 3.72 3.66 28.95 -7.72 -0.81
Real wages (Lempiras 1999)
Country Level 1,829 2,178 2,277 2,418 2.38 0.75 3.1
Rural Areas 1,321 1,432 1,400 1,508 1.05 -0.38 3.88
Urban Areas 2,424 2,887 3,084 3,338 2.39 1.13 4.12
Note: The indicator of age-dependency used in this table relates the number of individuals aged less than 10 
and of those aged 65 and over to the population aged 10 to 64.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from EPHPM I and EPHPM II. 
                                                          
119 See Bourguignon and Ferreira, in the technical chapter of “The Microeconomics of In-
come Distribution Dynamics in East Asia and Latin America” by Bourguignon et al. 
(2005). In order to keep initial conditions t constant, we use: $ =  ¤§(, , ) + ,, + ¨(,, ) + ©(£ª£ª«)+r.
Carlos Villalobos Barría - 978-3-653-01949-0
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 11:08:12AM
via free access
APPENDICES 137
Table A.2: Gini coefficient for household per-capita income and monthly earnings
Household per-capita income Monthly earnings
Year / Area Country Urban Rural Country Urban Rural
1991 54.01 51.16 49.81 50.80 49.08 49.15
1992 55.29 50.77 51.80 51.30 49.59 47.85
1993 56.32 53.45 53.23 52.86 52.11 49.58
1994 55.49 52.45 54.18 53.60 51.77 53.43
1995 57.36 51.68 56.99 56.04 52.00 57.34
1996 53.72 48.68 51.50 51.47 49.10 50.56
1997 55.36 50.93 52.22 54.06 51.50 53.13
1998 54.58 48.24 53.93 51.69 47.68 52.87
1999 56.68 50.18 54.45 54.52 49.99 55.13
2001 58.01 50.80 54.56 53.36 48.75 51.94
2002 60.06 52.48 59.72 56.26 50.26 56.10
2004 58.90 50.68 58.72 55.99 49.99 58.02
2005 60.92 52.57 61.43 57.00 49.46 60.88
2006 58.71 51.11 58.40 55.15 48.56 58.11
2007 55.73 49.41 54.15 55.01 49.19 55.88
Note: EPHPM 2003 presents a high degree of measurement errors.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from EPHPM I and EPHPM II.  
Table A.3: Pro-poor growth rates, 1991-2007




















10th percentile -16.43 0.52 54.2 -6.93 2.07 3.17 -27.96 0.32 79.35
15th percentile -11.3 -0.19 45.6 -3.04 2.06 5.64 -20.01 -0.78 67.51
20th percentile -8.37 -0.46 39.96 -0.95 1.95 6.9 -15.68 -1.21 59.28
25th percentile -6.38 -0.54 35.9 0.29 1.89 7.7 -12.87 -1.44 53.46
30th percentile -4.93 -0.5 32.72 1.13 1.84 8.19 -10.85 -1.57 49.01
Growth rate (mean) 4.74 2.17 5.46 5.28 2.19 3.83 2.53 1.63 9.53
Growth rate (median) 4.4 0.59 12.98 5.62 1.43 7.47 1.34 -0.93 17.53
Mean perc. growth rate 3.24 0.64 17.82 5.17 1.61 7.15 0.74 -0.76 27.98
Source: Authors' calculations based on EPHPM I and EPHPM II. 
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rate(as % of GDP)
1990 -2.7 -1.7 78.0 111.2 21.2 -3.42
1991 -3.1 -5.6 83.7 116.8 26.0 -3.30
1992 -4.1 -7.6 79.0 117.9 9.1 11.53
1993 -9.0 -8.9 87.4 127.0 13.6 7.44
1994 -10.0 -10.0 89.1 141.7 28.8 -3.27
1995 -4.4 -5.1 96.3 129.9 24.8 1.66
1996 -5.1 -8.3 89.6 130.1 22.9 5.55
1997 -5.6 -5.8 110.8 119.0 22.2 8.00
1998 -7.7 -2.8 113.4 109.0 11.6 17.08
1999 -15.0 -4.5 106.3 104.6 11.5 16.67
2000 -12.5 -7.2 100.0 100.0 30.8 -3.05
2001 -13.2 -6.3 94.8 97.1 8.0 14.51
2002 -12.5 -3.6 92.0 97.0 5.1 16.70
2003 -14.1 -6.7 88.0 98.5 5.7 14.23
2004 -18.6 -7.7 87.2 100.9 6.4 12.61
2005 -18.5 -3.1 87.2 100.7 7.2 10.77
2006 -21.0 -3.7 83.2 98.3 5.3 11.47
2007 -28.0 -9.0 81.6 98.1 6.7 9.36
Note: *2000=100.
Source: Based on Central Bank of Honduras data.
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Table A.5: Percentage contribution of the proximate determinants to inequality changes







Determinant (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a -36.01 -36.01 -36.01 8.84 8.84 8.84 8.84 12.25 12.25 12.25 12.25 12.25
a -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 -0.93 -0.93 -0.93 -0.93 -2.72 -2.72 -2.72 -2.72 -2.72
r 136.57 92.09 -109.5
o 11.08 11.08 1.36 1.36 1.36 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87 -0.87
o -23.49 -23.49 -1.33 -1.33 -42.94 -42.94
t 148.98 92.06 -65.73
u 12.39 11.09 11.09 22.89 22.89 22.89
u 1.83 4.73 4.73 -8.82 -8.82 -8.82
w 134.76 76.24 76.24 -79.8 -79.8 -79.8
rem 13.1 23.7 23.7






 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Note: r is decomposed in o+ o + t as t in u + u + w , o in rem	
 + rem + nrem and nrem
in socnsoc + soc + nsoc.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
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Table A.6: Percentage contribution of the proximate determinants to inequality changes







Determinant (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a 45.3 45.3 45.3 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 -7.84 -7.84 -7.84 -7.84 -7.84
a -3.65 -3.65 -3.65 -9.74 -9.74 -9.74 -9.74 -1.55 -1.55 -1.55 -1.55 -1.55
r -141.6 98.91 -90.61
o -15.91 -15.91 -1.09 -1.09 -1.09 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
o -109.3 -109.3 16.3 16.3 -80.0 -80.0
t -16.41 83.73 -14.96
u -159.27 5.48 5.48 11.2 11.2 11.2
u -12.87 23.1 23.1 -5.8 -5.8 -5.8
w 155.72 55.1 55.1 -20.4 -20.4 -20.4
rem 7.7 4.43 4.43






 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
Note: r is decomposed in o+ o + t as t in u + u + w , o in rem	
 + rem + nrem and nrem in 
socnsoc + soc + nsoc.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
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Figure A.1: Principal Honduran export markets, coffee and bananas, 1991-2007
Figure A.2: Growth incidence curves. Monthly labour earnings, 1991-2007
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Description of the Simulation Procedure
The simulation procedure aims to avoid the possibility that initial conditions 
could drive the characteristics of the simulated distributions (i.e. the respective 
Gini coefficient). In order to achieve this goal, initial parameters’ log normal 
distributions were taken from the observed distribution in Honduras in 1999 and 
2005. Table B.1 shows the mean and standard deviation of the log monthly earn-
ings observed in these years according to EPH 1999 and 2005 in real terms.
Table B.1: Distributional moments of the log monthly earnings, 1999 and 2005 
1999 2005
Distribution mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
Rural area - tradable sector 6.658 1.076 6.158 1.336
Rural area - non-tradable sector 6.848 1.14 7.115 0.988
Urban areas 7.471 0.988 7.537 1.013
Source: Own elaboration based on data from EPHPM I and EPHPM II.
Using these distributional moments, we proceed to generate a randomly 
normal distribution of size N=100,000. We truncate each distribution so that the 
final size of the distribution corresponds to those observed in 1999 and 2005.120
However, for the purposes of this simulation, it was necessary to repeat 
this procedure 100 times. Afterwards, we proceed to replicate tradable, non-
tradable and urban distribution 100 times based on underlying populations of 
size equal to 100,000. Then, by merging tradable and non-tradable distribution it 
was possible to create rural distributions. Subsequently, by merging rural and 
urban distribution, we obtained the distributions at the Country level. As a re-
sult, this simulation creates 100 rural and 100 country-level distributions. The 
procedure follows calculating the Gini coefficient for each distribution and boot-
strapping them 100 times excluding each time the 10% of the observations. Fi-
nally, the reported Gini is the average of the bootstrap Gini coefficients with 100
repetitions. The coefficient of variation of the estimated Gini coefficients does 
not exceed the 0.5%. In other words, the methodology proves to be effective in 
making our results independent of the initial conditions.
                                                          
120 The illustration of these rural distributions can be seen in the right panel of Figure 2.3. 
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Table B.2: Observed and simulated Gini coefficient using observed distributional moments 
reported in Table B.1
Gini coefficient - 1999 Gini coefficient - 2005 0
Distributions Simulated Observed Simulated Observed Simulated Observed
Rural 56.73 55.13 62.4 60.88 5.68 5.75
Country 56.54 54.52 60.29 57 3.75 2.48
Source: Own elaboration based on data from EPHPM I, EPHPM II and random data.
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Table C.1:  Reduced form of the index function, probit ML. Threshold set at 20,000 inhabi-
tants, 2002-2006 (first step) 
Dependent variable: migrant status
Rural-Urban Urban-Rural
Variables \ Model M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Basic education 0.356*** 0.304*** 0.296*** 0.0104 0.0769** 0.0757** 
Secondary education 0.458*** 0.372*** 0.317** -0.0504 0.063 0.0629
Tertiary education 0.573*** 0.424** 0.338** -0.0838* 0.0962* 0.0967* 
Potential experience >5 <11 0.097 0.121 -0.0502 -0.0428 -0.0834 -0.0833
Potential experience >10 <16 -0.168 -0.135 -0.327 -0.0755 -0.136* -0.136* 
Potential experience >15 -0.354 -0.342 -0.551** -0.325*** -0.349*** -0.348*** 
Avg. household education - 0.0236 0.0236 - -0.027*** -0.0262***
Commij  -2.99*** -3.02*** -5.06*** -  -  -  
Rab 1.903*** 1.877*** -0.35 -2.653*** -2.637*** -2.966*** 
Interaction 1 - - 0.237 - - -
Interaction 2 - - 0.303** - - 0.0413
Bi-parental household 0.185** 0.190** 0.225** 0.183*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 
Number of  Children 0.0128 0.0222 0.0294 -0.0859*** -0.102*** -0.103*** 
Mapuche -0.0105 -0.00395 0.0164 0.0026 -0.0121 -0.0148
Female -0.0104 -0.00918 -0.0122 -0.100*** -0.102*** -0.103*** 
Unemp. rates at origin 0.0922*** 0.092*** 0.098*** -0.0270*** -0.027*** -0.027***
Log of population at origin -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.29*** 0.012 0.0201 0.0192
Constant 0.136 0.0477 0.245 -2.344*** -2.234*** -2.229*** 
Regional controls Yes Yes
Observations 36,115 47,452
Non-migrant Population 509,549 4,515,090
Migrant Population 27,285 27,749
Population Size 536,834 4,542,839
F 7.524 7.738 7.342 17.74 18.00 17.97
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: Based on non-enrolled workers 25 years old and older reporting monthly labour earnings in 2006.
Source: Own calculations based on CASEN 2003 and CASEN 2006.
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Table C.2: Wage equations adjusted for self-selection. Movers and stayers. Threshold set at 
20,000 inhabitants using M2 (second step)
Dependent variable: monthly wages (threshold set at 20,000 inhabitants)
Rural Origin Urban Origin
Variables / Migrant status Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
Basic education 0.274 0.110*** 0.241*** 0.138*** 
Secondary education 0.332 0.268*** 0.331*** 0.322*** 
Tertiary education 0.890*** 0.537*** 0.714*** 0.680*** 
Potential experience >5 <11 0.607** 0.153*** 0.0203 0.215*** 
Potential experience >10 <16 0.526* 0.259*** -0.0029 0.363*** 
Potential experience >15 0.523** 0.328*** 0.118 0.447*** 
Average household education -0.0146 0.0382*** 0.0420*** 0.0374*** 
Number of children in household      -0.0173 0.0238*** 0.0459* 0.0403*** 
Mapuche -0.201* 0.0395 0.0963 -0.018
Female -0.387** -0.490*** -0.543*** -0.432*** 
Public sector -0.0695 0.0583*** 0.0474 -0.0225
Rich commune 0.28 - 0.0818 0.271*** 
Rural sector 0.013 0.0970*** 0.0867 -0.0706***
Inverse Mill’s ratio (Lambda) -0.0375 0.285*** -0.0181 0.234*** 
Constant 9.188*** 9.188*** 9.417*** 10.16*** 
Occupational controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectoral controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 36115 36115 47452 87304
Population size 536834 536834 4542839 5523250
Censored population 509549 27285 4515090 473621
F 13.71 293 26.07 419.5
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Based on non-enrolled workers 25 years old and older reporting monthly labour earnings in 2006.
Source: Own calculations based on CASEN 2003 and CASEN 2006.
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Table C.3: Structural form of the index function, probit ML, 2002-2006. Threshold set at 
20,000 inhabitants using M2 (third step)
Dependent variable: migrant status
Rural-Urban Urban-Rural
Variables M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Log-wage differential 3.758*** 4.505*** 4.592*** 3.529*** 3.537*** 3.537***
Log-wage diff. (sq.) -0.128 -0.974** -1.002** 4.48*** 4.59*** 4.59***
Age -0.00591* 0.00289 0.00266 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.0081***
Avg. household educ. - 0.151*** 0.138*** - -0.0198*** -0.0191***
Commij -2.053*** -2.036*** - - - -
Rab 2.126*** 1.795*** - -2.514*** -2.501*** -2.795***
Interaction 1 - - -0.185*** - - -
Interaction 2 - - 0.245*** - - 0.0366
Bi-parental household 0.233** 0.245** 0.261** 0.247*** 0.235*** 0.235***
Number of children 0.0781 0.156*** 0.167*** -0.154*** -0.166*** -0.166***
Mapuche 0.821*** 1.121*** 1.113*** -0.501*** -0.526*** -0.529***
Female -0.45*** -0.55*** -0.55*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24***
Unemp. rates at origin 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.0846*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038***
Log of pop. at origin -0.376*** -0.477*** -0.48*** 0.085*** 0.098*** 0.097***
Constant 1.432 0.829 0.839 -2.896*** -2.852*** -2.849***




Migrant Population 27,285 27,749
Population Size 536,834 4,542,839
F 21.15 30.59 29.41 54.53 51.70 50.30
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Based on non-enrolled workers 25 years old and older reporting monthly labour earnings in 2006.
Source: Own calculations based on CASEN 2003 and CASEN 2006.
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Table C.4: Structural form of the index function, probit ML, 2002-2006. Threshold set at 
40,000 inhabitants using M2 and allowing unemployment (third step) 
Dependent variable: migrant status
Rural-Urban Urban-Rural
Variables M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Log-wage differential 0.725*** 1.210*** 1.265*** 3.380*** 3.792*** 3.792*** 
Log-wage diff. (sq.) 1.237*** 0.769*** 0.715*** 3.988*** 4.119*** 4.119*** 
Age -0.02*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012***
Avg. household educ. - 0.109*** 0.106*** - -0.049*** -0.0480***
Commij -2.66*** -2.608*** - - - -
Rab 2.159*** 2.000*** - -2.948*** -2.917*** -3.12*** 
Interaction 1 - - -0.23*** - - -
Interaction 2 - - 0.24*** - - 0.0241
Bi-parental household 0.298*** 0.344*** 0.356*** 0.282*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 
Number of children -0.0263 0.0327 0.0386 -0.207*** -0.255*** -0.256*** 
Mapuche 0.0117 0.146 0.134 -0.199*** -0.285*** -0.287*** 
Female -0.131** -0.213*** -0.210*** 0.233*** 0.305*** 0.306*** 
Unemp. rates at origin 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.088*** -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.061***
Log of pop. at origin -0.160** -0.231*** -0.230*** 0.0566 0.0896** 0.0890** 
Constant -0.377 -0.737 -0.748 -1.801*** -1.635*** -1.635*** 
Regional controls Yes Yes
Observations 53,005 33,818
Non-migrant Population 1,044,193 4,236,425
Migrant Population 45,008 50,028
Population Size 1,089,201 4,286,453
F 16.56 17.30 18.91 42.20 40.38 38.78
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: Based on non-enrolled workers 25 years old and older reporting monthly labour earnings in 2006.
Source: Own calculations based on CASEN 2003 and CASEN 2006.
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Table D.1: Descriptive quantiles, Mathematics scores
Variable / Quantile 1 2 3 4 5
Mathematics score 7.55 13.01 18.02 22.54 26.65
Father with up to secondary education (%) 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.6 0.58
Mother with up to secondary education (%) 0.52 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.56
Father with up to tertiary education (%) 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07
Mother with up to tertiary education (%) 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08
Good classroom conditions (%) 0.84 0.88 0.9 0.91 0.94
Urban area (%) 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.44
Never failed to be promoted (%) 0.49 0.57 0.63 0.66 0.68
Illness rate < 11 years, last 90 days (%) 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.56
Health insurance rate < 11 years (%) 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.21 0.21
Teacher speaks usually Spanish (%) 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92
Family only speaks Guaraní (%) 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.38
Frequently works for money (%) 0.37 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.19
Frequently absent due to work (%) 0.25 0.2 0.17 0.17 0.15
Low or moderate absence rates (%) 0.52 0.61 0.66 0.68 0.72
Population - extreme poverty (%-district mean) 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17
Population - poverty (%-district mean) 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34
Stunting risk (%-district mean) 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26
Stunting (%-district mean) 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13
Starving risk (%-district mean) 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19
Starving (%-district mean) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
Source: Joint database EPH 2005 (DGEEC), SNEPE 2003 (MEC), WEI-SPS 2006 (UNESCO). 
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Table D.2: Descriptive quantiles, Communication score
Variable / Quantile 1 2 3 4 5
Communication score 6.37 10.54 13.95 17.41 22.1
Father with up to secondary education (%) 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.57
Mother with up to secondary education (%) 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.55
Father with up to tertiary education (%) 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
Mother with up to tertiary education (%) 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09
Good classroom conditions (%) 0.85 0.87 0.9 0.93 0.93
Urban area (%) 0.42 0.48 0.55 0.53 0.46
Never failed to be promoted (%) 0.49 0.55 0.64 0.68 0.68
Illness rate < 11 years, last 90 days (%) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.55
Health insurance rate < 11 years (%) 0.18 0.2 0.23 0.22 0.2
Teacher speaks usually Spanish (%) 0.8 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.93
Family only speaks Guaraní (%) 0.39 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.36
Frequently do paid work (%) 0.36 0.33 0.26 0.22 0.18
Frequently absent due to work (%) 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.16
Low or moderate absence rates (%) 0.55 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.71
Pop. in extreme poverty (% - district mean) 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.18
Population in poverty (% - district mean) 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35
Stunting risk (% - district mean) 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25
Stunting (% - district mean) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13
Starving risk (% - district mean) 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19
Starving (% - district mean) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Source: Joint database EPH 2005 (DGEEC), SNEPE 2003 (MEC), WEI-SPS 2006 (UNESCO).
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Table D.3: Descriptive schooling statistics
Official school age (years) Graduation age Duration 
Pre-school, 2005 5 3
Primary school, 2005 11 6
Secondary school, 2005 17 6
Compulsory education, 2005 14 9
Population (1,000) Male Female 
Pre-school age, 2006 221 213
Primary school age, 2006 429 415
Secondary school age, 2006 408 395
Total population, all ages, 2007 3096 3031
Net enrolment ratio (%) 
Pre-school NER, 2004 29.5 30.4
Primary school NER, 2004 93.6 94
Secondary school NER, 1991 25.6 27
Gross enrolment ratio (%) 
Pre-school GER, 2004 34.1 34.5
Primary school GER, 2004 113.4 109.9
Secondary school GER, 2004 66 67.3
Entrance and transition (%) 
Primary net intake rate, 1991 72.8 71.4
Primary gross intake rate, 2004 117.2 114.3
Primary entrants with ECCE, 2004 74 76.4
Transition rate primary-secondary, 2003 90.3 90.3
Repetition and completion 
Primary repetition rate (%), 2004 7.9 5.4
Secondary repetition rate (%), 2004 1.2 0.6
Survival rate to grade 5 (%), 2003 79.4 83.3
Survival rate to last primary grade (%), 2003 74.4 78.7
Primary completion rate (%), 2004 93.6 95.3
School life expectancy (years), 2004 10.9 10.7
Total public expenditure on education 
As % of GDP, 2003 4.7
As % of total government expenditure, 2003 11
Sources: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, March 2007. 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, January 2008. 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx.
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Table D.4: Baseline OLS regressions. Mathematics and communication test scores, only 
individual and household characteristics
Mathematics Communication
Variable Coefficient std. Dev. Coefficient std. Dev.
Age -0.0489 0.0903 -0.1393 0.0765
Female 0.0343 0.1567 0.2895** 0.127
Perspectives 0.3837* 0.2137 0.6413 0.1605
Secondary Education Father 0.5816*** 0.2187 0.3426** 0.1587
Secondary Education Mother 0.3278 0.2074 0.0515 0.1648
College Education Father 0.0673 0.4047 0.6789** 0.2834
College Education Mother 1.1249** 0.3649 0.4409 0.2886
Parents and Homework 1.3131*** 0.2494 1.1158*** 0.1958
Parents as co educators 1.5672*** 0.4189 0.8424** 0.3414
Family language Guaraní 0.9247*** 0.2928 0.3003 0.2555
Media 0.9263*** 0.1234 0.7751*** 0.0921
Brother 12
	
	 -0.9606*** 0.2726 -0.7655*** 0.216
Constant 14.4317*** 0.9844 12.7322*** 0.8113
N 9.655 9.655
Population Size 120,670 116,145
R2 0.079 0.065
F 9.21 10.63
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Own estimates based on joint database EPH 2005 (DGEEC), SNEPE 2003 (MEC), WEI SPS 2006 
(UNESCO).
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Table D.5: Complete OLS regressions. Mathematics and communication test scores
Mathematics Communication
Variable Coefficient std. Dev. Coefficient std. Dev.
Age -0.0001 0.0889 -0.0837 0.0723
Female -0.145 0.1574 0.1634 0.1279
Perspectives 0.3981* 0.2134 0.633*** 0.1607
Paid Work -0.799*** 0.2552 -0.4069** 0.1882
Unpaid Work -1.3013*** 0.2182 -1.1442*** 0.1672
Secondary Education Father 0.4983** 0.214 0.327** 0.1554
Secondary Education Mother 0.1458 0.2091 -0.042 0.1659
College Education Father 0.0574 0.3875 0.6636** 0.2779
College Education Mother 1.0822*** 0.3532 0.3311 0.2705
Parents and Homework 0.9426*** 0.2429 0.8589*** 0.1922
Parents as co educators 1.4883*** 0.4055 0.788** 0.3424
Family language - Guaraní 0.7621*** 0.2914 0.2751 0.2522
Media 0.738*** 0.1104 0.6185*** 0.0864
Brother / Sister look after -0.8708*** 0.268 -0.6818*** 0.2127
Urban area -0.2817 0.503 -0.0072 0.4222
Public sector -0.591 0.5572 -0.8196* 0.4412
District health insurance rate 2.1826* 1.1345 0.554 0.8475
District sickness rate -4.0249** 1.5734 -3.8469*** 1.3201
District malnutrition rate -5.5158** 2.6295 -2.8985 2.107
School Language 1.2945*** 0.4131 1.0687*** 0.3399
Classroom conditions 1.4993*** 0.3928 0.9436*** 0.3113
Small school 1.1765*** 0.5038 0.4379 0.4323
Alto Paraná -2.5122*** 0.7673 -1.8693*** 0.5929
Caazapá 2.62*** 1.062 1.2282 1.0663
Canindeyú 3.8905*** 1.3961 2.2325* 1.2831
Concepción -1.8352* 0.998 -1.7225** 0.7974
Cordillera -3.4031*** 0.7658 -1.7909*** 0.6714
Misiones -1.9002* 1.0966 -1.1124 0.7932
Paraguarí 1.2318 0.8359 0.703 0.8617
Constant 15.6073*** 1.6811 14.3255*** 1.3302
N 9.444 9.444
Population Size 119,850 115,286
R2 0.895 0.976
F 9.31 9.69
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Own estimates based on joint database EPH 2005 (DGEEC), SNEPE 2003 (MEC), WEI SPS 2006 
(UNESCO).
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Table D.6: Quantile Regression, dependent variable: Mathematics scores
Variable Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Median Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Age -0.11795 -0.06398 -0.02463 0.0658 0.0348
Female 0.08544 0.01587 -0.32642 -0.29627 -0.35571** 
Perspectives 0.30428 0.04793 0.58662** 0.42608** 0.10436
Paid Work -0.823*** -1.0185*** -1.060*** -0.666*** -0.38651* 
Unpaid Work -1.149*** -1.742*** -1.7*** -1.093*** -0.9439***
Secondary Education Father 0.8463*** 0.9744*** 0.644** 0.24883 0.10963
Secondary Education Mother 0.04949 0.28055 0.18983 -0.1551 -0.02582
College Education Father 0.07386 0.40913 -0.12261 0.06102 0.01331
College Education Mother 0.60621 0.92914 1.33207** 0.80413** 0.65121** 
Parents and Homework 0.38122 1.09165*** 1.46262*** 0.79098*** 0.35884** 
Parents as co educators 1.0703** 1.86552*** 1.97967*** 1.02659** 0.69359** 
Family language - Guaraní 0.21789 0.62825** 1.16788*** 0.8589*** 0.3184* 
Media 0.44829*** 0.80482*** 1.10758*** 0.7666*** 0.36665*** 
Brother / Sister look after -0.8226*** -1.03402*** -1.4034*** -0.7638*** -0.28006* 
Urban area 0.04433 -0.09904 -0.46376* -0.36185 -0.5354***
Public sector -0.60093* -0.70235** -0.38606 -0.34692 -0.4966** 
District health insurance rate 2.44264*** 2.20781*** 1.59737** 1.6645** 1.3349*** 
District sickness rate -2.9773*** -3.24105*** -5.0807*** -3.2373*** -2.1414***
District malnutrition rate -3.9** -7.43097*** -5.1694*** -5.3514*** -3.1362***
School Language 1.03103*** 1.33521*** 1.68139*** 1.18315*** 0.932*** 
Classroom conditions 1.47226*** 1.65958*** 1.50929*** 1.811*** 1.21399*** 
Small school 0.49039 1.28924*** 1.88915*** 0.994*** 0.42288** 
Alto Paraná -2.3732*** -3.44164*** -2.9526*** -1.807*** -1.4043*** 
Caazapá 2.77513*** 3.74649*** 2.0866*** 2.251*** 1.6299*** 
Canindeyú 5.20881*** 6.65209*** 3.1254*** 3.3719*** 2.3093*** 
Concepción -1.31932** -1.94716*** -2.903*** -1.2197*** -0.8397***
Cordillera -1.8436*** -3.36033*** -4.039*** -3.8549*** -2.8098***
Misiones -0.85852 -1.65761** -2.5383*** -1.4122** -1.2345***
Paraguarí 0.74857 1.20832* 1.6507*** 1.289*** 0.95563*** 
Constant 8.0354*** 10.298*** 15.387*** 20.307*** 24.923***
Observations 9444 9444 9444 9444 9444
Pseudo R-squared 0.0501 0.0758 0.0803 0.0562 0.0494
Bootstrapped Std. Errors 500 Repetitions
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Own estimates based on joint database EPH 2005 (DGEEC), SNEPE 2003 (MEC), WEI SPS 2006 
(UNESCO).
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Table D.7: Quantile Regression, dependent variable: Communication scores
Variable Q(0.1) Q(0.25) Median Q(0.75) Q(0.9) 
Age -0.16179** -0.2236*** -0.15387* 0.04318 0.04651
Female -0.13539 0.0511 0.34497** 0.26096 -0.12669
Perspectives 0.36665** 0.47409*** 0.65273*** 0.66997*** 0.5685*** 
Paid Work -0.18208 -0.49329*** -0.6348*** -0.5847** -0.16699
Unpaid Work -0.72753** -1.09133*** -1.2991*** -1.21723*** -1.3724***
Secondary Education Father 0.17423 0.31992* 0.43211** 0.20597 0.11052
Secondary Education Mother -0.05242 -0.03494 -0.0441 -0.038 0.11865
College Education Father 1.39227*** 0.66221** 0.5963 0.28684 0.82713* 
College Education Mother -0.1171 0.31959 0.17408 0.97708* 0.53782
Parents and Homework 0.93685*** 0.82595*** 1.2292*** 0.85354*** 0.72083*** 
Parents as co educators 0.63497** 0.91474*** 0.93955** 0.65828* 0.56181
Family language - Guaraní -0.22217 -0.22806 0.18257 0.69842*** 0.90868*** 
Media 0.42372*** 0.56705*** 0.75762*** 0.63904*** 0.60414*** 
Brother / Sister look after -0.6022*** -0.72816*** -0.7869*** -0.52098*** -0.39774* 
Urban area 0.26103 0.30644** 0.40803** -0.33521 -0.6416** 
Public sector -1.0856*** -1.09374*** -0.7622*** -0.83005*** -0.37136
District health insurance rate 1.28362** 1.29047*** 0.4834 -0.89179 0.38528
District sickness rate -2.4927*** -3.17164*** -4.6514*** -4.32255*** -4.8576***
District malnutrition rate -2.33022** -3.20336*** -3.607*** -1.91072 -3.5774*** 
School Language 0.90004*** 1.14141*** 0.89637*** 1.42537*** 1.09077*** 
Classroom conditions 0.80664*** 0.91849*** 1.1247*** 0.97401*** 0.9166*** 
Small school 0.29891 0.33063* 1.10705*** 0.57353** -0.45568* 
Alto Paraná -1.4578*** -1.5737*** -2.1536*** -2.13901*** -1.84683***
Caazapá 1.54704*** 1.27841*** 0.60847 1.6721*** 1.66985*** 
Canindeyú 2.39195** 3.18105*** 1.75381*** 1.62072** 2.11931** 
Concepción -0.47656 -1.25528*** -2.3621*** -2.36516*** -1.83*** 
Cordillera -0.54142* -1.0401*** -1.7501*** -2.80425*** -2.6053***
Misiones -0.20753 -0.73771 -1.535*** -1.05133* -1.19874* 
Paraguarí 0.18046 0.30585 1.00544** 1.07553** 0.79978** 
Constant 8.51413*** 11.46177*** 14.4894*** 17.18069*** 20.96956***
Observations 9444 9444 9444 9444 9444
Pseudo R-squared 0.0406 0.0565 0.0661 0.0558 0.0503
Bootstrapped Std. Errors 500 Repetitions
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Own estimates based on joint database EPH 2005 (DGEEC), SNEPE 2003 (MEC), WEI SPS 2006 
(UNESCO).
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